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This dissertation looks at the work of Phyllis Webb and Daphne Marlatt, two West 
Coast Canadian poets who explored questions of media technologies and trauma violence 
in their work during the latter half of the twentieth century. This thesis takes up 
contemporary phenomenological and feminist analyses of the connections between media 
technologies and trauma, especially war violence, in relation to both the creative and 
practical careers of these two writers. Research into the histories of media technologies 
such as the letter, radio, photography, and television shows how these technologies have 
shaped our experience of violence both globally and locally, from nineteenth-century 
colonial garrisons in Canada to the internment of Japanese Canadians during the Second 
World War to the 1991 Gulf War. Ultimately, this dissertation suggests that these two 
poets offer new phenomenological interpretations of the ways in which media 
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Introduction: Can Media Speak? 
It is the contention of this thesis that media not only make perceptual demands on 
us, on how we process and understand violence in our world, but they also make ethical 
demands. In other words, the perceptual possibilities and constrictions that come with 
each medium also harbour ethical responsibilities and consequences. In Ways of Seeing, 
John Berger argues that the invention of the camera disrupted how we look: “The camera 
isolated momentary appearances and in so doing destroyed the idea that images were 
timeless [. . .] It was no longer possible to imagine everything converging on the human 
eye as on the vanishing point of infinity [. . .] The invention of the camera changed the 
way men saw. The visible came to mean something different to them” (16). As Berger 
does here, many scholars of media trace the correspondence between a specific media 
technology and the emergence of a new form of perception. Berger insightfully notes that 
the photograph was mistakenly thought to “capture” a scene; however, what it truly 
represented was a scene at a specific moment in time, that is, a photograph actually 
captures both a where and a when. Thus, the invention of the photograph as a medium 
reveals that all sight is always time-dependent, always at the mercy of the moment. 
 Berger links this fracturing of the timeless observer to modernist and 
postmodernist ideas about the decentering of perspective and a skepticism toward 
transcendental truth. He suggests that the medium of the camera produces a new 
fundamental relationship to looking that seems to simultaneously usher in and reflect 
these changes in twentieth-century Western philosophy. The camera, for instance, 
challenges the idea of an omniscient “God’s eye” perspective by emphasizing how 




perspective. What is more, for Berger, the new relationship to reality that the camera 
provides is tied up with questions of power and how we understand, or “see,” the past. 
What this ultimately means, then, is that the camera technology, via the new conditions of 
perception that it provides, enables alternative (in this case fractured, destabilized) 
relations to power, or, put another way, the camera enables new ethical potentials. This 
thesis follows a similar trajectory to Berger’s analysis, but it looks at contemporary 
theories of violence rather than modernist and postmodernist theories of truth. I ask 
instead how certain media technologies—the letter, the radio, the photograph, and 
television news—shape and are shaped by feminist and phenomenological philosophies 
of trauma and violence. To investigate sensitive ethical responses to the proliferation of 
media and violence in the twentieth century, this thesis looks at the work of Phyllis Webb 
and Daphne Marlatt, two Canadian poets who are deeply concerned with media and the 
ways in which our intimate relations with each other speak to our obligations toward 
global histories of pain, including war, imprisonment, and suicide. 
 In a 2016 interview with Laura Moss and Gillian Jerome, Daphne Marlatt 
discusses her experiments with the long line or the run-on sentence that appear in Rings 
(1971), Vancouver Poems (1972), and Steveston (1974). A new form of the poetic line for 
Marlatt enables a new kind of perception, which she explains as “the doubleness of how 
we’re situated, both in the present moment and in our harking back to the past (history 
included) or anticipating the future” (260). Marlatt’s poetry shows this sensitivity toward 
the situatedness of perception not only as an aesthetic quality but also as a radical 
reformulation of the ethical obligations of creative work, specifically in the ways in which 




patriarchal Western art. But the “doubleness” of perspective, the resonance between the 
particularities of our context and the historical past, the shifting, uncertain vantage point, 
all also correspond to the fundamental changes in perception and their attending ethical 
implications that Berger notes in reference to the widespread use of camera technology. 
Indeed, one could argue (as the third chapter of this dissertation does) that Marlatt’s work 
is particularly camera-like, especially in the ways that its alternative forms of perception 
work to forge new relationships to the world and those around us, creating new ethical 
possibilities. 
 This thesis takes poetry, and specifically the work of two West Coast Canadian 
poets, Phyllis Webb and Daphne Marlatt, as a sort of “proving ground” for the ways that 
media technologies (such as the letter, radio, photography, and television) articulate, 
reframe, misrecognize, and interrupt how we perceive violence and trauma in our world. 
Part of the dovetailing of poetry with media is due to the poets’ own interests and subject 
matter. For instance, as the first chapter, “Intimations of Grief: Mourning, the Letter, and 
Wilson’s Bowl,” explains, Phyllis Webb’s 1980 book of poetry, Wilson’s Bowl, revolves 
around an intimate exchange through the medium of the letter between two friends in the 
few years before their suicides. Webb herself worked in the medium of public radio for 
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) from the 1950s to the 1970s. She served 
as an executive producer during the conception of the CBC Radio program Ideas in the 
1960s and continued to write and voice radio broadcasts for various CBC programs. The 
second chapter, “Radio in the Dark: Phyllis Webb’s Late Work and the CBC,” covers 
Webb’s work in public broadcasting. As the third chapter details, Daphne Marlatt in 




Robert Minden in order to create a text that is intimately tied to a place (Steveston, a 
Japanese Canadian fishing village south of Vancouver) by combining Marlatt’s poetic 
voice with Minden’s camera-eye. Marlatt’s later war novel, Taken (1996), derives its title 
from the metaphor of “capturing” that is performed both by the camera and by military 
bodies. This novel explores both the 1941 Japanese invasion of Malaya and the spectacle 
of television news that covered the 1990–1991 Gulf War, and it is examined in the fourth 
chapter, “Daphne Marlatt’s Taken, Intimacy, Clarity.” Each chapter focuses on the 
perceptual and ethical implications of particular media that make their appearance as 
points of investigation in the poets’ work. 
On what grounds, one may ask, should these poets be considered together? If we 
were to recover a tradition of women’s poetry in Canada, the lack of which seemed to 
loom like a shadow over Webb’s early work, we would find again and again surprising 
confluences between Webb and Marlatt. They both, of course, are considered regional 
poets of British Columbia since they spent formative years and much of their adult lives 
in the province. Likewise, they both studied at the University of British Columbia and 
were key figures in the consolidation of the anti-nationalist (regionalist), postmodern, 
white-Anglo Canadian literary scene of the ’70s and ’80s. They are probably most 
significant for the ways that they compelled Canadian literary circles to face questions of 
gender and queer ways of being, thus providing the groundwork for the emerging 
landscape of queer and feminist literatures in Canada that has flourished since the ’90s 
and the early years of the new millennium. 
The poets themselves admit a conscious relationship of mutual inspiration. Webb 




“Musing with Mothertongue,” where Marlatt frames the poetic process as “not rational 
but erotic” since it is “a drawing, a pulling toward. A ‘liking’” (54). Webb again dedicates 
the uncollected poem “Following” to Marlatt—the poles of this relationship, then, are 
staged as both “a pulling toward,” an attraction, as well as a mutual “following.” The two 
in fact discuss Webb’s dedication of “Following” to Marlatt in an exchange of letters 
published in a special issue of West Coast Line that focuses on Webb (“Phyllis Webb and 
Daphne Marlatt: A Selected Correspondence”). The utter cordiality, hesitations, and 
goodwill between the two make the exchange somewhat of a comedy of errors, with 
Webb first probing as to whether Marlatt might feel uncomfortable with the dedication. 
The question is asked so softly that Marlatt at first seems to think that Webb had 
eventually decided against the dedication, but finally Webb admits: “I was really 
sounding you out on whether you would want that,” yet also apologizing, since she 
considers it “not a very strong poem compared to” another that she sent along (93–94). 
This brief exchange positions the act of dedication as an offering, but also as a question: 
they both seem to be navigating and diffusing the responsibilities that an offering implies 
toward the receiver. A decade later Marlatt would return the favour in her 1992 poem 
“locative, for Phyllis” (Intertidal 542), which revisits Webb’s Hanging Fire (that 
originally quoted Marlatt) for another offered line: “The proper response to a poem is 
another poem” (Peacock Blue 405). And so the trading of dedications, like the long line 
that they discuss in their correspondence as a potential form of women’s expression,1 is 
not a tallied exchange, but a free and fragile offering, inviting but not demanding another 
 
1 “For me,” says Marlatt, “the long line has much more to do with the body than the ego, 





response. The mechanics of this exchange, an offering that is both an invitation to 
response and a question (“have I given enough?” p. 91), resembles the way that letter 
writing itself unfolds as a medium, which the first chapter of this dissertation further 
explores. In any event, the correspondence of their writing careers goes further than 
simply both being active members in shared Canadian literary circles in the last decades 
of the twentieth century. Through the development of their styles as well as through their 
discussions and interviews, we can trace a conscious and explicit mutual influence, 
especially in their shared search for a distinct women’s poetics. 
The dovetailing of their careers, styles, and values has resulted in several other 
critics analyzing the pair in tandem. Laurie Ricou’s “Phyllis Webb, Daphne Marlatt and 
Simultitude: Journal Entries from a Capitalist Bourgeois Patriarchal Anglo-Saxon 
Mainstream Critic” (1986) refers to a graduate seminar that he led which focused on 
Webb and Marlatt as emblematic voices of a women’s aesthetic, or syntax, in Canadian 
poetry. What is interesting is that Webb’s and Marlatt’s sprawling lines, experiments 
with—or rejections of—punctuation, their halting language, dissolutions of rational 
semantics, all of these qualities seem to indicate for Ricou a particularly feminine or 
feminist style beyond what he considers mere theme or subject matter. Susan Drodge also 
found Webb and Marlatt suitable to consider together, along with the poets Betsy 
Warland and Lola Lemire Tostevin, in a 1996 doctoral thesis titled The Feminist 
Romantic: The Revisionary Rhetoric of Double Negative, Naked Poems, and Gyno-Text. 
Drodge supports the idea that these four writers share what Marlatt herself called a 
“doubleness” toward the literary past and, in particular, the high British Romantic poets. 




reinterprets and, in some cases, iconoclastically transforms the legacy of the Romantics in 
light of new developments in feminist historiography. Again, the connection here is 
predicated on their shared sensibilities in regard to a feminist politics as well as a shared 
aesthetic toward a writing through and of the body. 
In a 2006 dissertation titled Alter/Nations—Long(ing) Poems: Reconfiguration of 
the Nation-Discourse in Experimental Canadian Poetry (1960s–1980s) by Alessandra 
Capperdoni, the two are again brought together, this time along with Roy Kiyooka and 
George Bowering, as poets of the avant-garde who disturb or unsettle a supposedly 
straightforward sense of nationalism and nationality in Canada, Webb particularly for her 
expressions of a queer poetics and Marlatt for her immigrant-outsider perspective. For 
Capperdoni, the queer and the migrant represent two alterities that rupture the dominant 
conception of the national body. However, these two categories, the queer and the 
migrant (or, the colonial in all of its trappings) are generative in experimental writing of 
or against the nation only insofar as they emerge out of a more essential feminist 
landscape: the idea of a “space” for women and women’s desire in Webb, and a thinking-
through of colonial structures by way of various configurations of women’s relationships 
in Marlatt. The feminist sensibilities expressed through their formal experimentalism 
again show the similarities in their writing practices. In these many studies we can also 
see the proliferation of feminist analyses of Webb and Marlatt, striking, perhaps, in light 
of the fact that Webb has been skeptical of the scholarly position that her work represents 
the early days of a stable feminist tradition in Canadian poetry. Webb frequently points 
out that in the early parts of her career she did not have a coherent term like “feminism” 




“feminist” may be anachronistic since the term did not form a large part of her conscious 
lexicon and writing practice. However, when attempting to reconstruct a feminist literary 
history, the unthought or the silenced experience of that marginalization should be 
expected rather than considered an aberration from the norm. That is, that very feminist 
history must necessarily be formed out of those fragments and silences that make up the 
experience of alterity. Thus, this study looks to complicate the scholarly narrative that 
Webb is a career feminist writer by suggesting that gender marginalization is a primary 
referent even for Webb’s early work insofar as that experience of marginalization is part 
of the half-thought, silenced fabric of her poetry and her professional work with the CBC. 
 Phyllis Webb’s own personal history begins in Victoria, BC, where she was born 
in 1927. She attended the University of British Columbia where she studied English and 
Philosophy. At 22 she ran, though unsuccessfully, as a candidate for the provincial Co-
operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF),2 one of a number of labour and social-
democrat parties in BC in 1949 (Wachtel 9–11). Stephen Collis in his 2007 book, Phyllis 
Webb and the Common Good: Poetry/Anarchy/Abstraction, argues that Webb’s 
professional, creative, and personal lives are marked by the oscillations into and out of the 
public sphere that are typified in her entrance into politics as the youngest candidate at 
that time. Her sense of outward duty, the commitment to the “public good” that Collis 
argues underpins much of her professional and creative labour, is hinted at when Webb 
says, in an interview with Anne Munton, that her “one ambition as a teenager was to get 
off the island” and enter the public sphere; however, she mentions with irony that “by half 
way through my life my ambition was to get back on an island” (qtd. in Munton 6–7). 
 




John Hulcoop in his introduction to Peacock Blue: The Collected Poems of Phyllis Webb 
considers this pull back toward the West Coast as both a rooted regionalism and as an 
aspect of a creative vulnerability that animates her work (3). In 1964 she began to work 
on the program University of the Air for the CBC, and in the following year she 
collaborated with William Young to produce the program The Best Ideas You’ll Hear 
Tonight, which would eventually simply be known as Ideas, a program that continues to 
be familiar to daily listeners of CBC Radio One today. She spent time over the years 
travelling abroad, sometimes by way of national awards funding for the arts, to Britain, 
Paris, and San Francisco, though she also lived in Edmonton, Montreal, and Toronto 
before she returned to live in Salt Spring Island, BC (Hulcoop 3–6). 
This image of Webb, endlessly navigating the intersection between being an 
engaged political poet and a private poet-in-crisis, has been put forward in recent Webb 
scholarship by writers like Pauline Butling and Stephen Collis who have convincingly 
depicted Webb beyond the limited set of concerns that ruled early Webb scholarship. This 
early scholarship began with John Hulcoop’s and Helen W. Sonthoff’s formalist and 
bibliographic work in the 1960s and 1970s. Hulcoop provides an informative introduction 
to Webb’s Selected Poems, 1954-1965, in which he outlines a biography of Webb’s life 
until that point and grapples with her difficulties, pessimisms, and disillusionments. In the 
introduction, he remarks that the emergent “world-view” of her poetry “is much bleaker [. 
. .] and more consistently pessimistic” (n.p.) than the views analyzed in his and Sonthoff’s 
earlier critical articles. These earlier studies provide interesting formalist readings of her 
poetry’s images and contradictions, and they lay the foundations for approaching Webb’s 




the end of Webb’s long writing career, her recent critics demonstrate the rich possibilities 
offered by Webb’s poetry that are not taken up in these early studies. Even Sonthoff’s 
“The Structure of Loss: The Poetry of Phyllis Webb” remarks that “the woman ‘weighed 
down by the race of man’” takes on “the shape of fertility and eternity only as it loses, 
must lose, its singular form” (22): in describing the structures of constraint, Sonthoff does 
not connect the images of fertility with a particularly feminist (or even feminine) struggle 
against the “singular form” of lyric subjectivity. This strain of discourse continues even 
recently in Gary Geddes’ 70 Canadian Poets (2014): in providing an introduction to 
Webb, Geddes remarks, “whatever its ostensible content, good poetry is an affirmation of 
the human spirit, of the power of the imagination to confront and reshape reality” (82). 
Webb’s work, as an instance of this prescribed version of “good poetry,” gets stripped of 
its “ostensible content,” that content being the particularities of her voice, the queer, the 
gendered, the white, in order to equalize it with the normative identities of canonized 
writers. The other face of this existentialist vision of Webb is what Stephen Collis 
caricatures as “The distraught, borderline suicidal Sapphic woman poet” (7); in other 
words, this strain of Webb criticism focuses primarily on the aesthetics of 
modernist/postmodernist self-annihilation, and Webb as a key figure who births, as it 
were, Canadian poetry into the new global landscape of postmodern art that was taking 
hold in the mid- to latter-twentieth century. From this perspective, the main concerns of 
interest in Webb’s work are the problems of personal expression, the instability of 
personal identity or the poetic ego, and the afterlife of mythopoeic art. 
In 1997, Pauline Butling’s Seeing in the Dark: The Poetry of Phyllis Webb 




Webb that had begun to emerge in studies by writers such as Smaro Kamboureli, Susan 
Glickman, Lorna Knight, Liza Potvin, and Stephen Scobie. Butling’s approach shares an 
attention to Webb’s aesthetics with the earlier formalist readings, but she deftly argues 
that it is mistaken to read these aesthetics as politically neutral. Webb has spoken 
frequently in interviews about the fact that through most of her writing life she lacked a 
conscious language to consider both a recovered canon of women’s writing as well as 
simply feminist concerns in general. However, Seeing in the Dark, as the title suggests, 
reterritorializes Webb’s aesthetics of dark enlightenment, absence, and alienation, not 
simply as the marginalization of the creative spirit from human activity (an anti-
industrialism familiar to the earlier humanist readings of Webb). Instead, Butling argues 
that Webb’s darknesses and absences are an expression of marginalization from gendered 
structures of power even if that marginalization is buried, especially in Webb’s earlier 
work. The new wave of Webb scholarship that has now followed Butling’s landmark 
study articulates a vision of Webb not as a solipsist, but as politically and socially 
engaged, with a sensitivity, inspired by Butling’s methodology, to the fractured and 
indirect ways that her poetry approaches the public world. Furthermore, Butling reads the 
notion of “Seeing” in relation to Enlightenment knowledge, the poetic observer, and the 
political recognition of marginalization, but not as it pertains to media technologies or 
phenomenological sense-experience. So, although my study intersects with Butling’s in 
their shared attention to sight, we locate its resonances in Webb’s work in quite different 
places. 
The next landmark study in Webb criticism comes a decade after Butling’s and 




Phyllis Webb and the Common Good: Poetry/Anarchy/Abstraction (2007) reads Webb’s 
“dissolution of the lyric ‘I’” (17), a main concern in the earlier formalist scholarship, and 
her turn to abstraction as an expression of anarchist political impulses and not only as 
existential alienation. He argues that her turns inward and her permeable lyric subjects are 
not turns away from political engagement but are instead turns toward a new kind of 
anarchist way of being that is unstable and ruptures the dominant categories of the self 
and the world as inherited from mainstream philosophies like Western enlightenment and 
liberal humanism. He also recovers the strain in her work of what he calls a “Poetics of 
Response,” or, her participation in the dialogic qualities of poetry as a communion with 
other writers in other places and at other times, countering the notion of Webb as a 
solitary and disconnected poet. 
Webb scholarship following Butling’s and Collis’s studies has become 
increasingly diversified and increasingly outward-looking to her social, literary, and 
political contexts. For instance, Butling has also authored what is perhaps an even more 
compelling study of Webb’s historical and social contexts than Seeing in the Dark in a 
2009 paper titled “Phyllis Webb as Public Intellectual,” which situates her avant-gardism 
in relation to the competing nationalist and internationalist impulses of her work with 
CBC Radio in the ’60s and ’70s. From the perspective of the newer ilk of Webb 
scholarship, including Laura Cameron’s, Alessandra Capperdoni’s, and Katherine 
McLeod’s investigations into the question of the archives and nationalist canons in 
relation to Webb, it seems almost incredible that she was ever considered a poet outside 
of the public spotlight. Part of why the early scholarship minimized her public 




the actual realization of that desire, i.e., a disengagement from the public world. Instead, a 
more sensitive reading would note that the desire for privacy emerges out of her over-
engagement with the public world. This contradiction between her public engagement and 
her private self was a paradox that even she remarked on. For instance, in the Foreword to 
her collection of essays and radio broadcast scripts titled Talking (1982), Webb explains, 
“I have always thought of myself as a quiet person, not much of a talker [. . .] but when I 
was putting these radio talks and essays together I realized just how much talking I have 
done in my life. In fact, I have for the most part earned my living by talking” (7). Webb 
appears, then, to be a reluctant public voice, but a public voice that nonetheless intimately 
shaped the landscape of Canadian intellectualism in the ’60s and ’70s. 
It is appropriate, therefore, to consider Webb as a poet always just on the edge of 
the spotlight, her interviews and book reviews for the CBC helping to bolster the 
reputations of more widely known mid-century poets including P.K. Page, Irving Layton, 
Miriam Waddington, Al Purdy, Gwendolyn MacEwen, bpNichol, and Leonard Cohen. I 
am often reminded of a line in Anne-Marie MacDonald’s Fall on Your Knees, which 
speaks about the renown of a lesser-known female jazz pianist, Doc Rose, in the age of 
jazz’s decline: “Rock ’n’ roll reigns and there are fewer gigs now. She has attained that 
thankless high status, to wit: Doc Rose is the jazz pianist most often cited by famous jazz 
pianists as their favourite jazz pianist” (562). Webb, I think, inhabits a similar position, 
being much esteemed by her contemporaries, but never a large figure in the public eye 
and certainly shrinking in the intervening years. She is sometimes considered among the 
other once-UBC-undergraduate poets dedicated to BC regionalism and inspired by Black 




looking in to the more well-known voices like George Bowering, Frank Davey, Fred 
Wah, and even someone like Marlatt, who has her own tenuous connection to the other 
poets of the short-lived TISH magazine. 
But then again, Webb slightly preceded this group, with her inclusion in a book 
titled Trio with Gael Turnbull and Eli Mandel in 1954, followed shortly after in 1956 with 
Even Your Right Eye. These earlier works have mostly been passed over by critics as the 
first experiments of a developing voice still wrapped in the already-aging garments of 
modernism. 1962’s The Sea Is Also a Garden begins to develop her fragile and emerging 
sense of her connection to a gendered literary canon with its explicit invocation of 
William Carlos Williams and an oblique reference to H. D. It ends with the much-
anthologized poem “Poetics against the Angel of Death,” which looks to create a new, 
long, unrestrained line outside of the stifling inheritance of Wordsworth’s grand 
Romantic posturing. This search for a new non-masculinist line came to a peak with the 
publication of her 1965 Naked Poems, sometimes said to be one of the first depictions of 
queer women’s love in Canadian poetry. The fragility and openness of the lines in Naked 
Poems still reads, I think, as radical, and its resonance can be detected in the work of 
Daphne Marlatt, certainly, as well as later writers like Lisa Robertson and Jan Zwicky. 
Though Webb would not publish another book until Wilson’s Bowl in 1980, Laura 
Cameron argues that this fifteen-year gap was a period of fruitful gestation rather than 
one of withdrawal. She spent most of this time working as a broadcaster and as executive 
producer of Ideas, though she also received a grant to begin writing what she imagined to 
be a new, grand, outward-looking book that would focus on the Russian anarchist Peter 




process of failure served as the anchoring point for Wilson’s Bowl. Webb’s lack of 
mainstream recognition, being ‘your favourite poet’s favourite poet,’ was put on full 
display when Wilson’s Bowl failed to even be shortlisted for the 1980 Governor General’s 
Award for English poetry. bpNichol, Margaret Atwood, and Michael Ondaatje 
collaborated to provide what Frank Davey calls a kind of “peoples [sic] poet” award for 
the perceived snubbing of Wilson’s Bowl (the idea coming from an award given to Milton 
Acorn a decade earlier). A number of other poets pitched in for the fund, including the 
winner of the actual 1980 award, Stephen Scobie (who apparently apologized 
“magnanimously” for having won the award over Webb; Davey 235). Strangely, though, 
this repeated alienation from the spotlight seems to be almost an aesthetic for Webb’s 
appeal, as her selected poems titled Vision Tree would finally win the 1982 Governor 
General’s Award. She would go on to experiment with the Arabic form of the ghazal in 
Water and Light: Ghazals and Anti Ghazals (1984), perhaps searching for expression 
beyond her inherited Anglo-Western tradition. She finally would experiment even further 
in 1990’s Hanging Fire with ghazals, prose, and concrete poetry, which Stephen Collis 
considers as a move toward abstraction and the ultimate anarchist self-sacrifice of poetry 
altogether: silence. Punctuated between and after these major works were of course 
Webb’s minor publications, often for celebratory occasions or activist groups, such as 
“Prison Report” which was written for Amnesty International in 1982, as well as prose 
volumes such as Talking (1982) and Nothing but Brush Strokes: Selected Prose (1995). 
Unlike Webb, Daphne Marlatt was not originally born on Canada’s west coast. 
Instead, she followed a winding road of displacement during her childhood years that 




to Canadian identity as she grew up. She was born in Melbourne, Australia, in 1942 to an 
English family, but from ages three to nine they lived in Penang, at the time still a British 
colony, in what was then known as the Federation of Malaya. After this, the family 
moved to another coastal island, Vancouver, where she navigated growing up as 
something of an outsider in Canada (Marlatt, “Entering In: The Immigrant Imagination”). 
Like Webb, she attended UBC, where she earned a BA in 1964, and was a part of the 
budding Vancouver literary scene that developed with the 1963 Vancouver Poetry 
Conference and the TISH literary magazine, though she has also been involved with other 
literary publications, including periodics, Tessera, Island, West Coast Review, and 
Capilano Review. She received an M.A. in comparative literature from Indiana University 
in 1968, and over the course of her career she has continued to make an impact in the 
academic worlds of literature and feminism in addition to her creative work. This acumen 
for high scholarship informs the developments of and experimentations in her creative 
work, and perhaps contributes in part to why her work has received so much critical 
attention. 
Marlatt first published a novella in 1962 titled The Sea Haven, followed by 1968’s 
Frames of a Story, an experimental verse retelling of Hans Christian Andersen’s fairy tale 
“The Snow Queen.” We can already see in these early works some of the primary 
references that continue to define much of her creative work throughout her career, 
mainly the attraction to pelagic metaphors as well as the uncertain blending of forms, 
rupturing the dichotomies between poetry and prose. Susan Holbrook notes that in 
Frames of a Story “the frames of form and genre start to flex” as poetry blends into prose, 




lined leaf leaf/s in 1969, followed by the billowing prose-poem Rings in 1971, which 
recounts her struggles during childbirth and as a mother, themes that would crop up again 
in her landmark experimental novel Ana Historic in 1988. In the interim she published a 
number of widely acclaimed collections, such as Vancouver Poems (1972), Steveston 
(1974), which is the focus of this dissertation’s third chapter, How Hug a Stone (1983), 
and Touch to My Tongue (1984), among several others. She also collaborated on two 
aural history projects, Steveston Recollected: A Japanese-Canadian History and Opening 
Doors: Vancouver’s East End in 1975 and 1979, respectively, the first of which served as 
a point of departure for her poetic exploration of the town in Steveston. 
In addition to the blending of form, Marlatt also blurs the idea of authorship in her 
various collaborations, which can be read as a feminist reconfiguration of literary 
ownership and community. For instance, the poems in Steveston also resonate with 
photographs by Robert Minden, who was part of the team that created the aural history 
book Steveston Recollected. Her historical collaboration continued with her co-editing of 
Opening Doors with Carole Itter. She also worked in a reciprocal relationship of 
translation with the French Canadian poet Nicole Broussard in Mauve (1985) and 
Character/Jeu de lettres (1986). Marlatt would go on to push the boundaries of intimate 
collaboration with Betsy Warland in 1988’s Double Negative and 1994’s Two Women in 
a Birth. Double Negative is truly collaborative for the fact that it utterly ruptures any 
critical attempt to distribute specific authorship, so much so that this blurring resulted in 
its absence from Intertidal, an anthology of Marlatt’s early poetry. 
Marlatt’s somewhat more recent engagements with the novel show her continued 




aforementioned Ana Historic combines prose poem elements with a disjointed narrative 
of mother-daughter lineage all set on the backdrop of a feminist recontextualization of 
how we come to know historical data. Taken, a novel published in 1996, leans more 
explicitly on conventional prose, yet it still displays the lyric acuteness of the prose poem. 
It explores the resonances between sites of violence over time and over vast distances, 
from the 1941 Japanese invasion of Malaya to the 1991 Gulf War. The fourth chapter of 
this dissertation investigates Taken and its exploration of media during wartime in detail. 
Marlatt’s The Given from 2008 picks up on the unfolding of a non-linear novelistic 
narrative in prose verse that she developed in Ana Historic and to a lesser extent in Taken. 
Critics must, though, take into account the deliberate deconstruction of the demarcation 
between poetry and prose in Marlatt’s fiction. In the end, it may be altogether misleading 
to imagine Marlatt as engaging in two distinct modes of creative work. One may find that 
Ana Historic looks a lot more like Rings than it does Taken. 
In terms of critical research dedicated to Marlatt’s work, the discipline is simply 
overflowing with perspectives, much different from what we find in Webb scholarship. 
Many readings, particularly those in the 1970s to 1990s, consider Marlatt’s poetry in 
terms of regional expression, the Black Mountain concept of the proprioceptive, her 
relationship to the other TISH poets, and her curious formal expression of a self-in-
process. The focus of scholarship from the ’90s and on has been her emerging and 
shifting feminisms and queer poetics, with some attention to her environmentalism as an 
extension of her feminist politics. Since these innumerable critical perspectives would not 
receive fruitful and just attention in toto in these pages, I will mainly focus on the strain 




analysis of media begins with phenomenology’s understanding of perception, a concept 
necessary to this dissertation’s readings of Steveston and Taken. 
 Phenomenology has long been considered a guiding reference point for Marlatt’s 
work, especially in scholarship on her early poetry, the influence of Charles Olson, and 
her envisioning of the proprioceptive (a poetic style that emphasizes the perspective of a 
consciousness at the centre of a moving world). For instance, in Frank Davey’s From 
There to Here (1974), he says that “The phenomenological method of Frames results in 
some extraordinarily elaborate and detailed evocations of consciousness,” and that leaf 
leaf/s “similarly emphasizes the pre-reflective aspects of consciousness” (194). According 
to this conception, Marlatt’s work instantiates the attentive eye of the poet, universal in 
the sensitivity of its gaze (it is, after all, “pre-reflective”), yet highly local in its devotion 
to regionalism and the politics of place. Similarly, Douglas Barbour in “The 
Phenomenological I: Daphne Marlatt’s Steveston” (1978) calls this “the post-modern, 
phenomenological thrust of Steveston, that it not only shows process but makes of the 
poetic act and the act of reading the poem processes of engagement with the lived world 
of Steveston as it stands” (187). Barbour does mention the political dimensions of 
Steveston, insofar as the phenomenological perceiver is involved with and constitutes the 
material world that it encounters. He says, “It is, in a non-didactic sense, a political poem, 
but its politics naturally emerge from the processes it records” (183). The ethics of 
phenomenology in this characterization of Marlatt’s early work seem Heideggerian in that 
they emerge out of the primary demand to attend to the world as it is, the “processes of 




primary duty of the artist, to attend to the world, as well as a treatise on our obligation to 
attend carefully to the world in this way. 
 However, Lorraine Weir in “Daphne Marlatt’s ‘Ecology of Language’” (1989) 
makes a convincing case not only that critics have overstated the extent to which 
Marlatt’s work is primarily phenomenological but also that this categorization is 
coterminous with a misrecognition of the queer feminist politics and poetics that steadily 
crystallized over the course of Marlatt’s early career. As Weir puts it, “To assume that 
pre-1984 Marlatt [before Touch to My Tongue] is ‘lyrical’ and ideologically neutral is to 
subscribe to the colonizing hypothesis of those who have attempted to typecast Marlatt as 
a ‘phenomenologist,’ and to relegate her to the role of bright observer of man’s world” 
(63). Although the early scholarship on Marlatt as a phenomenologist does offer some 
ways in which this “bright observer” is engaged in the ethical responsibilities of the artist 
to attend to the world, Weir urges us to consider feminist and queer politics as primary (if 
less explicit) referents even of the pre-1984 period. Weir points out, crucially, that 
traditional phenomenology tends to universalize both the poet and the subject matter. This 
dissertation explores the possibility of reinterpreting phenomenology in light of these 
feminist critiques in order to recover a way of reading media that does not universalize—
and thus dilute—the queer feminist politics of the text. 
 Weir’s argument seems to anticipate the critiques that recent materialist feminists 
have broadly levelled at phenomenology. Claire Colebrook, for instance, argues that 
phenomenology tends to reduce gender difference to alterity in general, and thus should 
be abandoned in favour of a materialist approach that asserts the irreducibility of gender 




Simone de Beauvoir and Luce Irigaray. She suggests that feminist phenomenology may 
be able to undergo a similar turn as materialism in order to recognize the unassailability 
of gender difference not as one instance of alterity among many but as a distinct “horizon 
of sense” (478). In re-reading Irigaray, van Leeuwen suggests that our sense-making 
capacities are not composed before what she calls sexuate difference, but are instead 
mutually conditioned by that difference: “rather than a foundationalist appeal to sexuate 
difference, I will suggest that what is at stake in [Irigaray’s] text is the attempt to think the 
appearance of sexuate difference as coextensive with the disclosure of a world that is not 
one” (480; original emphasis). The “world that is not one” radically departs from 
traditional phenomenology, which asserts that an attention to the processes of our 
encounter with the world can reveal universal truths regarding the structures of our 
perception. Instead, van Leeuwen argues that gender difference emerges as an irreducible 
form of inquiry as soon as one recognizes “the otherness of the other” (480). The 
irreducible ambiguity of gender difference means that a universal phenomenological 
observer cannot exist, and that we live not in a singular world but many worlds, each 
constructed by the senses—or gazes—conditioned by various alterities. Marlatt’s 
Steveston and Taken, for example, measure and refract these many, ambiguous gazes 
against each other: the gaze of the colonizer, the gaze of the displaced, the gaze of the 
photograph and the photographer, and more. What van Leeuwen’s articulation of feminist 
phenomenology provides is a way of reading how these gazes work to constrict and 
constrain an Other, and what kinds of encounters other gazes—queer, feminist, 
motherly—can offer. Thus, I argue that new turns in materialist feminisms, which 




Marlatt’s work as phenomenologically inflected without falling victim to the errors that 
Weir points out, since Marlatt is, in the end, not a traditional phenomenologist. 
This dissertation’s methodologies were chosen in order to distill the connections 
among trauma, war, media technologies, and the histories of violence in Canada. This 
thesis begins within the prevailing methodologies of phenomenology, namely Emmanuel 
Levinas’s ethics of the Other, because it provides a hinge point between media—
extensions of the senses—and ethics. Levinas argues that the most basic condition of our 
existence is not the Cartesian ego but instead the relationship between the self and the 
Other and its attendant ethical responsibilities. The first chapters begin by reading 
violence within the framework of Levinas’s ethics, which calls us to care for the Other 
because of the mediated gaze between the self and the Other, a gaze that brings both 
compassion and radical alterity. In teasing out Webb’s and Marlatt’s articulations of 
intimacy and care, this dissertation eventually finds that the terms of Levinas’s traditional 
phenomenology, which have been so fundamental for theorists of violence and ethics like 
Judith Butler, may be untenable for a full apprehension of the material experience of 
trauma. The fourth chapter, then, provides a prolonged argument that attempts to show 
how feminist materialist criticisms can be incorporated into a new feminist 
phenomenology. The dissertation ends by exploring the relationship between feminist 
phenomenology and Webb’s and Marlatt’s articulations of hurt, ultimately finding that 
feminist phenomenology may help us to see more intimately the violences of the past. In 
order to make use of methodologies that are themselves the subject of contestation and 
scrutiny, this dissertation takes up an interdisciplinary approach, thinking through the 




In terms of trauma studies, if we can even speak about a coherent and proper 
discipline at all, this dissertation takes a skewed rather than a traditional approach—since 
oblique and unlikely connections are at the heart of trauma’s unfolding, perhaps we 
should expect a critical discourse to match. Broadly speaking, trauma studies traces its 
roots to a set of supposedly canonical texts written around the 1990s by scholars such as 
Cathy Caruth, Dominick LaCapra, Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub, and Judith Herman. 
These early canonical theorists generally take as paradigmatic the case of the Holocaust 
in conjunction with Sigmund Freud’s study of the unfillable void of loss in their 
theorization of the mechanics of trauma. We can see these two poles—the Holocaust and 
Freud—defining many of these texts: Caruth’s Unclaimed Experience begins with an 
analysis of trauma in Freud’s Moses and Monotheism; LaCapra’s “Trauma, Absence, 
Loss” compares post-apartheid South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission to 
Germany after the Holocaust; and Herman’s Trauma and Recovery transforms Freudian 
psychoanalytic concepts of melancholy and loss into contemporary medicalized and 
psychiatric discourse. These early conceptualizations of trauma include a number of ideas 
about trauma that have since come under scrutiny, including the central figure of the 
cataclysmic and singular event, the fragmentations of the psyche, the ensuing period of 
silence, and the eventual bearing of witness. 
Two early studies near the tail end of this formative period seem to anticipate the 
recent calls for a rethinking of trauma studies, Kalí Tal’s Worlds of Hurt and Felman’s 
The Juridical Unconscious. Both texts, surprisingly or not, begin with Holocaust 
memorialization, but their analyses focus on the ways in which the Holocaust has been 




Holocaust (6), a process that serves not only to stage all knowledge of trauma around a 
specific event but also to evacuate that event of its historical particularities and its 
ongoing afterlife. Furthermore, both texts call for a reassessment of how we understand 
gendered violence in relation to trauma in general, and Tal makes the point that gendered 
violence—especially domestic violence in American families—is often a manifestation of 
intergenerational war trauma (particularly in the families of former U.S. soldiers deployed 
in Vietnam); thus, instances of gendered violence are not exceptions to—or minor forms 
of—the paradigmatic case of the PTSD war veteran, who stands in as the prototypical 
trauma victim in U.S. cultural consciousness (156–60).  Both texts begin, much like the 
canonical works, with a grappling with the Holocaust, but only to critique its cultural 
misuse and its primacy in popular conceptions of trauma. Felman’s book is especially 
informative for my project, since in its thinking about public dramatizations of trauma 
and the law (the Nuremberg trials, the Eichmann trial, and the O.J. Simpson trial), the text 
uncannily finds itself contending with media studies and television broadcasts. This 
dissertation attempts to trace out a web of surprising confluences among its core theorists, 
and Tal and Felman are two scholars who offer a bridge between foundational trauma 
studies and the newer attention to gendered and colonial trauma. 
In recent years there has been widespread agreement among the most innovative 
trauma scholars that the early “canonical” studies suffer from Western biases in their 
readings of trauma.3 Succinctly articulating this growing dissatisfaction with early trauma 
studies, Stef Craps describes the problem as an unrecognized conflation of Western and 
 
3 See scholars such as Jill Bennet, Rosanne Kennedy, Richard Crownshaw, Michael 




modernist values with a wider psychological experience: “they tend to take for granted 
the universal validity of definitions of trauma and recovery that developed out of the 
history of Western modernity, [and] they often favour or even prescribe a modernist 
aesthetic of fragmentation and aporia as uniquely suited to the task of bearing witness to 
trauma” in addition to focusing almost exclusively on traumas experienced by majority 
cultures in the West (2). Thus, if one were to look for typical trauma readings in the pages 
of this thesis—such as psychoanalysis or the schema of the witness, the perpetrator, and 
the survivor—one may come away disappointed. I look to articulations of fragility and 
loss outside of these canonical modes in an attempt to meet the urgent challenge to do 
away with the Eurocentric, universalized conceptions of trauma. Inspired by Tal’s and 
Felman’s insights, this thesis attempts to trace out connections between trauma and its 
closest companion-disciplines, feminism and media studies. 
Consequently, this thesis also draws on communications and media studies. Since 
each chapter analyzes a particular media technology—from the letter to radio, 
photography, television, and back to the novel—scholars of specific media technologies 
and histories of media, such as Kym Brindle and Jason Loviglio, were necessary. 
Additionally, broader media studies scholars such as Marshall McLuhan, Susan Sontag, 
Mona Oikawa, and Paul Virilio were chosen in order to inform how the inherent “gazes” 
of particular media technologies impact our encounter with others and with violence. 
Furthermore, in order to account for historical traumas, such as the third chapter’s focus 
on Japanese internment in Canada, I make use of scholars of historiography, such as John 
Michael and Hayden White, to suggest that the inherited modes of encountering history 




The dissertation begins with Webb, whose writing career starts and ends earlier 
than Marlatt’s. The first chapter, titled “Intimations of Grief: Mourning, the Letter, and 
Wilson’s Bowl,” analyzes Webb’s preoccupation with the form of the letter and argues 
that it provides a structure for intimate, dialogic poetic response. It places Webb’s 
explorations of grief in Wilson’s Bowl as well as some uncollected poems into 
conversation with Levinas’s theory of the vulnerability of the Other. This chapter lays 
some foundations for understanding the connection between media studies and 
phenomenology: it argues that a phenomenological reading of media demands that we 
account for the ethical responsibilities that are placed on us as soon as we encounter the 
Other, and that that encounter is always mediated. However, that mediation, whether 
through the letter, the radio, or the slot in a prison cell, may more or less severely inhibit 
the potential for our full encounter with the Other. This mediation of our perceptions can 
be tracked especially in Wilson’s Bowl since it attempts to think through the connection 
between her friends’ suicides and global atrocities. 
The second chapter, “Radio in the Dark: Phyllis Webb’s Late Work and the 
CBC,” looks at Webb’s involvement with the CBC, from being an executive producer on 
the radio program Ideas to writing and conducting reviews about and interviews with 
intellectuals and Canadian literary celebrities on CBC Radio. It puts her radical 
intellectual work in context with the nationalizing influence of radio in the mid-twentieth 
century in Canada, and then turns to the ways that this jostling between impulses toward 
and away from the nation as a site of colonial influence appears in her later work, 




in Canada, and it reflects on the afterlife of this history as it relates to the later period of 
her work. 
The third chapter, titled “Labour and the Lyric Camera: (Re)viewing Robert 
Minden’s Photographs in Steveston with Daphne Marlatt,” examines Minden’s 
photographs in the collaborative book Steveston. It argues that the camera lens offers 
various ways of viewing its so-called “subjects,” with some of those ways housing the 
potential to recommit historical traumas, particularly the internment of Japanese 
communities in Canada during the Second World War. However, the chapter suggests 
that some photographs bear a lyrical style of perceiving the Other, which results in an 
alternative way of apprehending the traumas of the past outside of dominant narratives of 
memorialization. Thus, a particular kind of photographic perception, one that depends on 
Marlatt’s lyrical eye in Steveston, enables a reinvigorated encounter with the Other that is 
not otherwise possible. 
The final chapter, “Daphne Marlatt’s Taken, Intimacy, Clarity,” returns to the 
question of phenomenology in regard to the novel’s exploration of photography and 
television news as they pertain to family histories and the spectacle of the 1991 Gulf War. 
It argues that the novel affirms new potentials for an encounter with the Other; these 
potentials are predicated on women’s relationships, both between mothers and daughters 
and between queer lovers. Thus, the chapter finds, especially in light of new 
developments in materialist feminisms, that the received logic of phenomenology is 
inadequate to register these new forms of ethical responsibility. 
The dissertation discovers, then, that among the noise and distractions of media, 




most intimate encounters with those closest to us. This study attempts to develop a 
grammar of mediation that can articulate when media work to confound that signal, 
especially as a reproduction of colonial violence, and when they can clarify our 
obligations to those most vulnerable in our world. In the end, this thesis explores new 
ethical potentials in Webb’s and Marlatt’s work which are outside the bounds of 
Levinas’s phenomenology due to developments in the intervening years both of media 





Chapter 1: Intimations of Grief: Mourning, the Letter, and Wilson’s Bowl 
 Although Phyllis Webb’s 1980 book Wilson’s Bowl was originally conceived as a 
“beautiful anarchist dream poem” dedicated to Peter Kropotkin (9), it would eventually 
become a memorial to personal and global loss. In an essay titled “A Correspondence,”4 
Webb discusses the people on whom Wilson’s Bowl is based. Webb remembers her friend 
Lilo Berliner through Berliner’s letters to Wilson Duff, an anthropologist who studied 
Indigenous art of the West Coast. Berliner would eventually name the Haida rock bowl 
after Duff, and this rock bowl would go on to serve as the title and the guiding symbol of 
Webb’s Wilson’s Bowl. From 1973 to 1975, Berliner and Duff kept up a correspondence 
about the connection between Indigenous myths and art, moving in their dialogue 
between the psychoanalytic, the poetic, the transcendental, and the personal. From initial 
letters between two mutually interested students of art who had never met, their exchange 
developed into an intimate dialogue, both requiring and giving “‘All my love’” (Talking 
146); to quote Berliner’s last letter, “‘writing to you is my best Christmas present to 
myself’” (147). Although their correspondence became unflinchingly affectionate, and 
despite the fact that Berliner attended Duff’s exhibitions, the two never met in person. In 
fact, when their letters ceased, their last form of communication came not in writing but 
in the material actions that Berliner took when she learned that, in August, 1976, Wilson 
Duff had shot himself in his office at the University of British Columbia. After Berliner 
dedicated the rock bowl to Duff and left all of his letters on Webb’s doorstep, as Webb 
recalls, “In January, 1977, thinking of the bowl, of Wilson, ‘my twin,’ and having plotted 
with the full moon, she walked into the sea” (131). 
 




 Why, if Berliner and Duff shared such a profound intimacy as well as a 
professional interest, did they never meet? What is it about the medium of the letter that 
allows such strangers to, paradoxically, collapse social and personal distances in addition 
to geographic ones? How and why does loss make itself felt in such a tender way through 
the mediation of the letter, and how does this felt register—loss, mediated—overwrite 
Webb’s original “anarchist dream poem” to turn it into something that approaches an 
elegy? 
 Wilson’s Bowl originally came out of a research grant that Webb proposed in 1967 
in order to study and complete a book of poetry about the Russian anarchist Peter 
Kropotkin. As Webb recounts in the Foreword to Wilson’s Bowl, she originally planned 
for the collection to draw together “the ‘body politic’ and ‘love’s body’ as 
interchangeable polymorphous analogues in an ideal world” (9). After the diminutive and 
minimalist Naked Poems in 1965, it seems that Webb felt her next project failed due to its 
excess: she calls it “Too grand and too designed” and “perhaps too big and too weak for 
me” (9). In characteristic Webb fashion, that prepositional phrase, “for me,” does more 
than reveal her failures. It also posits that “The Kropotkin Poems” exist in a Platonic, 
ideal plane as she first imagined them; she was simply unable to access and write them, 
since she was too small, too muddled, and not up to the task of bearing—or baring—their 
weaknesses. “For me” indicates that there may be another, grander (or simply more self-
assured) poet who could serve as medium to write “The Kropotkin Poems.” The issue at 
stake here seems to be her inability to translate the ideal of “The Kropotkin Poems” onto 
the page, that is, to mediate between the imaginative world and the material one. As the 




immanent, which is to say, the ethical problem of mediation, expresses itself in Wilson’s 
Bowl as loss. 
 In the following pages, I want to develop the connection between media theory 
and the moral philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas’s philosophy has been 
instrumental for trauma theorists like Butler because it allows us to have compassion for 
an unknowable Other, such as, for instance, someone whom violence has rendered 
unrecognizable. Since we can perceive nothing about the Other except for the possibility 
of its loss, Levinas says that in this vulnerability we are compelled to care for the Other. 
This section argues, first, that all perception is always mediated, and, second, that 
mediation always enters us into an ethical relationship. This argument then returns to 
Wilson’s Bowl via the mediation of letter writing. The frame narrative of Webb’s book, 
the intimacy between Berliner and Duff that becomes an intimacy with the poet, depends 
upon the mediated relationship of letter writing. This epistolary conversation compels the 
recipient: it compels a response, a correspondence; it compels an affect, an identification 
with the voice of the letter; and, as I will argue, it compels a moral response, an ethics of 
letter reading. Furthermore, as Wilson’s Bowl oscillates between the intensely personal 
and the global, as letter writing becomes poetry, this ethical relationship of mediation 
serves as a First Principle upon which the book builds a vision of global care. 
In Phyllis Webb and the Common Good, Stephen Collis first connected Levinas’s 
ethics to the social commitments of Webb’s poetry, what he calls her “poetics of 
response” (27). This chapter reinterprets Webb’s connection to Levinas and arrives at a 
different conclusion regarding how she is situated in relation to the modernist 




“Because there are others—there are poems because there are other poems—and poetry is 
a responsibility for and toward the other, a responsibility to respond” (31; original 
emphasis). For Collis, the literary response maps onto the ethical responsibility. In 
Collis’s analysis of Webb, writing is essentially a moral task in that it is guided toward an 
Other to whom we are compelled to respond. Collis conceives of Webb’s theory of 
writing as a writing-with that is also a being-with others. Writing-with, Collis suggests, 
begins for Webb as “the response of modernist allusion and quotation” (20). Writing-with 
then becomes a conversation, what he terms “the response capacities of poem-to-poem” 
(20). Finally, it is a response in the abstract, “to the very otherness of language itself” 
(20). Collis understands Webb’s writing career to have moved from the uprooted 
traditions of modernism into the “play” of postmodernism, with a final gesture toward 
abstraction and silence. In a sense, this chapter will be “writing-with” Collis’s abstract 
reading of Levinas in Webb’s work. As a departure from Collis’s focus, I would instead 
like to re-read Levinas’s ethics and ground it in media theory in order to demonstrate that 
Wilson’s Bowl repudiates the writing-with of the modernist tradition. This chapter 
suggests that, from the dialogic properties of the letter itself, a more bounded and 
personal being-with arises. 
Webb’s poem “Prison Report,” which features a political inmate who struggles to 
be with another, typifies the connection between violence, Levinas’s ethics, and 
perception in her poetry of the 1970s and 1980s. It was published independently in 1982 
(and contemporaneous to Wilson’s Bowl). “Prison Report” was written in an awareness 
effort for the non-governmental organization, Amnesty International, and focuses on 




by the Argentinian military junta for reporting on missing and imprisoned persons in 
Argentina (Rein and Davidi 2). Timerman’s crime was that he gave voice to the people 
who were silenced by the military’s violence, so the regime turned the same muzzling 
violence back onto him. Although Timerman was freed and subsequently exiled to Israel 
by the time the poem was published, the poem allows the reader to be with him in solitary 
confinement, and, by extension, to be with the countless others in extra-judicial prisons 
whom as a journalist Timerman nevertheless attempted to recount. 
In solitary confinement, Jacobo Timerman sees another prisoner being held 
captive: 
The eye of Jacobo Timerman looks through the hole and sees 
another eye looking through a hole. 
 
These holes are cut into steel doors in prison cells in Argentina. 
 
Both eyes are wary. 
They disappear. 
 
Timerman rests his cheek on the icy door, 
amazed at the sense of space he feels – the joy. 
 
He looks again: the other’s eye is there, 





Comes back, goes, comes back. 
 
This is a game of hide-and-seek. 
This is intelligence with a sense of humour. 
(“Prison Report” ll. 1–12) 
This poem has Webb at her characteristic playfulness, the mixing of the, as she puts it, 
“dark” (l. 29) situation of the prison with the very human game of hide-and-seek. The 
poem offers the prisoners some recovery of a human connection even in solitary 
confinement. That connection, however, seems fundamentally ambiguous: the false starts, 
the muffled dialogue, the restricted vision all suggest failures to communicate, yet the 
poem ends hopefully, “saying, / I am with you” (ll. 31–32). We are left to wonder: does 
their mutual hope stem from the other? Or does it emerge primarily from their connection 
to the game itself? And what is the nature of the game, which seems only to function as a 
result of their bodily deconstruction, an eye, a nose, “parts of bodies, parts of speech” (ll. 
29–30)? What kind of ethical relationship emerges out of their restricted vision, this 
parody of the blazon? 
 The structure of “Prison Report” moves from the material conditions of 
Timerman’s isolation to a final pronouncement of intimacy: “I am with you” (l. 32). The 
game seems to allow Timerman to transcend the immanent conditions of his 
imprisonment. As I have discussed, the Foreword to Wilson’s Bowl hangs on a distinction 
between an ideal poetic vision and its immanent artistic representation. I would like to 
characterize this tension between the ideal and the material in Webb’s work as a problem 




toward an ideal intimacy emerges out of this game of looking, this restricted encounter 
between two prisoners. As I will later argue, the intimacy in “Prison Report” does not 
happen despite their restricted gaze, but because of it. Just like the fated connection 
between Lilo and Duff, restricted only to letter-writing, I am suggesting ways in which 
mediation opens new forms of connection, intimacy, and ethics in Webb’s poetry. 
This understanding of mediation is rooted in Emmanuel Levinas’s 
phenomenological analysis of one’s encounter with another person. Levinas’s ethics 
understand the emergence of phenomenology as a philosophical embodiment of the 
movement from the transcendent to the concrete. Before coming to Levinas’s departure, it 
is necessary to spend some time tracing a cursory history of phenomenology in order to 
clarify the landscape out of which Levinas’s—and consequently Webb’s—new ethics of 
mediation emerge. 
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1787) proposes that our encounter 
with the empirical world depends on the structures of our senses and cognitions, and 
those structures correspond to the empirical world. Thus, it is possible to understand the 
empirical world not only by engaging with the actual data of the world, but also by 
reading the structures of the rational world. Kant calls this correspondence between the 
empirical world and the rational world the “Transcendental Aesthetic” (SS9), which, in 
part, takes philosophy out of both the purely empirical world and the purely rational one. 
Edmund Husserl in Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (1931) likewise 
develops a method for understanding the structures through which we experience the 




“pure” structures of experience: “Thus we fix our eyes steadily upon the sphere of 
Consciousness and study what it is that we find immanent in it” (S33). 
For Levinas and Martin Heidegger, this tradition of German Idealism shores up 
truth into the mind, which makes rationality both the form and content of knowledge. In 
Being and Time (1953), Heidegger proposes instead to interrogate the fundamental 
proposition on which truth rests: what it is to be, or what is “is-ness.” Heidegger calls this 
question a “fundamental ontology” (186): the interrogation folds back on itself and asks 
what is at stake in the “is.” Levinas understands Heidegger to have taken philosophy 
away from both the Idealist world of the rational mind as well as the particulars of the 
empirical world, and to thrust us back into the first nature of existence. In Ethics and 
Infinity (1982), a conversation between Levinas and Philippe Nemo, Levinas credits 
Heidegger for showing him the possibility of a turn away from Idealism, saying that 
“While Husserl still proposed—or seemed to propose—a transcendental program for 
philosophy, Heidegger clearly defined philosophy in relation to other forms of knowledge 
as ‘fundamental ontology’” (38). Within Heidegger’s project of giving voice to Being, 
Levinas finds two radical turns in philosophy. The first is a turn away from the thinking 
mind as the condition of knowledge, both that which makes cognition possible and that 
which limits or structures it. Heidegger instead finds a structure of thinking in the voice of 
Being. The second is a reduction to First Principles, a radical interrogation of what 
constitutes existence in the first place. Heidegger proposes that the essential question of 
existence is the condition of the question itself: what is “is.” Instead, Levinas searches for 




Levinas’s turn to ethics comes as a critique of the primacy Heidegger’s work 
gives to the voice of Being. In the introduction to Levinas’s Ethics and Infinity, Richard 
A. Cohen notes that, in rejecting metaphysics and traditional morality in favour of 
“fundamental ontology,” Heidegger actually supplants ethics onto Being: “Ontology 
becomes indebtedness to what is, a quiet listening vigilant against its own interference, 
cautious of its own interventions, careful not to disturb. In a word, thinking becomes a 
lovingkindness” (2). That is, Being destabilizes traditional morality, yet, in that ethical 
void, attention to Being becomes a compulsion. Heidegger’s ontology marries description 
and ethics: the question of Being is fundamental to understanding our world, and 
Heidegger suggests that moral duty comes after a description of that world. Indeed, we 
are at our most moral when we sharpen our understanding of the world. 
In opposition to Heidegger, Levinas proposes that our thinking should begin with 
ethics rather than ontology as its First Principle. In Heidegger’s position, we interrogate 
what it is “to be” through understanding our relationship with Being and our attention to 
the voice of Being. In the philosophy of the “face,” Levinas suggests that how we relate 
to other people, the duties we have to those around us, must come before the question of 
Being if we want to move the world in an ethical direction. If ontology is essentially 
descriptive, an answer to the question “what is” (it “to be”), then any ethics arising out of 
ontology will lack the compulsion to change how we are in the world, or, what “ought to 
be.” Thus, he presents a new First Principle, our irreducible encounter with the face of the 
Other: 
I wonder if one can speak of a look turned toward the face, for the look is 




ethical. You turn yourself toward the Other as toward an object when you see a 
nose, eyes, a forehead, a chin, and you can describe them. The best way of 
encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! When one 
observes the color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the Other. 
(Ethics and Infinity 85) 
Levinas describes an encounter with a face that is not a look, an encounter which is 
before perception. One meets the face without, or beside, seeing “it” (as an object). 
Counterintuitively, Levinas distinguishes looking at the eyes of the Other from seeing 
their face. He suggests that looking at the eyes belongs to the realm of ontology, asking, 
“what constitutes the face of the Other?” Attention to the parts of the face, if they 
dominate how we encounter the face, reduces it to an object in the world. Levinas argues 
that we must alter and restrict how we look at the face; we should not look in a way that 
describes the face, and instead we should see in a way that offers ourselves up to the face 
through our responsibility toward the Other. In “Prison Report,” we can see a similar 
process in which the structure of the prison attempts to reduce prisoners to mere parts: an 
eye, an ear, a nose. 
 This philosophy refuses to describe what the face “is” and thus refuses an 
ontology of the face. Rather, it asks not what the face “is,” but what the face “means,” 
that is, what it compels in us. He goes on to say that “The relation with the face can surely 
be dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face is what cannot be reduced to 
that” (85–86). The face’s irreducibility, its demand not to be described, constitutes it as a 
First Principle for Levinas’s philosophy. As Kant first looks to the ways in which we 




relationship with the face before looking at the face itself. If Kant’s interrogation into our 
ways of knowing the world survives a skepticism of the empirical world, then Levinas’s 
interrogation into our responsibility toward the face survives our (in)ability to know the 
face of the Other. Indeed, his rejection of the phenomenology of the face indicates that 
our responsibility toward the Other derives from the impossibility of knowing the Other. 
If we reject ontology, reject our ability to “know” the face, then we reject a mere 
description of the world as it is. And in this void we are left instead to attend to the world 
as it should be: an ethical compulsion. 
 What is it that the face calls to in us? Levinas notes that “there is an essential 
poverty in the face” and that “The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of 
violence. At the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill” (86). The economic 
metaphor, the “poverty of the face,” suggests that the naked face lacks both value and 
security. The face, so “exposed,” cannot supply what is essentially valuable in ethics, that 
is, an ability to speak for itself or to demand its own justice. The face’s inability to speak 
for itself causes an ethical vacuum, and Levinas says that, in that vacuum, we feel 
compelled to act toward the face, perhaps even “inviting us to an act of violence.” 
Encountered in its poverty, the face is not meaningful due to its material contents (a nose, 
and eyes). Instead, the mere fact of the face’s bare existence calls us to respond ethically. 
 These ethical responses appear at first to contradict each other: the “poverty” or 
vulnerability of the face seems to be “inviting us to an act of violence,” yet this 
vulnerability should also lead to a relationship of care with the Other. In Precarious Life, 
Judith Butler suggests that this call to violence arises out of a mutual vulnerability that 




the Other, the subject sees her own vulnerable face reflected back: “I could put an end to 
my fear of my own death by obliterating the Other, although I would have to keep 
obliterating, especially if there are four hundred men behind him, and they all have 
families and friends” (Butler 137). In Butler’s reading, the impulse to hurt the Other 
stems from our own vulnerability, so we spare the Other as if we are sparing ourselves. 
Since in this reading the void left by the bare face is filled by the reflection of our own 
vulnerability, we never encounter the radical irreducibility of the face. 
Yet, to transform the Other’s face into one’s own would be to claim to know the 
face, that is, to be confident in its ontology.5 Levinas, though, is searching for an ethical 
principle that precedes knowing the face. As he says, “Stripped of its form, the face is 
chilled to the bone in its nakedness. It is a desolation” (Humanism of the Other 32). The 
encounter with the bare face removes the condition necessary in order to identify its 
material components, including the condition of identifying it as one’s own. Perhaps 
Levinas suggests that the naked face, the face that is “a desolation,” its abstract form, is 
essentially violent. Its weakness, its potential for suffering, calls up the violence that 
grants it that weakness. Thus, by encountering the face, by stripping it of its empirical 
matter, we are already in a fundamentally violent relationship with the Other; the face of 
the Other reminds us of the possibility of violence that permeates the world. In Homo 
Sacer, Giorgio Agamben suggests that the State follows through on this very impulse to 
extinguish the bare life of the Other. By following through on this impulse, the State 
 
5 Recent materialist feminists argue that traditional phenomenology, as outlined here, has 
not properly accounted for the problem of universalizing the self’s experience onto the 
Other. See chapter four for a lengthy argument in favour of a feminist reinterpretation of 




consolidates its power by proving its utter authority over life and death. This can be seen 
as a radical assertion of the ontology of the State: by taking up the face’s offer that it can 
so easily be killed, the State declares that things are as they are (and not likely to change). 
Levinas instead claims that the vulnerability of the face begs for another response. 
“The nakedness of the face,” Levinas says, “is destitution and already supplication in the 
rectitude that sights me. But this supplication is an obligation” (Humanism of the Other 
32). Within the face’s vulnerability is its call for us to recognize our power to commit 
violence against the Other. It supplicates; it demands that we refuse to do violence: “the 
face imposes on me and I cannot stay deaf to its appeal, or forget it, what I mean is I 
cannot stop being responsible for its desolation” (32). If we are “responsible” for the 
desolation of the face, it seems that we have already committed violence on the Other, 
whether that violence comes from our reduction of the face into an abstract form or from 
the very relationship we have with the face in the first place. In contrast to the State’s 
response of radical ontology (for the violence, already done, to be done again), Levinas 
offers us the possibility for ethics, for things to be not as they are but as they ought to be. 
This is an undoing of the original violence already done to the Other, and thus an undoing 
of power and a refusal of ontology. Levinas claims that “free thinking,” transcendent 
rationality, “stays the Same,” or doubles down on its ontology, whereas the ethical 
relationship attempts to change the world from how it is to how it ought to be (32). This 
ethics, derived from First Principles, does away with transcendent rationality: 
“Consciousness loses its first place” in favour of ethics (32). 
 To return to Webb’s “Prison Report,” we can see the broad strokes of Levinas’s 




an Other while they are both held in solitary confinement. The oscillation between the 
solitariness of the cell and the solidarity of our being-with the prisoner becomes the 
central drama around which the poem is staged: “The eye of Jacobo Timerman looks 
through the hole and sees / another eye looking through a hole” (ll. 1–2). In contrast to 
Heidegger’s sense of being-with others, a philosophy of radical presence, we can 
understand the eye/I of Timerman as being alone and alone-with that other, unidentifiable 
eye/I. Although geographically Timerman is quite close to his fellow inmates, the 
mediation of the prison doors radically protracts that distance even while the hole in the 
door permits a partial form of intimacy. In terms of the phenomenological experience of 
solitary confinement, this extreme form of being alone ruptures an inmate’s connection to 
being-with; this ontological quality of the human, that we are fundamentally connected to 
each other, becomes conditional in the prison cell. The poem, thus, suggests that 
Timerman and the other inmate are not connected by their presence, but by their mutual 
state of being radically alone. 
The poem forges their connection through perception. If Timerman and the other 
prisoner are mirrors of each other, they are fractured mirrors: Timerman himself does not 
look through the hole, rather, his eye specifically looks through, and sees another eye. The 
hole, too small to fit a face, shrinks their perception of each other down to the essential 
data: the most that they can perceive of each other is the bare fact that there is an Other. 
Their speech fails: “My name is Jacobo, one eye says. / Other eye says something, but 
Jacobo can’t quite catch it” (ll. 18–19). The sheer smallness of the hole empties their 
encounter of content, and they cannot identify themselves to each other. The encounter is 




In this bare fact of the presence of the Other, they both are aware of the inherent 
danger of this encounter: “Both eyes are wary. / They disappear” (ll. 4–5). Instead of the 
comfort we might expect from two prisoners being alone-with each other, they recognize 
the fundamental responsibility they will bear onto each other simply by acknowledging 
the presence of the Other. That danger, though, becomes the essential content of their 
“game”: 
He looks again: the other’s eye is there, 
then vanishes like a spider. 
 
Comes back, goes, comes back. 
 
This is a game of hide-and-seek. 
This is intelligence with a sense of humour. 
Timerman joins the game. (ll. 8–13) 
The game is both “spider” and “love” (l. 15), which indicates that their playing does not 
evade the danger of the encounter. And what is it about this absurd game of hide-and-seek 
that is so intelligent and so funny? The appearance of the eye establishes the being-with 
or alone-with that forms the basis of their encounter. By hiding the eye, they are play-
acting the utter solitariness that seemed to be their plight before they encountered each 
other. The movement from presence to absence, from alone-with to merely alone, reveals 
to them the simple fact of their own bare existence, another fundamental ontology that 
signifies that they themselves are not dead (yet). However, the hiding of the eye is also a 




encounter, an escape from the danger and violence endemic to one’s being-with an Other. 
The thrill, then, is being thrust between isolation and danger, confinement and the being-
with at the heart of the ethical encounter. 
 Finally, each prisoner offers to the sight of the other the constituent parts of their 
face: 
An eye, a nose, a cheek resting against a steel door 
in the middle of the dark night. 
These are parts of bodies, parts of speech, 
saying, 
I am with you. (ll. 28–32) 
Levinas warns that the empirical matter of the face breaks us off from the ethical 
encounter, saying, “You turn yourself toward the Other as toward an object when you see 
a nose, eyes, a forehead, a chin, and you can describe them” (Ethics and Infinity 85). Yet, 
the hole in the steel door limits perception in such a way that the eye, nose, and cheek 
cannot enter into a totality, cannot describe a particular face. The “parts,” if whole, could 
constitute a body that then could be reducible as an object. However, the “parts” 
themselves have already been reduced from the totality of the face, thus each prisoner 
encounters only the form of the face in the Other rather than any specific face. In the utter 
reduction of the face to its bare form, the face speaks in a way not permitted to the mouth, 
“saying, / I am with you.” The parts of the face, the eye, the nose, the cheek, refuse 
objectification by moving beyond into the world of language as “parts of speech.” Rather 





On the one hand, the form of the encounter, looking through a hole, makes 
objectification of the face impossible since the face cannot be described in its totality. On 
the other, the poem implies that the hole is a form of mediation like a camera’s aperture. 
“These holes,” the poem says, are not accidental breaches in the prison, but instead “are 
cut into steel doors in prison cells in Argentina” (l. 3). The encounter, then, is not in spite 
of the prison, rather, it is fundamental to the architecture of the prison. The holes compel 
the prisoners to look at each other, to become both proximate to and isolated from each 
other. The mandate of the prison is to provide a territory on which the prisoner can be 
exiled even within the homeland. The limited size of the holes creates a perceptual 
problem where the holes do not overcome this exile: the faces cannot be heard, touched, 
or even seen as a whole. 
The connection between sight and the prison has a long history, most notably in 
Michel Foucault’s analysis of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. In speaking about the 
architecture that makes the Panopticon possible, Foucault says: 
By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing precisely 
against the light, the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are 
like so many cages, so many small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly 
individualized and constantly visible. The panoptic mechanism arranges spatial 
unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately. 
(Discipline and Punish 200) 
The ability of the guard to be so vigilant and to watch so carefully relies on backlighting. 
Part of what backlighting does is that it erases difference between prisoners: they no 




indistinct masses that are permitted only a small variety of recognizable movements, 
which is to say, nothing suspect. Not only are the private behaviours of the prisoners 
made visible, but the very nature of their private identities and private bodies becomes 
exposed and policed. To be sure, this is not the private self being made public, a 
generalized fear that certainly haunts much of Webb’s work, underwriting, for instance, 
the Foreword to Wilson’s Bowl (“my desire for privacy”). The prison is decidedly not a 
public space; both the Panopticon and Timerman’s prison in Argentina attempt to prevent 
any kind of community or public to develop within their walls. There seems even to be a 
contradiction in the dichotomy between private and public spaces that is fundamental to 
the structure of the prison and, in particular, solitary confinement. The prison subjects the 
private lives of inmates to scrutiny—their perpetual surveillance, the body searches, the 
room searches, the screening of letters—so that their most intimate selves are understood 
as the locations of potential new crimes. And the prisoners are made visible not to the 
public, but to an institutional body that works by accumulating knowledge and hiding it 
from public view. The prison is designed to tuck inmates away from the public, to 
separate and hide them from the larger community. They become simultaneously exposed 
and hidden. 
In the prison, as Foucault notes, “Visibility is a trap” (Discipline and Punish 200). 
One’s private body becomes open to the prison so that they can be closed away from the 
public. In “Prison Report,” Timerman and the other inmate have no private selves to 
recover. Their faces and voices do not become constituted to each other after being 
dissected by the prison: they remain “parts of bodies, parts of speech” (l. 30). The final 




(l. 32). Rather than a reassertion of the prisoners’ individuality or identities, the poem 
suggests that their intimacy and communion happen both in spite of and because of their 
lack of individuation. This is, again, due to the fact that they can only see each other 
through holes in the cell doors. Since they cannot see each other as totalities, which is to 
say that they are not individuated in front of each other, they escape the “trap” of 
visibility. Thus, as Levinas agrees, their forms of care for each other follow from their 
ways of seeing differently. 
Evading the “trap” of visibility seems to be at the heart of Levinas’s encounter, 
and seeing differently is a main preoccupation of Webb’s work. In Seeing in the Dark: 
The Poetry of Phyllis Webb, Butling suggests that Webb offers a way of seeing the 
“‘dark’ of Western (Patriarchal) thought,” the eclipsed “otherness” suppressed under the 
weight of the Western literary tradition, the sub-rational and unconscious thought-patterns 
that Webb reclaims as feminist modes of being (1). Butling links the kinds of “seeing” 
that Webb’s poetry performs with Webb’s ability to “see” and, crucially, to speak to a 
hitherto hidden legacy of writers outside the dominant Western intellectual tradition. 
“Seeing,” according to Butling, is the first step toward speaking, a communion. It is 
curious that both Butling’s and Collis’s projects dissolve into analyses of intertextuality. 
That Webb is fundamentally a poet of response, as Collis says, “writing-with” (20) her 
contemporaries and predecessors, is certainly well-demonstrated in these two 
monographs. In contradistinction, I would like to pursue the idea of “seeing,” or, not 





What bearing do vision and “seeing” have on the letter? Butling reads Webb’s 
“seeing” as intertextuality, arguing that her work “uses the full palette of imitation, theft, 
translation, allusion, parody, paraphrase, pastiche, direct and indirect quotation, and 
naming” (90). Certainly, some theories of the letter pick up on the effect of pastiche, 
especially in multimedia works. For instance, Kym Brindle’s Epistolary Encounters in 
Neo-Victorian Fiction reads the fictional use of the letter also as pastiche, claiming that 
this pastiche allows the texts to engage “with the past as a metacritical relationship” (4). 
These fictional letters seem embedded with an authorship outside of the text, and Brindle 
suggests that this patchwork complex of authorship allows the texts to interrogate history. 
In Negotiating with the Dead, Margaret Atwood discusses her own theory of writing with 
the past, being herself a Neo-Victorian novelist who makes use of the letter in novels like 
Alias Grace (1996). She says, “all must go from here to there; all must descend to where 
the stories are kept; all must take care not to be captured and held immobile by the past” 
(178). The emergence of the past for Atwood is a digging up of the bones of history, 
complete with its requisite dangers. The container of those bones, the proof that digging 
took place, seems to be, curiously enough, the letter. For Atwood and Brindle, the letter 
seems to keep something of the original writer for us, not to commune with, but to 
encounter. The letter from history is itself an Othered object: we cannot apprehend the 
letter, and it retains its vulnerability and danger. Brindle argues that the unresolved nature 
of the letter allows writers to interrogate historiography even while they, as Atwood puts 
it, “negotiat[e] with the dead.” “Negotiate” indicates the unresolved nature of the 
encounter with the dead, the simultaneous claim that history also has on us. Thus, the 




What, then, of the non-fictional, the personal letter? In Understanding Media: The 
Extensions of Man, Marshall McLuhan conceptualizes the new form of media, the 
telegraph, which overtook the letter as the medium of distributing news, as the reification 
of our neurological processes: “For with the telegraph, man had initiated that outering or 
extension of his central nervous system that is now approaching an extension of 
consciousness with satellite broadcasting,” ushering in what he calls the “Age of 
Anxiety” (273–74). McLuhan sees in the instantaneous form of communication 
engendered in the telegraph the substantiation of our moment-to-moment problems, 
events, and worries. In the letter, the transmission of news needs to be relevant beyond 
the actual travel-time of the document. Furthermore, the telegraph places a burden on 
lengthy communication. Thus, the telegraph constrains the possibilities of communication 
to only that which can be compressed into its clipped syntax, while it can transmit news 
that is relevant for briefer and briefer timeframes. McLuhan uses the metaphor of the 
central nervous system to characterize this abundance of felt pains and annoyances, 
registered but not contemplated. The telegraph, then, reveals what the letter as a form of 
news media is not: it is not quick to inform or quick to correct, it is not necessarily brief, 
and its technological form (ink, paper, and couriers) does not defy basic comprehension. 
Whereas the telegraph, according to McLuhan’s metaphor, reproduces our 
biological selves in its mystifying technological processes, the letter, especially in the age 
of electronic media, provides a mode of registering feeling and meaning beyond the pains 
and pleasures of the skin. These possibilities of the letter are not only a consequence of its 
longform genre, giving the letter enough space to contain familiar rhetorical styles and to 




a long duration, since the processes of delivering letters are not instantaneous and are 
subject to delay, trouble, and forgetfulness. Brindle notes that the epistolary genre is 
riddled with dropped letters, found letters, last wills, and mistaken recipients. She notes 
that the contents of the letters have a narrative veracity, so that a letter may contain a kind 
of truth or factuality that would not be accessible to the characters in another mode of 
communication. Indeed, for us as readers, letters from the dead seem to bear (or 
complicate) historical truths. In addition to this analysis, I would add that letters almost 
resist contextualization, even as they signify and verify historical time. That is, a 
misplaced letter that explains and vindicates one character’s actions actually accumulates 
value and importance as the narrative goes on. A personal letter from a nineteen-year-old 
boy stationed in Albert, France to his mother back home in Ontario may have been quite 
routine and, in 1916, relevant to scarcely more than his immediate family. But, in 2015, 
that letter is put on display in Ottawa, within view of the parliament buildings and the war 
memorial, becoming a nationalist symbol for current efforts in Great War 
commemoration. In contrast, telegraph communication is valuable insofar as its 
information remains relevant to a particular moment. Light speed communication like the 
telegraph makes possible (and thus demands) the exchange of information that emerges 
and disintegrates quickly. The technological processes of the type of media, physical 
delivery versus instantaneous transmission, define the temporal duration of a message’s 
value. 
Thus, years after the last letter was written between Berliner and Duff in 1975, 
these letters seem to gain significance for Webb, first in her 1977 article, “A 




of the letters accumulates as time goes on, grounding and, it could be said, redeeming her 
failed text “The Kropotkin Poems” in Wilson’s Bowl. My focus on this seemingly 
excursive correspondence may also be demonstrative of the letter’s ability to gather 
meaning over time. 
The consequences of the form of the letter, the delayed response, the persistence 
of meaning, the nonphysical and non-aural encounter, all come together to allow the letter 
to take on the properties of literature. Webb notes that Berliner “used to say that her 
letters to Wilson were automatic writing, or that she was sleepwalking on the typewriter 
keys” and that Berliner’s “replies were often provocatively non-linear, associative and 
dream-like, but I am sure Wilson detected the inner logic and enjoyed the casual, 
absurdist, at times abandoned approach” (Talking 136–37). Webb is taken up by 
Berliner’s style, which, for Webb, mimics experimental modernist literature, possibly 
seeing in Berliner something of Webb’s hidden fascination with Hilda Doolittle. The bulk 
of their correspondence revolved around making a structural analysis of Haida myths, 
uncovering their inner logic as a kind of mystical-academic practice. As their discussion 
drew on, the form of Berliner’s interrogations began to mirror the content of their 
analyses, so that her language, too, took on paradoxes, non-linearity, and structural 
complementarities. In the letter, Berliner is able to try on and perform linguistic and 
literary masks. And Duff’s correspondence slides even more naturally into literature: “But 
in 1974 he began to send poems, his own and those of a young Indian woman from the 
Tlingit region, and his letters, as such, decreased” (131). Webb’s inclusion of the short 




letters of a different sort, or as natural extensions of the gradual shift in their style closer 
and closer to the source material of the myths themselves. 
What kind of encounter do Berliner and Duff, or any other personal 
correspondents, find within the letter? In Levinas’s terms, do Berliner and Duff discover 
in the Other an inscrutable, unknowable face? The shifts in their style between a more 
typical communicative prose register and a high literary mode reveal that the linguistic 
“faces” that each of them wear can change. In one sense, these morphing linguistic 
appearances are similar to Timerman’s “game” in “Prison Report,” concealing and 
renewing partial visions of the face. As in Timerman’s game, there is something thrilling 
and dangerous in the repeated revelations of mixed up, unclear faces. These linguistic 
faces, though, do not seem totally unknowable to Berliner and Duff, despite the fact that 
they never actually met face to face, as it were. The ways in which the letter persists 
outside of time, in a kind of eternal present of the writing, recalls Stephen Collis’s 
conception of Webb’s intertextual poetry as a “writing-with.” The letter repudiates both 
the temporal delay between it being written and it being received as well as the 
geographic distance between writer and reader, and this fact is endemic to the medium 
rather than being a by-product or coincidence. Since time and distance are both collapsed 
in the letter, the two correspondents engage in a much more immanent form of “writing-
with” than what Collis has in mind with intertextual literature. The eternal present of the 
reading and the writing is subject only to the linearity of prose-time, of, in other words, 
the fact that one letter responds to another, and is followed by a third letter, and so on. 
This eternal present as well as the resemblances between the letter and literature 




telephones or instant messages do. Thus, I think it is not simply idealism (or, techno-
idealism and perhaps futurism) to claim that the letter collapses geographic and temporal 
distance in order for the correspondents to encounter each other in a familiar “writing-
with” rather than in the inscrutable otherness of the face, even as it plays a game of 
encounter. If we can read the modality of the letter, it might not be inappropriate to 
characterize the message in the medium as, like Timerman’s game, saying, “I am with 
you” (“Prison Report” l. 32). 
The collapse of temporal and geographic distances here seems to be a productive 
feature of the ethical encounter in the letter. However, wartime, looming over “The 
Kropotkin Poems” and Wilson’s Bowl, also features a collapse of both time and distance. 
In War at a Distance: Romanticism and the Making of Modern Wartime, Mary A. Favret 
analyzes the long history of poetic responses to wartime from the Romantics to 
contemporaneity. She identifies a number of affects particular to modern wartime, 
including the threat of physical and existential violence, a sense of a never-ending 
wartime, the fears of a war in such excess that it nullifies or obliterates history, and she 
shows how these affects rear their heads in the most unexpected places. Favret begins her 
project by taking us to one of these unexpected places, the hearth, long thought to be a 
place of safety, warmth, and meditation. She discovers hearth poems by writers as distant 
as Samuel Taylor Coleridge and C.K. Williams who find in the hearth, surprisingly, not 
the comfort of home but their fears of ever-expanding war: “something from the 
superstitious, premodern past survives to call forth an unsure future. Home and hearth are 
invaded by strange worlds and other times and the poet is pressed to prophecy” (Favret 




breakfast table, the hearth—are nevertheless invaded by distant wars fought over seas and 
on other continents. 
Wilson’s Bowl has a hearth poem of its own in its opening section, “Poems of 
Failure,” which serves as the collection’s “preface,” or entry point: 
Away from everything, alone with a road 
map of Salt Spring Island 
I drive spitting dust with a map 
of the U.S.S.R. in my head. Too big 
for my head. Too big to remember how many 
independent republics, airline routes, rivers, 
mountain ranges, lakes, and all named places. 
I speed on covering the highspots up to the 
north end back to my southeast Beaver Point. 
Back home in front of the fireplace I wonder 
Russia, Suicide, or France? I am aware. 
Darkness pulls over the islands. 
Russia, Suicide, or France. Islands, places 
on a map. Nowhere. (“v.”) 
The poem pits three places of the personal, the speaker’s “head,” her car interior, and her 
“fireplace” toward which she drives, or is driven, against both the obliterating affect 
(uncountable dread) of the distant cold war and her grief over the deaths of her friends, 
Berliner and Duff. The documentary (the categorical map of “named places” in the USSR 




its static, pervasive, and demanding facts, names, and locations fill up and spill out of the 
speaker’s head, which closes off her potential for a more sensitive thinking and poetics. 
“Beaver point” sticks up like a beacon amid all the “named places”: it seems to be 
a safe place, a home place. However, on Salt Spring Island, it is off the coast of North 
America, gesturing toward mainland Asia and the USSR. Furthermore, her brief moment 
of respite “in front of the fireplace” is invaded by multiple symbols of grief, longing, and 
death. The first symbol, “Russia,” is the site of international conflict with Western 
superpowers (the very structures of orientation, East vs. West, and influence, super vs. 
average state power, with which we speak about that conflict erases the disempowered, 
the in between). Russia also points to the late anarchist hero Peter Kropotkin. The second 
symbol, “Suicide,” recalls the series of deaths that drew Webb together with Lilo Berliner 
and Wilson Duff in the first place, though it also brings up the possibility of her own 
suicide (a literal manifestation of nullification). Finally, “France” becomes a final 
possible destination of escape. Names become unnamed, places misplaced, as griefs both 
personal and public invade and shuck open the speaker’s inner, enclosed world, and leave 
her both poetically and psychically “Nowhere.” 
 However, I read the state of being “Nowhere,” or, the state of being stateless, not 
as (or only as) a static defeat, or a place where the speaker’s ability to choose (“Russia, 
Suicide, or France?”) is stagnated. Rather, being stateless and existing between nations 
(and ontological states—suicide or somewhere else) permits the speaker to exist outside 
of a narrowly confined psychic and subjective space: she is neither simply a national 
body (a Canadian on a defined Canadian island) nor an ontologically certain body (since 




global politics that makes violence primary and quashes alternative ideological modes, 
namely, the statelessness inherent in Kropotkin’s anarchy. 
In “Crimes,” the middle section of Wilson’s Bowl, the blows to justice that 
Kropotkin’s imprisonments and exiles represent repeat themselves symbolically in the 
Second World War. However, instead of the body of Kropotkin standing in for the ideal 
of anarchism, the “Crimes” in the Second World War do damage to the concept of the 
body itself. The poem “Treblinka Gas Chamber” depicts a Holocaust concentration camp 
scene based on Joseph Hyams’s historical novel A Field of Buttercups (1968). In the 
novel, the Stars of David, snipped from the children’s clothes, look like buttercups on the 
ground. In the poem, the industrial method of killing robs the victims even of their 
individual deaths. It reads:  
the prisoners 
         the children 
     falling 
        
          in heaps 
            on one another 
they go down (ll. 7-12) 
Wilson’s Bowl insists that the body generates meaning, and the falling bodies in 
“Treblinka Gas Chamber” demonstrate this point. The poem moves from the inarticulate 
bodies to the breakdown of articulate poetic language itself: the lines fall down the page 






‘a field of 
          buttercups’ 
 
   a metaphor 
                    where all that’s 
left lies down (ll. 21-26) 
The poem here attempts to put to rest, or, make “lie down,” all meanings aside from the 
poem’s framing trope, the Stars of David. However, the poem botches even the trope 
itself. It reads: “David’s / ‘a field of buttercups,’” yet, they are actually Stars of David, 
and it should read, Joseph Hyams’ “a field of buttercups.” So, even the basic unit of 
poetic meaning, the metaphor, is disrupted. 
 “Treblinka Gas Chamber” is one of two explicitly war-themed poems in Wilson’s 
Bowl. The other is a sound poem called “Still There Are Wars and Crimes of War.” This 
poem is meant to be chanted, and it features interweaving repetitions: “war crimes war 
crimes war cries cries war” (l. 1). The poem picks up on an ambiguity in the phrase “war 
cry,” which could be a rallying cry, or, as it is used here, a lament. These two war poems 
are also the most linguistically and structurally disjointed in the whole collection. Stephen 
Collis, Pauline Butling, and other critics contend that the personal and the individual are 
in flux in Webb’s poetry, though her lyrics maintain an intimate speaking voice even in 
crisis. These poems not only differ from Webb’s established poetic styles, but they also 
register a collective speaking voice as opposed to the “I-in-crisis” found in the rest of 




found poem based on a biofictional text, which is a genre that already tells a hybrid story. 
“Still There Are Wars” is meant to be chanted, and thus emulates the multivocal choral 
line found in Greek theatre. These two poems are surely laments for the dead, and 
politically engaged insofar as any call to mourn the war dead has some commentary on 
war itself, whether that be a call-to-arms or a call to peace. Yet these two poems are 
striking in Wilson’s Bowl because they are so depersonalized and the speaker is so vacant. 
If we recall Collis’s argument that Webb needs to be primarily understood as an anarchist 
poet, we typically find her anarchism in her radical interrogations of selfhood and not 
through the adoption of a public (or choral) voice. So, the experimental chanting of “Still 
There Are Wars” sticks out as a direction not often explored by Webb, remarkable both 
for the bluntness of its articulation (total grammatical breakdown) as well as the bluntness 
of its politics. Perhaps the overloading or deadening effect of wartime (Favret 10) can 
only be expressed with an equally dead aesthetic or linguistic construction. The beautiful 
tragedy entailed by the personal death of a friend like Berliner is, the collection seems to 
say, decidedly not the emotional register upon which war horrors take place. 
 In Paul Fussel’s Wartime: Understanding and Behaviour in the Second World 
War (1989), he distinguishes the two “World Wars” by claiming that the Great War killed 
the meaning of Heroism, while the Second World War killed meaning itself; Fussel calls 
this destruction of meaning “The Ideological Vacuum” (129-30). At first glance, Wilson’s 
Bowl seems to follow the same structure: it begins with the Russian Revolutions and the 
hubris to take on the theme of Power writ-large in the twentieth century. However, as the 
book moves through the Second World War, the text’s discovery of absolute power over 




We are left in 1976 with the collection’s failure to comprehend and contextualize Webb’s 
friend’s suicide. Of course, Wilson’s Bowl insists that the failure of comprehension is the 
only adequate way of mourning such an intimate loss. 
 At the same time, this gesturing to the Second World War as an allegory for the 
horrors of war in general does not take place in a political vacuum. During the Vietnam 
War in the previous decades, anti-War and anti-American State sentiments developed. In 
Canada at least, these anti-War sentiments attached themselves to the more general 
Canadian nationalist impulse that feared American cultural domination over Canadian art, 
literature and media. For Canadian nationalists, America’s cultural imperialism and the 
American State’s policy of military imperialism in South East Asia looked like a single 
threat. Therefore, as Robert Lecker notes in Keepers of the Code, to the Canadian 
anthology makers at the time, “There was a sense in which putting Canada on the map 
was an act of political resistance” (218). Lecker picks up on the military rhetoric of this 
brand of cultural nationalism, noting that they felt “the very act of anthologizing 
Canadian literature is a form of defending the country” (238). Thus, for these young, 
highly political Canadian academics, the texture of their nationalism was one that mixed a 
certain kind of anti-State resistance politics, that is, anti-American State, with a 
militarized language of defence. Alan Knight, writing before Lecker, agrees that 
Canadian post-WWII canon-making has been forged in military rhetoric. In Knight’s 
introduction to the proceedings of the Long-Liner’s conference, cleverly titled “Taking 
the Balls Out of the Can(n)on,” which is both the single “n” literary canon as well as the 
double “n” ballistic weapon, he argues that both the literary canon-makers and the 




to maintain a sensible order. It is highly ironic, then, that these politically resistant 
academics and artists would rally around an anti-American-Military agenda while they 
reproduce its symbols and structures in their attempt to forge new Canadian national 
identities through the literary canon. 
 Webb herself was one of these young, politically engaged (and perhaps reluctant) 
canon-makers, as the next chapter of this thesis develops in more detail. In the late ’60s 
and ‘70s she hosted and organized interviews and readings of a number of Canadian poets 
on various CBC Radio and Television programs. For instance, the long-running CBC 
Radio program Ideas, which she co-created with William A. Young, featured Earle 
Birney in one of its very first airings, and Webb also interviewed Leonard Cohen in a 
stretch of broadcasts on Canadian novelists hosted by Timothy Findley. she interviewed a 
number of established and growing poets, including F.R. Scott, Raymond Souster, and 
Irving Layton, on. In 1967 she hosted a television program called Extension (also known 
by the series title, Modern Canadian Poetry), where she interviewed over twenty poets, 
some, like F.R. Scott and Irving Layton, from the incumbent generation of established 
heavy-hitters, and others, like bpNichol and Michael Ondaatje, who represented the new, 
emerging generation of poets like herself. This program aimed to inform the public about 
the landscape of poets that emerged in the new postwar era of Canadian literature and to 
connect this living history with the new transformations in Canadian poetry in 1967 
(McLeod 75). Interestingly, as Katherine McLeod points out, the nationalism of the 
program is embedded in its very financial and institutional structure: Extension was 
funded only as a part of the CBC’s Centennial efforts, and was discontinued thereafter 




conspicuously titled program Anthology, which shows her dual role as both a producer of 
and participant in the developing postwar literary scene. Although Webb and the other 
poets and organizers involved in these various radio and television broadcasts may have 
had their own personal misgivings toward nationalism, the programs nevertheless had the 
simultaneous effect of establishing for the listeners the sense of a shared national literary 
identity. Even when local literary scenes were expounded on, such as Montreal and 
Vancouver, the shows still produced an atomized simultaneity of local literatures within 
the larger group of “Canadian literature.” 
 These two poems, “Treblinka Gas Chamber” and “Still There Are Wars and 
Crimes of War,” read differently in Wilson’s Bowl in light of this historical context. They 
may seem to be critical commentaries on the destructive powers of the State and a call to 
mourn those who were erased by war. However, they also participate in fairly widespread 
nationalist impulses. As I mentioned, these two poems disrupt Wilson’s Bowl. Part of the 
disruption is formal, in that the structures and voices of these two poems are distinct from 
the rest of the collection. And here the disruption proves also to be thematic. Webb’s 
original plan for “The Kropotkin Poems,” which was to explore the powers of the State 
and radical politics, collapses at the moment of these two poems, where anti-War politics 
also show themselves to reinforce Canadian nationalism. 
 Nationalism presents a very real problem for Webb. Collis argues that Webb’s 
poetry operates under concrete, radical anarchist politics, and in several interviews Webb 
notes that this is true in her working life as well. In 1949 she was involved with F.R. Scott 
and the provincial branch of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, for which she 




political ideals were sacrificed due to compromise and infighting. However, she 
continued throughout her life to be involved in local activism and, as mentioned 
previously, Amnesty International. It is somewhat bizarre, then, for a radical anarchist, 
whose intellectual and poetic roots lie abroad as much as at home, to participate in the 
postwar nation building of the new canon-makers, especially when “The Kropotkin 
Poems” began as interrogations of possible cosmopolitan or transnational identities. The 
next chapter explores in more detail the paradox of anti-national nationalism in Webb’s 
radio work with the CBC, ultimately finding that public radio is marred by the 
unresolvable contradictions of settler-colonialism in Canada. 
 I read this tension found in “Treblinka Gas Chamber” and “Still There Are Wars” 
alongside another tension in Wilson’s Bowl, this one feminist instead of nationalist. The 
previous section of Wilson’s Bowl titled “Portraits” explores the roots of Webb’s personal 
intellectual and literary canon, with portraits including Socrates, her father, and Ezra 
Pound, with the portrait of Margaret Atwood being the only one of a woman. In the 
Foreword to Wilson’s Bowl, Webb says these portraits “signify the domination of a male 
power culture in my educational and emotional formation so overpowering that I have, up 
to now, been denied access to inspiration from the female figures of my intellectual life, 
my heart, my imagination.” She goes on to say that Atwood, whom the speaker addresses 
as “Peggy” in the poem, appears only because she was explicitly asked to write about 
women. 
Webb’s relationship to a literary tradition overshadowed by male writers is more 
complicated than a lack of women writer’s inclusion in the canon. For example, in her 




quotation from William Carlos Williams. Beneath this explicit intertextual reference lies 
an even deeper and unacknowledged influence. This time the reference is to the female 
modernist H. D. and her volume Sea Garden. Webb’s text, The Sea Is Also a Garden, 
bears a much stronger formal and thematic affinity to H. D.’s book than to Williams’s, 
and yet, in the logic of hidden, hesitant feminine spheres that appears again in Wilson’s 
Bowl, it is Williams whose influence is credited in the opening pages, and H. D.’s which 
is silent. 
 Both of these tensions, the nationalist and the feminist, go unresolved in Wilson’s 
Bowl. The collection, then, can be considered a process text, and not only within specific 
poems, some of which perform their hesitancies and revisions. The organization of the 
poems itself shows process. The Foreword tells us that Webb was aware of the problem 
that the male portraits pose to her burgeoning feminist awareness, and yet they, like the 
war poems, persist as they are, with their contradictions, and in the midst of this crucial 
turning point in Wilson’s Bowl, where the original  text, “The Kropotkin Poems,” 
collapses into the personal lament for her friend. As the speaker wonders in “Letters to 
Margaret Atwood,” “If you can tolerate both ideas at once, then, like me, you eat meat 
and, as knife and fork are raised in benediction, amazed eyes at the slaughterhouse follow 
you, and you taste a quick stun on a shining place” (38). 
Wilson’s Bowl asks us to tolerate both ideas at once, such as the idea to interrogate 
war and power or gender and power in the twentieth century, and to let that interrogation 
persist in the poetry through its own deconstruction. The collection’s logic, where the 
political is personal and the personal is political, asks us to consider intimate grief—and 




global politics. The way that the letter mediates conversation—slowing time, collapsing 
distance, breaking down social proprieties—makes it possible for a fragile voice and a 
delicate sense of care to stretch out over vast distances without being lost in the signal 
noise. Moreover, the letter’s mediation may allow one to recapture Levinas’s sense of the 
encounter with the Other even in far-away places and in distant times; the visual 
perception of the face simply becomes reconstituted by the mediated perception of the 
letter. 
The letter, though, is far from the only media technology that allows the 
projection of a seemingly personal voice across large distances. The following chapter 
considers the various registers of radio, from the commanding public address of the Prime 
Minister to the educating voice of radio intellectualism to the commercial day-time soap 
opera. In radio’s many quasi-conversational dialects, however, my analysis discovers not 
the extension of intimate care found in the letter but the organization of listeners into 
nationalist and anti-nationalist publics which are ultimately instantiations of colonial life 
on the land—and in the airwaves—that make up Canada. 
For the time being, Levinas’s phenomenology of the face adequately allows us to 
think through the many perceptions that are endemic to different media technologies. The 
underlying structure of that phenomenology—our encounter with alterity through the 
structures of our senses—will continue to inform the next two chapters’ readings of radio, 
photography, and historical narratives. The final chapter finds in Marlatt’s Taken a similar 
forging of intimate desires and griefs stretched out across the globe as Wilson’s Bowl and 
Berliner and Duff’s letters suggest. However, Taken also maps this intimacy across the 




feminist materialism—an apprehension that Levinas’s traditional phenomenology cannot 
account for. Thus, in order to fully understand the stretching of intimate affects across 
global distances, this dissertation eventually looks to a new feminist phenomenology that 
integrates Levinas’s essential otherness with the attention to bodily and perceptual 
difference in feminist materialism. 
Wilson’s Bowl asks us to keep so many ideas in our heads: the celebration and 
mourning of Kropotkin, the countless violences of the Holocaust, Berliner and Duff’s 
long-distance friendship, their fateful suicides, Webb’s existential anxieties, and her 
anarchist dreams for the future. All of these ideas seem, as the poet says, “Too big / for 
my head” (“V.” ll. 4–5), but the collection asks if in the excess of violence and mourning 
we can drive our senses of intimate care out beyond the edges of our personal “Islands, 
places on a map” (ll. 13–14) to the unstable cartographies of global trauma. Deeply 
skeptical of whose deaths are seen, whose are hidden, and whose are subsumed into 
nationalist identities, Wilson’s Bowl finally insists that no mourning is neutral.6  
 
6 See Dionne Brand’s No Language Is Neutral (1990) for an intensified take on the anti-




Chapter 2: Radio in the Dark: Phyllis Webb’s Late Work and the CBC 
 In 1964, Phyllis Webb, along with William A. Young, helped to combine two 
adult education programs on CBC Radio, University of the Air and The Learning Stage, in 
order to form The Best Ideas You’ll Hear Tonight, which later came to be known simply 
as Ideas (Butling, “Phyllis Webb as Public Intellectual” 237–38). The origins of Ideas as 
well as Webb’s own authored broadcasts, many of which are transcribed in Talking, 
harbour competing impulses: an imagined public duty for continuing education, a 
responsibility toward high modernist aesthetics and intellectualism, and the obligations of 
a national broadcasting corporation. Pauline Butling, Peggy Lynn Kelly, and Jody 
Berland have shown the ambivalent and contradictory nature of public broadcasting in the 
postwar period, and this chapter aims to explore how these contradictions also connect to 
wider concerns with the concept of Canadian literature as a national, and potentially 
violent, discourse. This chapter’s analysis of the creation and consolidation of public 
radio broadcasting in Canada demonstrates the ways in which the history of settler-
colonialism remains embedded in the technological structures of public radio. 
Part of the contradictions in the Ideas programming and Webb’s own broadcasts 
lay in the collaborative nature of radio, including all of the following: the CBC’s 
mandate, the ideologies of the producers, and the political positions of the writers 
themselves. In analyzing radio broadcasts, Paddy Scannell reminds us to pay careful 
attention to what she calls “the moment of policy” (6). He considers “the moment of 
policy” to be “the juncture when institutional motives are considered: Will it make 
money, will it do us good, and will we run into trouble if we do this” (6). However, he 




ultimately analyses of broadcasts limited to policy “do not constitute the meaningfulness 
of programs” (6–7). Thus, in radio we have two spheres of critical inquiry, which do not 
necessarily intersect. The first sphere analyzes the broadcast as a literary text, but the 
“meaningfulness” of the program extends beyond the verbal script and into the 
consequences of radio as a media technology. The second sphere, however, forces us to 
confront competing notions, in both popular and intellectual circles of discourse, about 
the relevance and responsibilities of public media. 
Many of Webb’s authored broadcasts through the 1970s are reproduced in the 
aptly named Talking from 1982, which anthologized her prose pieces in order to show 
Webb’s more conversational side in contrast to her volumes of poetry. As previously 
mentioned, Webb says in the Foreword to Talking, “when I was putting these radio talks 
and essays together I realized just how much talking I have done in my life. In fact, I have 
for the most part earned my living by talking” (7). In a sense, Webb expresses that 
Talking revealed to her how un-solipsistic the majority of her work has been. She expands 
on the contradictory tension further by saying, “As a poet I find writing prose a very 
different and much more difficult process—forced labour compared with the labour of 
love that is the poem” (8). The supposedly reclusive poet Webb here admits both that the 
bulk of her “earned living” has been made through prose and that prose represents for her 
a kind of alien, “forced” medium, admissions that she herself seemed not to recognize 
before she was made to confront them in Talking. 
Webb as a public rather than solipsistic writer seems to agree with Stephen 
Collis’s previously mentioned project in Phyllis Webb and the Common Good which 




artist,” a “distraught, borderline suicidal Sapphic woman poet,” or a “lonely Canadian in 
the wilderness” in favour of a more holistic view of Webb as a “public and engaged” poet 
who has from the beginning been invested in what Collis calls the “common good” (7). 
Collis argues that the emphasis on Webb as a silent, solipsistic artist is simply a 
misapprehension of the anarchist and collectivist implications of the poetic ego—an ego 
especially characterized by its own disintegration or instability. Thus, his book 
demonstrates a kind of transformative paradox in the poetic ego, both gesturing toward an 
Other and collapsing in on itself, which forms the basis of her social and political 
engagement, and he convincingly argues that Webb scholars need to correct the record on 
her solipsism. However, Webb’s comments on her own surprise at realizing just how 
much “talking” she has done in her career suggest that perhaps the confusion between her 
outward engagement and inward exploration is actually a feature of her reserved way of 
talking, poetically and otherwise. That is to say that the correction of the “record” must 
continue to be dramatized when we engage with her prose and her politics—that we must 
continue to balk at and be surprised by the extent of her public engagement. This point 
seems only more conspicuous when we consider that biographical and scholarly accounts 
of Webb’s life that seek to establish and, in a sense, mythologize her as an understated 
pioneer of Canadian intellectual life all begin by recounting her collaboration on the still-
surviving program Ideas, while Webb herself claims that during this period where she 
served as executive producer of Ideas she “stopped talking—on air, for a time, at least” 
(Talking 7). So, what is treated as the pinnacle of Webb’s contribution to the public and 
popular life of Canadian culture is characterized also by a unique period of her own 




Perhaps, then, we can conceive of her radio voice not as a repudiation of her 
quietness but within this matrix of contradiction—the ever-present voice that seems, 
bizarrely, unremarked or inaudible, a kind of background noise in the arena of Canadian 
public intellectualism. We need, first, to read the “meaningfulness” of her radio 
broadcasts as Scannell suggests, not simply as scripts or as the manifestation of 
institutional desires, but as an ontological being, the consequences of radio as a media 
technology. In some sense, then, Talking as a volume is not fully up to the task, since the 
translation from sound waves to print, from ear to eye, occludes the contingencies unique 
to broadcast radio. Webb first nearly apologizes for the inconsistencies of the volume, 
conceding that the scripts are constrained by the demands of the genre and the 
expectations for public radio: “One avoids the passive voice; one avoids ‘one.’ I speak to 
you. Very simple. Very direct. I may jest, I may be ironic, I may be bawdy but not 
obscene, daring only within limits. I should not preach, but I may teach” (7). She seems to 
suggest that the “voice” of the broadcast almost takes on a life of its own, that radio itself 
generates a “personality”: “because another of the arts of radio is the projection of 
personality, my own voice may at times be more brash or judgmental or less subtle than it 
might be if I were writing for print. Not only must the broadcaster not bore, she must do a 
bit of entertaining” (8). Webb’s characterization of the radio personality seems marked 
both by cultural demands toward public intellectual discourse and by Scannell’s “moment 
of policy.” On the first hand, the “must” that the broadcaster is subjected to seems to be 
the expectations of the radio audience, to be entertained even as they are enlightened (but 
never instructed). The broadcaster must, as the word itself implies, cast her voice for a 




She must be “judgmental” without, finally, making conclusive judgements. On the other 
hand, the obligations that Webb expresses also indicate the institutional desires contained 
within the “moment of policy” that led to the airing of intellectual programs like Ideas or 
Critics on Air. The radio personality, then, also carries the voice of the institutional 
executives and their ideas about what responsibilities radio has to their conception of the 
public good, and, of course, how programs may remain popular to listening audiences. 
Radio’s status as a servant for the “public good” extends back to some of its 
earliest constitutions in the English-speaking world. In an article from 1946, the 
American Robert J. Landry argued that more people who seriously critique radio are 
needed, and especially those that actually love the craft and are not simply snobs. Landry 
goes so far as to claim that not only radio but also radio criticism is necessary to the 
public good: “It is criticism of the living broadcast that is the great social need as I see it” 
(“The Improbability of Radio Criticism” 70). His language here of the “living broadcast” 
seems to foreshadow Scannell’s conception of the “meaningfulness” of the radio 
broadcast extending beyond the mere script behind the program. Landry, then, connects 
serious analysis of the broadcast, the so-called “meaningfulness of programs,” with his 
idea of “social need,” or the public good, via the “living broadcast.” This is to say that 
some of the very features that distinguish the “living broadcast” from the written script 
hinge on how the broadcast relates to the public in ways that written text cannot. In an 
earlier piece titled “Wanted: Radio Critics,” Landry further expresses that this 
relationship between the broadcast and the public must be carefully guarded: “the radio 
channels are so important to democracy that as a nation we would be much better off to 




The function of the critic, then, is both as a guardian of social morality and as a type of 
police, staving off the ostensible enemies of American democracy (including fascism, 
communism, and anarchy).7 For Landry and other critics, broadcasters, and public 
intellectuals in the 1940s and after, it is almost as if radio grants and preserves Western 
democracy by virtue of its very existence, provided, of course, that the programs 
themselves are not suspect. 
In “The Revolt Against Radio” Victor Pickard outlines a few ways in which 
American radio in the postwar period in particular was seen to have failed the high ideals 
that radio seemed to offer. Pickard suggests that the main culprits of the so-called 
degradation of American radio were the corporatization and commercialization of the 
radio waves, a problem that the national broadcasting strategies in Canada and Britain 
sought to prevent, though American radio waves certainly made their way north to 
Canadian receivers. Pickard recounts a 1947 scathing attack on American radio by Lee de 
Forest, one of the early pioneers of radio: “What have you gentlemen done with my 
child? He was conceived as a potent instrumentality for culture, fine music, the uplifting 
of America’s mass intelligence. You have debased the child . . . the curse of your 
commercials has grown consistently more cursed, year by year” (38). Lee de Forest 
seems to conceive of radio as a kind of gentrifying technology, to “uplift” the “mass 
intelligence” of the American nation. His insistence upon “culture” and “fine music” 
 
7 In A.J.M. Smith’s pertinent essay, “Wanted—Canadian Criticism” (1928), he too casts 
the critic as a military figure responsible for the public good—a figure that Canadian 
intellectual life sorely lacks. First, he quips that “Without a body of critical opinion to 
hearten and direct them canadian [sic] writers are like a leaderless army” (601). Later, he 
says, “But the work must be done. The critic-militant is required for this, not a very 




suggests that the powers of radio for democracy depend on its capacity to facilitate social 
mobility in the mind of the average American. Ironically, it is that very “average” 
American, now subsumed into the “masses,” that denigrates radio’s potential when it 
demands low-cultural, easily digestible programs, such as daytime dramas. The origin of 
the term “soap opera,” indicating a daytime drama sponsored by a soap company that 
relentlessly and intrusively advertises its products in the midst of the program, 
demonstrates too the gendered ideas of proper radio content. The disdain for the frivolity 
of the soap opera is doubled for the fact that it not only stages radio content primarily 
around the commercial sale of material products but also largely targets women who 
work in the home, providing, in the critics’ eyes, not much more than a simple distraction 
from daily chores. Landry’s conception, then, of the critic as “watchman” takes on a 
further dimension if we consider its practical relationship to discourses surrounding the 
gendered division of wartime participation, between the brutal and honourable world of 
male soldiers and the fragile world of women on the homefront. The “watchman” critic, 
then, is charged with defending the masses, formed primarily by the undereducated and 
women in the domestic sphere, from themselves and their own corrupt desires for 
materialism and frivolous distraction. However, this problem seemed somewhat unique to 
American radio, since Pickard points out that the most widespread broadcasting 
corporations in the United States were dominated by private advertising in comparison to 
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), whose public-radio structure was imitated 
by the CBC (44). The CBC in the postwar period, then, could be considered part of the 
vanguard that warded off the threats to democracy and the public good that American 




As critics of the CBC have argued, the question of gender in relation to postwar 
radio is not collapsible simply to wider sexist labour practices in Canada, the United 
States, or Britain in the mid- to latter-twentieth century. In Peggy Lynn Kelly’s study, 
“Dorothy Livesay and CBC Radio,” she does point out that part of Livesay’s struggles 
with the CBC are connected to the fact that, “Like all federal government institutions in 
the first half of the twentieth century, the CBC adopted discriminatory employment 
practices,” recalling that, “From 1921, married Canadian women were not permitted to 
work full-time in Canadian government institutions” (220). Although this mandate was 
abandoned federally in 1955, but not in the CBC until 1961, soft forms of discriminatory 
hiring practices persisted. However, Kelly also demonstrates how gender discrimination 
was written into the very programming of the CBC itself. For instance, a late 1940s 
program entitled A Life of My Own was ostensibly created “to show postwar women how 
to make time for personal development,” but this purpose “is contradicted by gender role 
assumptions” within the program (220). While the program seemed to encourage women, 
conceptualized as homemakers, to find time to pursue personal, creative, and spiritual 
enrichment, that “time” was always considered in relation to the primary responsibility of 
domestic upkeep. Kelly articulates this contradiction as the ability of the program “to 
interpellate women into the entrenchment of patriarchal social structures” (221) and adds 
that this is also a “question of class: patronization of the uneducated housewife by the 
professional woman” (232). What this program reveals is not so much the actual 
landscape of radio listeners as the imagined public-in-crisis. That is, the CBC executives 
in their “moment of policy” are not only considering who makes up their listening 




the example that Kelly describes, the CBC again acts as a kind of vanguard, at once both 
attacking and defending the imagined undereducated, lower-class women who make up 
their listening public. In this practical sense, questions of gender necessarily inflect our 
reading of the “meaningfulness of programs” at least insofar as part of that 
meaningfulness is constituted by a real or imagined listening audience, and how corporate 
ideas regarding the duties of public broadcasting revolve around the wartime notion of 
domesticity and protection. 
In part, the programming choices of the CBC relied on this unresolvable 
ambiguity between the threat and the groups in need of protection from that threat. In 
turn, this ambiguity stems from the connection between the concept of the “masses” and 
national identity: are the “masses” simply a sum of “average Canadians,” or does the 
“average Canadian” itself need to be refined by careful education from the conglomerate 
of the “masses?” And, radio’s “mass” audience seemed to be a unique opportunity for 
national education on a broad scale, but anxieties over mass culture, consumerism, and 
the “mass” appeal of lowbrow entertainment continued to dictate how CBC programs 
interacted with its large listening audience. The “threat,” then, that public radio must ward 
against seems to be both external and internal, guarding the group of Canadians against 
the mass. Therefore, we need to ask how radio constructs or conceptualizes national 
identity in contrast to the “masses.” 
In Jason Loviglio’s book Radio’s Intimate Public, he outlines how Franklin 
Roosevelt used a series of broadcasts they called “Fireside Chats” for speaking, 
ostensibly, “directly” into the homes and living rooms of Americans in the 1930s and 




forum in order to draw a kind of tightly knit community of “Americans” around 
Roosevelt’s political motives, especially in regard to the New Deal. The Fireside Chats 
seemed to provide new avenues for citizens to engage politically and socially in the 
United States: “Representing the public was the kind of cultural work that changed one’s 
status, conferring on even ‘humble citizens’ the new social mobility made available by 
speaking in the intimate public arena opened up by the Fireside Chats” (24). The 
conversational tone and the weight of the issues in the Fireside Chats offered a 
counterpoint to the commercialism that would continue to expand in American radio in 
the following decades, and these Chats seem much closer to the kinds of programming 
that the CBC was interested in, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. The Fireside Chats, 
curiously enough, seemed to represent a dovetailing of public and commercial interests: 
while they aimed to create and uplift an American listening public regardless of profits 
(not unlike the CBC’s intentions), they were so widely popular that they were broadcast 
across the major commercial networks. At the onset of the Fireside Chats, Americans 
responded to the construction of radio programming as a device of social mobility, 
imagining at once, impossibly, that they uniquely had been lifted by the Fireside Chats 
and simultaneously that they were taking part in a much grander experience of political 
consciousness and American unity than their own. Loviglio argues, though, that 
Roosevelt’s Fireside Chats were careful to demarcate the lines between his intimate, but 
not small, community of politically enlightened listeners, and the “masses” of uncouth, 
threatening others: 
Many of these listeners picked up on Roosevelt’s rhetoric, extolling national unity 




hysterical, and the foreign . . . it appears that listeners have learned well from 
Roosevelt’s contradictory rhetoric: appeals to national unity became the occasion 
for a reimposition of distinctions and hierarchies policing the boundaries of the 
national public. (24) 
The Fireside Chats, and the various responses from its attentive listeners,8 provide an 
explicit articulation of the politics that underpin the intellectual broadcasts of the CBC, 
the kind that Webb wrote and produced. The rhetoric of the Fireside Chats demonstrates 
clearly the separation of groups into national communities on the one hand, those 
committed to the public good, and part of (or on their way toward becoming) the social 
and intellectual elite, and the masses on the other, who are selfish, uneducated, and 
foreign. What is so key, though, in the difference between the intimate presidential 
addresses and CBC’s critical or educational programming is that, for the Fireside Chats, 
the listeners constitute a national community in opposition to an external “mass.” In the 
case of the CBC broadcasts, the struggle between the good Canadian and the masses 
occurs within the landscape of the individual listener. They are at once invited into the 
Canadian community even as they are purged of (and, in the case of programs like A Life 
of My Own, ultimately reconstituted by) the very qualities that make up the masses. 
The “threat” that the vanguard programming protects against is purportedly 
external, directed toward those others who are a part of the masses, uneducated, anti-
Canadian, foreign, or lowbrow. However, the executives’ ideas that the broadcasts will 
 
8 For instance, Loviglio recalls a letter that praised Roosevelt for raising the seemingly 
uncouth common-man into the folds of national unity: “You talked to them—not over 
their heads—in direct simple words. A change came over them—a feeling of confidence, 





uplift or educate the listeners reveal the dimension of the threat that is internal to the 
audience. Peggy Lynne Kelly demonstrates the extent to which CBC program executives, 
as well as contributors like Dorothy Livesay, recognized the opportunity for public radio 
to generate and construct a Canadian national community, especially through cultural 
programming that focused on Canadian literature: “Literature has always been seen by 
nationalists as central to the development of a national identity, and the rise of CBC 
Radio in the first half of the twentieth century was understood to be a means to that end” 
(228). Kelly also describes how Livesay and other CBC executives in the early days of 
public radio paved the way for Webb and the self-consciously literary broadcasts of the 
later twentieth century. In Loviglio’s terms, however, we can read the interpellation of the 
CBC’s cultural programming not simply as a utopian call for the celebration of Canadian 
culture, literature, and identity, but also as a means of forming a national identity through 
differentiation, that is, the ones who can identify with and appreciate Canadian highbrow 
culture and those who cannot. This is not even to speak of the stranglehold of the Anglo-
British tradition on what was considered “Canadian literature” by CBC executives and 
officers, but Kelly likewise details how Canadian regionalism even within the Anglo-
British tradition was suppressed by systemic institutional forces: “the CBC was 
centralized in Toronto in 1939, as a wartime cost-cutting measure, and all CBC Radio 
stations had to wait for approval from headquarters before producing or broadcasting a 
show locally or regionally” (223). The result was that programs and writers with 
significant local appeal would not see airtime if the central offices in Toronto failed to 
recognize the regional importance of the work. Kelly outlines Livesay’s struggle to have 




broadcast due to varying beliefs that internment was a local issue to British Columbia on 
the one hand, or too politically provocative and divisive on the other; it was ultimately 
CBC executives in Toronto who upheld both positions—that it was too local and too 
contentious—in their resistance to Livesay’s poem (224–26). We can see the impulse 
both to unify broadcast identities into a pan-Canadian experience and to erase political 
friction and dissent from national programming even in what the executives considered to 
be the flagship highbrow, cutting-edge radio shows hosted by CBC Radio. 
The CBC executives’ efforts to construct and contain Romantic national identities 
was not the only impulse that shaped radio programming in the mid-century. In order to 
understand fully the moments of policy behind the highly intellectual broadcasts that 
Webb wrote and produced in the 1960s and 1970s, we also need to account for the 
competing, contradictory impulses of modernist politics in national radio. Jody Berland 
argues that these contradictory impulses were unique to postwar Canada, whereas “the 
war created a very different response in Europe, where there was a widespread retreat 
from nationalist politics and a move toward articulating new ideas of the social” (16). 
Instead, she remarks, “How paradoxical, then, that Canadians seeking to advance the 
collective interests of Canadian artists should come to embrace this forward-looking 
modernism as the means to cultivate a national culture” (Berland 16–17). Berland 
suggests that the idea that modernism could provide an avenue to nationalism was made 
tenable in Canada for a number of reasons not available to Europeans, including the 
relative distance between the sites of violence in the Second World War and Canada, 
anxieties about Canada’s sense of autonomy on the world stage, and the continued 




Partaking in modernism, then, became a signal, more for Canadian artists and 
intellectuals than for outside observers, that Canadian culture had significance beyond the 
local and parochial. The ultimate sign that Canadian intellectual production had “made it” 
was in the laissez-faire attitudes of its cultural elites toward promoting “Canadian-ness” 
explicitly. The contradiction here seems to show through in the muted version of 
modernism that Berland finds in postwar Canada. It is characterized first by “a dignified 
antipathy to the dominance of American commercial and popular culture,” which 
somewhat answers the question of the striking difference in radio’s reception by cultural 
critics between the public broadcasting of the CBC and the largely private, 
commercialized broadcasting that was widespread in the United States (Berland 17). 
Furthermore, this modernism also held “the belief that national subjects were (or would 
evolve to become) united by shared cultural values and beliefs, nurtured by the country’s 
art,” while also somehow holding “the arguably countering belief that art ought to be 
disengaged and free from local traditions, community standards, commercial markets,” 
and the like (18). What Berland calls these two “countering” beliefs may possibly be 
synthesized if we imagine the goal of this modernist project was to, in a sense, make 
universal the local events and culture of Canada, in the way that British, French, or 
American politics and culture were imagined to be for postwar Canadians. This, of 
course, creates a narrow view of what kinds of historical events or cultural production 
would be considered of appropriate national interest and what would be considered too 
regional, and, as Kelly clearly demonstrates, this question became the source of much 




Butling reads these operations of the CBC as parallel to Webb’s departure from 
“the domination of a male power culture” in her received literary canon, which she 
discusses in the Foreword to Wilson’s Bowl. Butling describes the CBC as also being 
“involved in asserting independence from father figures—in this case, independence from 
the Imperial fathers” (242). Fatherhood seems to be a metaphor emblematic to 
imperialism, as, in Butling’s words, “Politicians and artists alike have long argued that 
developing a distinct Canadian culture would bring an end to Canada’s colonial period, 
while also protecting a fragile national identity from US influence and dominance” (242). 
The apparent project of nationalism here visibly embodies contradictory tensions, since 
the posturing of Canadian unity and cultural significance covers over deep anxieties about 
the “fragility” of this very identity. That aside, the project both requires and actively 
constructs a particular language of coloniality: under this language, Canada without a 
distinct sense of nationalism and identity, an identity which clusters around white English 
and French settler history, is a Canada firmly in the grasp of its colonial “father figures,” 
that is, Britain, France, and European imperialism. Underneath the nationalist rhetoric, it 
is clear that the fervour in projecting an English or French Canadian identity is designed 
to take the reins of colonial rule over the land of Canada from Britain and France and 
transfer it firmly to the new, sovereign, independent “father” that is the Canadian state. 
Thus, one must recognize in this rhetoric not the abolishment of colonial “fathers” 
wholesale, but the so-called “coming-of-age” of the new Canadian nation, able now to 





However, Butling supports Berland’s reading that the arena of Canadian high 
culture and intellectualism, of which Webb’s radio broadcasts form an integral part, 
approaches the project of nationalism without “fanfare or flag waving” but by being 
“internationalist in scope and subversive in content,” this fact made all the more 
conspicuous since Webb began her role as executive producer of Ideas in 1967, the same 
year as centennial zeal seemed to sweep through public institutions. Butling goes on to 
highlight how slippery a political reading of Webb’s work on Ideas is, noting that she 
chose Black American civil rights activism as the first subject of Ideas even during the 
centennial: 
The fact that neither the speaker nor the topic is even remotely nationalist, yet the 
series takes place within one of Canada’s major cultural institutions, foregrounds 
the salutary autonomy of the CBC and thereby affirms Canada’s “mature” nation 
status. At the same time, Webb had long been interested in minority rights and 
power issues. Her cutting-edge programming became mutually beneficial, 
simultaneously fulfilling the CBC’s mandate and her own creative and critical 
interests. (245) 
Given such an analysis, it would be irresponsible to view Webb’s radio work either as a 
utopian golden age of high modernist cultural expression or as simply the carrying out of 
the nationalist agenda of senior CBC executives. Webb, for her part, seemed to be content 
with executive control over her slice of the public airwaves, mostly unconcerned either 
way with the nationalist implications of her broadcast work. Indeed, Butling does wonder 
aloud whether Webb’s decision to leave Ideas was in part because she possibly “became 




optation in the nationalist project,” with “the CBC prov[ing] to be the biggest daddy of 
them all” (247). However, despite the allure of this reading, Butling ultimately seems to 
indicate that Webb was mostly indifferent to the question of nationalism altogether, 
neither actively building nor rejecting the project of nationalism in the CBC. Regardless, 
Berland and Butling both demonstrate that the “moment of policy” regarding high 
cultural broadcasts like Ideas encompasses diverse executive agendas, of which Webb’s 
forms only a part. 
 In any case, Butling’s analysis shows the crucial connection between the moments 
of policy and the actual content of the broadcasts, and that even a seemingly orthogonal 
relationship between them can have larger implications for the way that the broadcast 
interacts with a listening audience. Certainly, the verbal content of the broadcasts is vital 
to a full analysis of their “meaningfulness,” which is why Webb’s playful, sharp, and 
distinct broadcasts have been collected in Talking, even if this volume receives 
significantly less critical attention than her poetry. For instance, in a review of Irving 
Layton’s The Swinging Flesh, broadcast in 1961 on the program Critically Speaking, 
Webb notes how the “now familiar Layton lion exploded in my face from every page,” 
continuing with the metaphor: 
Between its teeth the lion has taken not only the “bourgeois-Christian civilization” 
but also the monolithic Communistic culture, has taken and devoured. The lion 
roars because the diet disgusted him and his belly ached. And I can sympathize 
with the lion—who wants to eat that!—but his roar bored me . . . The Swinging 
Flesh, though it has good moments, even exciting ones, makes me on the whole 




Her sensibilities as a poet show through in the wordplay and the extended metaphor, but 
even more remarkable is how few punches the review pulls, and this about a titan in 
Canadian modernist literature who not only was an associate of Webb but also had his 
own broadcast presence on CBC Radio and Television. Perhaps this is the voice that 
Webb claims in the Foreword may be “more brash or judgmental” than otherwise, but the 
result is a decidedly less demure version of Webb than the caricature of her might lead us 
to believe. The radio voice, though, does seem to take on a personality of its own, which 
asks the writer to pocket their subtle qualities in favour of their combative or embellished 
side. Even more, such a brash review inevitably demands some response from the 
listener, anywhere from an assenting chuckle to a guffaw of incredulousness, or a 
disapproving rant. That is, the voice that comes out of the speakers invites a dialogue with 
the listener which never fully materializes or resolves; it compels a verbal response that 
nevertheless will not make it back to the voice on the airwaves. This compulsion for 
dialogue, of course, explains the draw and drama of radio programs that feature call-ins 
by members of the listening audience, but even without these formal substantiations, the 
invitation to dialogue seems always to be a function of radio broadcast. 
 The script versions of broadcasts contained in Talking indicate the kinds of 
strategies and phenomena that formed the high intellectualism of Webb’s public 
broadcasts, but ultimately they provide only a shadow or a skeleton of the actual 
dramatized radio shows, and Talking is careful to point this out. For example, the first 
broadcast in the collection, an exploration of Proust for Ideas in 1970, contains a footnote 
which declares that “It was designed for two voices, the narrator and ‘M.’ In revising for 




did not translate adequately to the page” (18). Webb’s editing voice intrudes here to 
indicate a disappointment with the script version of her broadcast, an inadequacy of the 
page in representing the radio experience. In a footnote to the next Ideas broadcast in the 
collection, “The Question as an Instrument of Torture” from 1971, Webb states, “I have 
shortened and otherwise revised the essay and removed indications of voices, music, and 
other technical details required for radio production” (31). A trip to the Phyllis Webb 
fonds at Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa confirms this indication. Elaborate 
music cues are woven throughout the original scripts, especially framing monologues and 
long quotations from the various “voices” that take up the broadcast. The script declares 
“MUSIC UP AND UNDER” these quotations, a spatial metaphor that at once describes 
the music with a kind of buoyancy, rising or floating the voices which may sink without 
it, and borrows orchestral language, as if the broadcast as a whole is a dramatized 
symphony (Phyllis Webb fonds, Box 15, Folder IV.F, p. 12). The emergence of 
secondary voices resonates with the “question of questions” that forms the heart of the 
piece, hinting at the internal questioning voice where the torturer-examiner becomes the 
self. And “MUSIC UP AND OUT” brings in and focuses Phyllis Webb’s own 
exploratory, questioning voice, denoted by the simple initials, “PW” (13). Her voice for 
much of the program is supported only by silence, her questions probing in the dark, all 
the more fragile when put up against the embellished quotations read by the other 
“voices.” Yet, this is not a true silence, since the crackle of static and interference 
foregrounds the technology that serves as medium, a reminder only possible in the 




Nine other broadcast scripts follow these two from Ideas. They were variously 
broadcast throughout the 1960s and 1970s on the following programs: Critically Speaking 
in Toronto, Critics at Large and Critics on Air from Vancouver’s CBU station, and Arts 
in Review from the CBC FM Network. All of these scripts list their original broadcast 
date, but none suggest that any substantial editing was required in the “translation” to the 
page. The lack of cues on the page is striking in comparison to the elaborate, careful work 
put into the broadcasts on Ideas; “The Question as an Instrument of Torture” possibly 
stands out as a flagship performance, since it involves specialized musical cues and a 
number of other readers in addition to Webb’s voice. In contrast, the lack of mentioned 
editing for these scripts, which are mostly reviews, indicates perhaps the “everyday” 
nature of broadcast shows like Critics on Air, which had more stock, consistent, and 
minimal editing, transitions, and music, and so these were not required in the scripts 
themselves. In a sense, these programs created a kind of factory-prepared intellectualism, 
which writers like Webb could churn out with little attention paid to the unique potentials 
of radio as a media technology. This is not to suggest laziness in the prose of these 
broadcasts itself, but that the serial nature of particular radio programs shouldered the 
work of exploring the potentials of radio technology so that the writer could focus on the 
verbal content of the broadcast. Moreover, the proliferation of casual “critical” 
programming (including Critics on Air, Critics at Large, and Critically Speaking) points 
to a broadcast landscape that sought to integrate intellectualism with everyday life. 
The difference between Critics on Air, say, and Ideas also has to do with the kind 
of experience each program wanted to give its audience. Ideas was often interested in 




Critics on Air, in contrast, attempted to emulate the more casual, household 
intellectualism of programs like Roosevelt’s Fireside Chats, as if a listener was simply 
overhearing a particularly witty conversation in the living room or at the dinner table. It is 
as if Critics on Air wants to resurrect a Samuel Johnson era, effortless renaissance 
intellectualism, where high culture permeates the everydayness of daily life, whereas 
Ideas functions by way of modernist experimentation, signalling and confirming radio 
technology’s power and breadth to shoulder an almost avant-garde high cultural product. 
The implications of both of these styles of programming for Canadian modernist 
nationalism are heavy. Critics on Air almost seems to elevate the mundane parts of so-
called “ordinary” Canadian life. For the listening audience, the “everyday” nature of 
something as familiar and commonplace as a dinnertime conversation or flipping on the 
radio becomes connected with high intellectualism. Thus, even as Critics on Air fulfills 
its explicit function, to give the listener an interesting review or opinion, it at the same 
time performs for the audience the intellectualism that permeates everyday Canadian life, 
demonstrating that very ordinary life to be as refined and civilized as any in the US or 
Europe. Ideas instead shows Canadian listeners that the upper bounds of high intellectual 
output in Canada can rival that of any other modernist nation. A life permeated by the 
soundscape of both Critics on Air and Ideas would feel confident that its social conditions 
are not an obstacle to high cultural production. 
We may wonder if these arms of CBC Radio are simply extensions of other kinds 
of literary nation-building efforts. Although the general structure of modernist nation-
building is consistent across media (the absence of overt nationalism demonstrating the 




particular implications for the ways that these nationalisms circulate. For instance, A. J. 
M. Smith’s landmark The Book of Canadian Poetry: A Critical and Historical Anthology 
(1943) capitalizes on a modernist sentiment that had been descending on Canadian 
literary circles in the mid-twentieth century. It demonstrated for readers at the time that 
enough Canadian verse exists that passes the taste parameters of high modernists to show 
that local works deserve to be considered among world literatures. In a 1944 review of 
Smith’s anthology in the journal American Literature, the critic E. K. Brown succinctly 
articulates how The Book of Canadian Poetry satisfies the paradox of modernist 
nationalism. He says that Smith’s “book is important for two main reasons. The first is 
that it reveals what seems living and good in Canadian poetry for a critic whose 
fundamental bias is anti-romantic” (440), which is to say that it contains a satisfactory 
amount of modernist material. Brown goes on to say that “Its second importance lies in 
the relative absence of national feeling and of nationalist criteria” (440). Brown continues 
to discuss how Romantic and nationalist biases often complicate a critic’s ability to 
correctly evaluate a writer’s work, and that the anthology helps to “deflate some very 
swollen reputations” (441) of Romantic, nationalist writers in favour of poets with greater 
international appeal. Brown’s reading of the anthology follows the same structure as the 
modernist (anti-)nationalism of Ideas: the explicit rejection of parochial nationalism in 
turn confirms the universality of the work. 
Although CBC Radio and Smith’s anthology share this structure, the ways in 
which these two cultural products, the broadcast and the book, circulate have significant 
consequences for how these nationalisms unfold. In his review, Brown comments 




been in many years, Mr. Smith’s collection will be a gateway to Canadian poetry for 
American readers” (440). Brown seems to see Smith’s decision to publish with the 
University of Chicago Press as being indicative of the larger rejection of parochial forms 
of nationalism that the anthology seems to embody more generally. Added to this, 
although Brown was born in Toronto, his own review appears in American Literature, 
demonstrating the impulse to introduce American readers to Canadian content. The 
material choice to publish the book outside of Canadian presses seems also to have the 
practical effect of circulating the anthology in international (and especially American) 
literary circles, and the inclusion of Brown’s review of a Canadian poetry anthology in 
the journal American Literature seems to confirm that Smith was successful in expanding 
its readership to global markets. 
Even if The Book of Canadian Poetry was not actively published beyond 
Canadian borders with this overt strategy of circulation in mind, the book, as an object 
composed of solid matter, always has the potential to be physically moved into 
unintended geographical spaces. Additionally, the object of the book persists over a long 
period of time. Thus, any idea of a book’s audience must contain people in other places 
and future times, a point that may seem trivial until we measure it against radio, which 
has much more rigid limits on its sphere of circulation. Who, then, is The Book of 
Canadian Poetry for? On the one hand, the anthology clearly seems to be a repudiation of 
what Smith sees as the traditional idea of the canon that is too Romantic and too 
parochial. In this sense, the anthology is both descriptive, recording what has been 
achieved in Canadian verse, and prescriptive, instructing and reforming the Canadian 




On the other hand, since there is good evidence that the text was intended to circulate in 
foreign markets, and simply by the fact that the object of the book always contains the 
potential to move to other places, one must also read it as a performance of Canadian 
(anti-)nationalism for world literary elites. Its terse modernist focus is certainly somewhat 
more intense than would be typical for Canadian critics, and Brown remarks on the 
surprising lack of material from the late-nineteenth-century Romantics, an unwelcome 
surprise even for his own modernist palette (440). We could chalk this up simply to 
Smith’s almost fanatical commitment to modernist aesthetics, but it seems more 
appropriate, given the practical decisions around the book’s publication, to consider this, 
possibly, as the performance of Canadian literature’s ascendency to high modernism for 
international readers. His project, then, has both an inward scope, speaking back to the 
more traditional Canadian critics, as well as an outward scope, convincing international 
audiences that Canadian poetry contains something of significance beyond its own 
regional borders. What is crucial here is that this doubling of nationalist projects, one for 
the in-group and the other for outsiders, is made possible only by the material properties 
of the book as a media technology. 
In contrast, the spontaneous nature of radio means that it can only reach the 
limited sphere defined by the signal strength of the broadcast towers that choose to host it. 
The following image, from Saturday Night magazine in 1931, shows the propagation of 
radio waves into Canada. Canadian stations are indicated with solid lines, while American 






Figure 1: Map of radio propagation from American and Canadian radio stations, 
from Saturday Night (1931), via Sean Graham’s As Canadian as Possible: The Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 1936-1939 (2014), p. 67. 
This map shows how many small, local radio transmitters were used to service 
mainly urban, population-dense areas near the southern border in 1931. The larger semi-
circles show the much more powerful transmitters that were up and running in the United 
States at this time. The power and number of Canadian transmitters grew over the next 
few decades, but a CBC-SRC North proposal in 2006 to extend shortwave radio to 
northern communities that are under-serviced demonstrates how spotty and limited the 




Radio propagates in a vacuum according to the inverse square law, which means 
that transmitter power must exponentially increase in order to reach more and more 
distant places, and this is not even to account for atmospheric and other practical sources 
of interference (National Communications System, “Inverse-Square Law”). In order to 
double the effective range of a radio wave in a vacuum, one must increase the power of 
the transmitter by a factor of four. Although there are various technological strategies to 
mitigate this issue in practice, the fundamental reality of radio is that it travels a finite 
distance, and the signal deteriorates rapidly the farther it propagates. Thus, the precise 
design practicalities of the radio station, from location, to the type, power, and 
configuration of the transmitters, define and limit the potential listening audience. As the 
image above demonstrates, the technological practicalities of radio make literal the 
concept of a “target audience,” as the resonating circles of propagation define that 
audience primarily by geographical location. Of course, various marketing strategies can 
heavily influence the circulation of a book, for example, into specific geographies, but the 
technological structures of radio make geographical location a primary and definitive 
characteristic of its audience. Additionally, other than rebroadcasts, traditional radio 
programs can only be consumed during the specific duration of the airing rather than 
opened and closed at one’s leisure like a book, further limiting the kinds of circulation 
that are possible to radio. 
This is also why it is crucial now, in the digital age of radio, to pay particular 
attention to the material practicalities of the media technology that delivers “broadcasts.” 
The resurgence of long-form, audio-only interviews and talks through the new influx and 




technologies, and certainly the way that Webb discusses radio prose in the introduction to 
Talking applies equally to these new types of content. However, what we could call “the 
age of digital reproduction” drastically alters just such questions about the target 
audience, the afterlife of the broadcast, and the question of nationalism specifically due to 
the structures of the technologies that underpin new media content. Indeed, it is even 
possible now to look up and listen to digitally archived CBC Radio shows, if one happens 
to have missed their first airing on traditional radio waves. This is true both of currently 
produced radio content, as well as certain broadcasts from the pre-digital age that an 
executive at CBC Radio has decided are worthy of being translated to a digital medium 
and archived. Thus, the digital age of radio has substantially altered both the meaning of 
currently produced broadcasts, as well as our relationship to broadcasts of the past, which, 
at one time, were wholly inaccessible if one happened not to be in the region and listening 
with a radio-receiver at a certain time. 
So, our analysis of the “meaningfulness” of the nationalism of CBC broadcasts 
like Ideas has to account for the finite scope of the audience, especially when compared 
to the modernist nationalism of a book like Smith’s The Book of Canadian Poetry. Since 
Ideas and Critics on Air were broadcast from stations that serviced regional Canadian 
areas like Vancouver or southern Ontario, and, unlike some other CBC programs, did not 
extend deeply into international territories (other than the northern United States), the 
nationalisms that these programs constructed were almost wholly pointed toward a 
Canadian audience. Thus, when Webb and the other Ideas coordinators choose to air a 
series of lectures on Black civil rights in America during the Canadian centennial, they 




Instead, we must read this kind of posturing as a performance of internationalism 
specifically for the listening pleasure of Canadian audiences. Knowing that American 
legal and social struggles might be of significant interest to, but not a primary material 
concern for most of their audience, the coordinators again create a type of “overheard” 
effect, whereby the audience gets the chance to “listen in” not only to the conversations of 
intellectuals but also to the cultural struggles of a foreign place, brought conveniently into 
their kitchens and living rooms. This kind of dispassionate attitude toward regional 
concerns seems deeply powerful for Canadians’ sense that they can participate in the life 
of international society and geopolitics, which again seems built around the tension 
between (inter)nationalism and regionality that defines much of the programming choices 
of CBC Radio. 
The particularities of the modernist nationalism that constitute Ideas and Critics 
on Air seem especially contingent on the material reality of the localized radio 
transmitters that broadcast these programs to domestic Canadian audiences when we 
compare them to the kinds of programs that were aired on CBC’s international radio, 
which was established in 1945. CBC Radio has chosen to digitally archive William Lyon 
Mackenzie King’s announcement of the new shortwave radio transmitters established 
outside of Sackville, New Brunswick, which enabled international broadcasting. The first 
“official” broadcast on this new technology aired on February 25th, 1945. It begins with 
the exclamation, “This is Canada calling!” Immediately, a grainy and embellished 
rendition of the Canadian national anthem follows. A voice cuts in, courteously 
addressing the audience and introducing Mackenzie King: “Ladies and gentlemen, the 




the arms-length reference to “the Prime Minister of Canada,” rather than any kind of 
intimate, “your Prime Minister,” or similar. “This evening,” begins Mackenzie King, 
marks the formal opening of Canada’s international broadcasting service. The 
program is wholly Canadian in its creation and in its spirit. Most appropriately, it 
has been prepared for the entertainment of Canadians on active service abroad. I 
should like the first words spoken officially over the international service of the 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to be words of greeting to Canadian armed 
forces serving on and beyond the seas. I should like them to be words of 
unbounded admiration and gratitude on behalf of all the people of Canada. 
Mackenzie King makes explicit that the technologies of CBC Radio are being leveraged 
in support of the war effort. This new service expertly allows all of the following: the 
exchange of information from home to the military abroad, the reforging of serving 
Canadians’ connection to the home nation, the propagation of Canadian culture to 
potential international audiences, as well as the broadcasting of propaganda aimed at 
rupturing the morale of German civilians and soldiers. How effortlessly the early minutes 
of this broadcast slip between the national anthem and the high praise of Canadian 
military forces demonstrates just the kind of nationalist fervour that Ideas repudiates. 
Mackenzie King goes on to articulate the primary aims of the international service (of 
course, not mentioning the coming propagandistic broadcasts): 
The establishment of this service in Canada is of historic significance. It will serve 
both a national and an international purpose. It will bring the voice of Canada to 
our own sons and daughters in other lands. It will also bring Canada into closer 




Canada will have a large part to play in furthering between nations the mutual 
understanding and goodwill on which the permanence of peace depends. 
Mackenzie King goes on to congratulate Canadians, whom he for the first time addresses 
with the second person pronoun, for putting aside differences of “backgrounds, origins, 
and creeds” in order to engage in a common war effort. The framing of the comment here 
by the personal address, “you,” as well as the patriarchal claiming of “our own sons and 
daughters,” and the reference to “Canada calling,” as if this is a telephone conversation, 
seems to speak through Jason Loviglio’s conceptualization of the intimate public address. 
The form of this new technology, radio waves that propagate great distances beyond the 
nation’s borders, now makes it necessary for the speaker to define the intended audience 
(Canadians abroad) against other potential international listeners. Those other listeners, 
now, become the ones “overhearing” this address from a nation’s Prime Minister to the 
constituents abroad, who are cleverly collapsed into the singularity of a familial unit, 
differences and tensions erased in the name of the war effort. Thus, the address goes to 
great lengths to preserve the international face of Canada as a unified nation, proud of its 
traditional and bounding anthem, gently watched over by its chief authority. With 
potential foreign ears, and with the fragile balance of peace at risk, there is no space on 
this broadcast for the experimentation or irony that a listener would find in a program like 
Ideas. However, to reiterate, my argument is not that the international broadcasts are 
nationalist and Ideas is not; rather, the forms of each technology, international shortwave 
versus regional stations, influence the kind of nationalism by which each operates. 
 The international service demonstrates explicitly how radio technologies, and, 




international radio was specifically designed in order to pacify and encourage members of 
the Canadian military. And, even more sinisterly, as mentioned, the German-language 
broadcasts attempted to wage a morale-war on the airwaves against both the German 
military and German non-combatants alike. Public radio, then, could be considered a 
weapon in the arsenal of the Canadian militia, even as it fulfilled its ostensible duties to 
bring news and content to Canadians abroad. 
 At the same time, the nationalist flair of Mackenzie King’s broadcast aims the 
violence of colonialist discourse back toward the homeland itself. The framing of Canada 
as a unified nation, where differences of “backgrounds, origins, and creeds” are erased 
under duties to the flag, attempts to re-envision the nation as ethnically homogenous. The 
familial reference to “our own sons and daughters” is certainly par for the course as far as 
paternalistic colonialist speeches go. However, in another sense, imagining the members 
of the nation within stable familial bloodlines does seem to reconstruct the nation as 
linked not only by a common and unquestioned faithfulness to the fatherland, but also by 
a common genealogy, which, as Mackenzie King’s accent suggests, would be traced to 
settlers from the British Isles. Thus, this framing of Canada as a stable family unit, 
working toward a common goal in the name of spreading the peace that it knows so well, 
pre-emptively quashes the histories of violence enacted by colonial states against the 
Indigenous peoples of Canada, the erasure of which could be considered a violence 
doubled. This is also not to mention other kinds of racial violence in Canada, including 
the internment of Japanese migrants as well as Japanese Canadians, thousands of whom 




by his own legislation. The following chapter explores in more detail the relationship 
between nationalism, colonialism, and internment. 
 Since the CBC International Service had to contend with wartime fervour and a 
potentially international audience, the violences of its nationalism are clear: social 
injustices and legal battles are erased, and Mackenzie King postures as a comforting, 
colonial patriarch to the world. As much of the subject matter of Ideas indicates, it did not 
necessarily suppress social and cultural struggles. Could, then, domestic, high cultural, 
modernist radio escape the violent discourses that underpin international and other 
explicitly nationalist programming? 
 On the one hand, the early Ideas series that aired during the centennial on 
American Black civil rights activism certainly does seem to foreground disunities and the 
failures of contemporary Western nations. However, on the other hand, telling the story of 
the United States’ ethical bankruptcy and its deep social divisions to a Canadian audience 
does seem quite convenient for the listeners’ sense of being a part of an abstracted, 
middle-class intellectualism. Certainly, much of Canadian nationalism, even to this day, 
positions itself in relation to Britain and the United States, with the latter acting as a kind 
of photographic negative against which Canadian nationalism can pit itself. Thus, the 
experience of listening to these broadcasts about American civil rights in the material 
context of the average Ideas audience member—white, Anglo, middle-class—would have 
the bizarre effect of reifying how comparatively cohesive their immediate community 
might seem, whether or not this is truly the case. We must, therefore, account for the 
often disparate and contradictory consequences that emerge out of the necessary tension 




national broadcasting network. Part of these consequences lies in the discrepancy between 
the imagined listening audience and the practical realities of the actual one. 
 Beyond an analysis of specific programs, does the form of the technology on 
which Ideas was broadcast, that is, domestic, regional radio, define its relationship to 
potentially violent discourses? If we look back on Figure 1, which displays a map of radio 
coverage in Canada in the 1930s—much expanded, of course, by the 1960s, but still not 
providing total coverage—what we can see is that those circles emanate out from and 
surround mostly dense urban centres and their nearby areas. Thus, mapping the 
propagation of radio waves also has the effect of mapping the spaces that the CBC, in 
partnership with the Canadian government, imagines as being primarily in need of public 
broadcasting. It is more than apparent that these areas correspond to the early European 
colonial settlements that would eventually expand into large Canadian cities, mostly in 
close proximity to the southern border. Rural and northern communities, which would 
consist largely of non-European peoples, were and continue to be underserved as far as 
radio coverage goes (CBC-SRC North). 
 It would be appropriate, then, to conceptualize the circles of radio propagation as 
a set of borders around early colonial settlements, and it is within these politically defined 
spaces that domestic programs like Ideas function. And this practical reality of the 
technology exists apart from the desires and intentions of program coordinators like 
Webb, who, despite their best efforts and the ideals of their vision, simply cannot operate 
beyond the borders of the technology. Of course, as I have been arguing, Ideas and 
Critics on Air primarily speak to an in-group of mostly white, middle-class Canadian 




beyond nationalism, as culturally refined, as modernist. Even as these programs posture 
as internationalist, the structures of regional radio technology forcefully re-establish those 
domestic borders. Thus, it is the voice of culture and high intellectualism that extends to 
the ends of those rings, confirming the in-group within those rings as part of an 
intellectual community. With this structure in mind, these modernist programs, which 
seem at first to reject nationalism, begin curiously to resemble the garrison mentality. 
 In Northrop Frye’s “Conclusion to a Literary History of Canada” (1965),9 he 
argues that the relationship to nature of the traditional Canadian Romantics is an 
extension of the concept of the garrison, which, he explains, is made up of: 
Small and isolated communities surrounded with a physical or psychological 
“frontier,” separated from one another and from their American and British 
cultural sources: communities that provide all that their members have in the way 
of distinctively human values, and that are compelled to feel a great respect for the 
law and order that holds them together, yet confronted with a huge, unthinking, 
menacing, and formidable physical setting—such communities are bound to 
develop what we may provisionally call a garrison mentality. (225) 
The border between the frontier settlements and the hostile natural world beyond 
(including the original Indigenous inhabitants) becomes a marker of the limits of human 
(or European) cultural production. Frye suggests that the garrison community would “feel 
 
9 Some contemporary voices, including D.M.R. Bentley’s and Frank Davey’s, have 
pointed out the error in Frye’s attempt to distill the multitude of Canadian literatures into 
a universal and synchronous “Canadian imagination.” My reading of Frye here is less 
concerned with factual accuracy than it is with the way that Frye’s supposedly external 
analysis of Canadian literature nevertheless itself lays bare and engages in the metaphors 





a great respect for the law and order that holds them together,” which, of course, confirms 
the thoroughly colonial nature of the garrison—colonial law is the law by which the 
garrison justifies and perpetuates itself. Frye goes on to claim: “In the earliest maps of the 
country the only inhabited centres are forts, and that remains true of the cultural maps for 
a much later time” (225). The first important point here is that the history of these 
settlements in Canada explicitly originates in military “forts,” used to consolidate and 
converge physical, colonial power on strategic points in the pre-Canadian landscape. 
Second, these maps to which Frye refers could very well stand in for a map of regional 
radio propagation in the mid-twentieth century (compare Figure 2 below to the map in 
Figure 1). 
 
Figure 2: Map of 18th-century fur-trading posts, from “Fur Trade,” John E. Foster et al, 




All but the most northern forts (which are less advantageous military points and were not 
as heavily settled by European migrants as the south) fall within, or indeed form the 
centre of, the circles of radio propagation in the 1930s. Thus, those radio waves provide a 
kind of archaeological marker for early colonial military garrisons. Additionally, the 
farthest reaches of those radio waves create another sort of garrison fence between the 
colonial community and a potentially hostile outside world that falls beyond the reach of 
the CBC’s intellectual and cultural programming. Since the modus operandi of high 
intellectual programs like Critics on Air and Ideas was to spread the best of modernist 
Canadian culture, Frye’s idea that the garrison primarily functions to consolidate what is 
most human (that is, “civilized”) within the community seems to hold for regional radio 
as well. 
 This analysis emphasizes the structure of regional radio technology rather than the 
content of those broadcasts. We may recognize, then, that much of Ideas, and, to a lesser 
extent, Critics on Air, seems specifically anti-national in its content even while its 
structure perpetuates a kind of garrison mentality; that is, the programs feature writers and 
concepts that sometimes defy the law and traditional morality. As Stephen Collis argues, 
of course, Webb became more and more a committed anarchist, dissatisfied with Western 
geopolitics as her life and career went on, and this period in the late 1960s was a gestating 
time for Webb’s creation of the early “Kropotkin Poems” that would eventually become 
Wilson’s Bowl. Surprisingly enough, Frye seems to recognize or even predict this shift 
away from traditional communal morality that marks modernism: 
As the centre of Canadian life moves from the fortress to the metropolis, the 




moral values generally accepted in the group as a whole, and then, as society gets 
more complicated and more in control of its environment, it becomes more of a 
revolutionary garrison within a metropolitan society. (231) 
In this sense, modernist (anti-)nationalism is not so much a repudiation of the garrison 
structure as it is an extension of it. Furthermore, Frye’s concept, though clearly critical of 
the garrison, calling it “anti-cultural,” where “nothing original can grow” (226), is still 
steeped in colonial discourses of the “complications” inherent in modern Western 
societies; even if those “complications” are sources of anxiety and difficulty for the 
(white Canadian) artist, the important point is that those complex problems provide the 
necessary, and indeed only, ground on which significant cultural production can grow. 
That is to say that the conditions that provide suitably artistic struggles still remain 
limited to the colonial settlements (now seen as metropolitan cities), even if the artists pit 
their struggles against that very garrison. As far as the radio waves go, everything outside 
is silence or indecipherable noise, while within the circles of regional radio’s propagation, 
Ideas and other modernist programs provide a beacon of light and culture. 
 The paradox here, that the critique of the garrison still reinforces its primacy, also 
invades Webb’s poetry. In Water and Light (1984), Webb explores the poetic tradition of 
the Arabic ghazal, in part as a rejection of what she understood to be the British and 
Canadian Romantic traditions, traditions that partially served as the foundation of 
garrison cultural morality as Frye articulates it. Butling, for instance, argues that Webb 
uses the ghazal’s open-ended lines and strange semantic disconnections “to ‘liberate her 
psyche’ from the Western lyric tradition of synthesis and unity” (Seeing in the Dark 64). 




poet seems, time and again, to reach the edge of the safety of the garrison, gazing out into 
the wilderness, only to turn back: 
My soul, my soul, who said that? 
as the rain stumbles over my mental horizon 
 
horizon which wavers, creates the mirage 
of a café in Milano where 
 
Mary, he says, what shall we do tonight? (ll. 1–5) 
The poet first attempts to follow the rain as it “stumbles over [her] mental horizon,” the 
horizon that signifies the limits of the poet’s self and skills. The horizon, though, is 
articulated through garrison language: the home and the wilderness beyond. Does the poet 
truly see past the knowable horizon and into the wilderness, or does she simply see the 
cultured inside reflected back at her, “the mirage / of a café in Milano” (ll. 3–4)? The rain 
melds with this “mirage” in the distance, creating an impossible place, both rains and 
desert: 
Tonight, tonight, love, what shall we do tonight? 
The mirage settles into rain falling 
 
into the harbour and onto the day I own 
feeding the heat of dry September (ll. 6—9) 
The oxymoron here between the rain, the mirage, and the dry heat echoes Archibald 




[the road] seems to swim / Beyond, and melt into the glare” (ll. 3–4). The shimmering 
horizon, like Webb’s mirage, merges dry heat with liquid imagery, drawing language out 
to the edge, as it were, of its imaginative capacity. In Lampman’s work, the imaginative 
horizon gestures toward the transcendental possibilities of the artistic mind. However, in 
Webb’s anti-ghazal we seem to be on the edge of a crisis, suggested in part by the 
confusion of voices that open the poem on the existential question: “My soul, my soul, 
who said that?” Not only are the ontological criteria of the soul uncertain here, but the 
very location or subject of that crisis is unknown (who, the poet wonders, is doing the 
saying?). The resonance with Lampman seems again to fit Frye’s mould of the critique-
by-correspondence, which re-asserts, even in negation, the dominance of the Romantic 
tradition in Webb’s literary upbringing. This poem continues on, searching for a language 
beyond the horizon of the colonial garrison: 
September and the cats restless, hungry 
in view of winter, in view of cold 
 
cold as the curse of mere matter, Mère 
matter, the subject family, the repeated 
 
word ready to pounce out of the thunder 
out of the rainforest where leap the wild, bereft deer. (ll. 10–15) 
The poet looks for a language outside of the familiar, the “the repeated // word” that 
would arrive “ready to pounce out of the thunder / out of the rainforest where leap the 




cosmopolitan image of the “café in Milano” (l. 2–4). The poem ends on this hesitancy, on 
the expectation of the “wild” and “bereft” language that may supplant the known, 
domestic images within the horizon. But in the end the poet remains stuck in the 
anticipatory moment before this wild language—a tongue that she cannot speak—
emerges. 
Certainly, Water and Light does not suggest that the Arabic tradition in which 
Webb discovers the form of the ghazal is this new anti-garrison dialect. This is made clear 
in the fact that the illusory “mirage” of the café in Milano contains the couple who speaks 
in language more typical to the traditional ghazal: “Mary, he says, what shall we do 
tonight? // Tonight, tonight, love, what shall we do tonight?” The repeated and exerted 
demands on the object of love from a passive male lover who relies on the desired for 
action accords with one way of reading the history of the ghazal as a patriarchal form. For 
instance, Butling sees Water and Light as enacting a “feminist critique of the ghazal 
tradition by foregrounding renegade lines and anti-romantic tropes” (viii). Susan 
Glickman, though, interestingly provides a counter-narrative of the ghazal that is 
predicated on “The ambiguity of the Beloved’s identity,” since “The lack of grammatical 
gender in Persian makes possible a lack of specificity as to the Beloved’s sex,” whereas 
“in Urdu, the Beloved is conventionally masculine, so as to suggest many possibilities” 
(49). Glickman argues that Webb’s ghazals seize on this gender and sexual ambiguity in 
order to discover “a kind of aesthetic androgyny in the ghazal” (56), which allows her to 
recuperate the form in spite of its potentially patriarchal tradition (hence, the anti-ghazal). 
Still, though, what Glickman sees as the most essentially feminist aspect of the form is 




Glickman of Webb’s comments on Emily Dickinson’s hesitations and dashes (from the 
essay “On the Line” in Talking). What is key here though is that even though Webb, 
according to Glickman, finds a queer, potentially feminist history in the form of the 
ghazal, it is not a “word ready to pounce out of the thunder.” Instead, it is a space of 
hesitation, of silence, perhaps, in fact, the very “thunder” or “rainforest” beyond the 
horizon out of which Webb hopes a new language will emerge. What happens in the 
shadowy, subversive, feminine white space could be considered outside of the edge of the 
garrison and, consequently, outside of perception itself. 
In the end, what is most crucial and revealing in this poem is probably not that the 
poet seeks—and fails—to articulate a language beyond the horizon. Instead, what the 
poem makes plain is that this horizon of sense, the known, the controlled, is represented 
through the metaphor of the garrison. Thus, we find within the garrison the café in Milano 
and the lovers parroting T. S. Eliot, which casts the Western literary tradition, from the 
Canadian Romantics to the Modernists, as a functional arm of the colonial garrison, the 
same kind of cultural fortification as the spheres of propagation from national radio 
broadcasts. And, most tellingly, despite all of the poet’s apprehensions toward this 
garrison of the sensical—the dominating force of Western patriarchal poetry—the poem 
still exists entirely within this horizon. Indeed, one could argue that the first and last lines 
of the ghazal itself serve as the very edges of this horizon, and the gesturing beyond, into 
the inarticulable, could explain some of the curious and characteristic disjointed 
flourishes that often end Webb’s poems—that often, either by design or necessity, the 




 In any event, Water and Light continues on with the poet’s uncertain relationship 
to the patriarchal cultural past. A ghazal in the section “Middle Distance” opens by 
ironically quoting Blake: 
The Authors are in Eternity, 
or so Blake said, 
 
but I am here, feet planted 
on the ground; 
 
I am listening to the song 
of the underground river. (351) 
The vertical metaphor here between the seen (the canon fathers in “Eternity”) and the 
unseen (the chthonic women writers in “the underground river”) maps onto the tall, dated 
capitalizations that declare themselves in the opening of this ghazal. Instead of likewise 
announcing her entrance into the world of Anglo poetry, the poet opts for the more 
sensitive “listening” to the songs of the hidden, which is a function of the close attention 
to the materialism of her body, “feet planted / on the ground.” Curiously, the poet here 
seems to decline the abstraction of the self, or, what could be called the disintegration of 
the self into the ethereal plane of “Eternity.” A careful reader here would become 
skeptical of John F. Hulcoop’s remarks in his introduction to Webb’s collected poems, 
Peacock Blue, when he interprets Webb’s voice as abstracting itself: 
We all identify with it [the lyric “I”] because everything we say is predicated upon 




Naked Poem (“Suite II”) that it doesn’t matter what we are—lesbians, gay guys, 
straight men or women, African, Asian, or Caucasian— we don’t need to be told 
what the speaker and her lover know. We know it too. (10–11; original emphasis) 
No doubt that Webb employs a complex, shifting lyric self that is sometimes 
confessional, sometimes a character, and sometimes an abstraction. However, the idea 
that the “I” could be unmarked, and unmarked by gender, no less, seems refuted by 
moments such as this ghazal in “Middle Distance” which asserts the primacy of the 
material body. In fact, one could read the rending of the self from the material body 
(Blake’s Authors moving into ethereal Eternity) as a product of the patriarchal repression 
of “the song / of the underground river,” the feminine dark that Butling sees as 
underpinning Webb’s politics. We may likewise be able to recover an “underground” 
Webb that is a material poet, and the relevant question is not the extent to which her 
“abstractions” and language games challenge the tradition of the lyric subject, but what 
has gotten in the way to bury that materialism (why the poet seems to continuously be 
turned away from the edge of the garrison’s horizon and back to the café in Milano). 
Perhaps this is precisely the object of pity at the end of this ghazal: “Poor Fishstar! Yet – 
all is not lost” (351). Fishstar has always been a feminine trickster-muse for Webb, the 
bearer of “a new alphabet,” which does not immediately articulate itself, but instead 
“gasps for air,” hesitates, gestures rather than declares (Naked Poems 181). After all, it is 
she—or, at least, her sister Ishtar—whose “blue-veined hands” polish the stones in the 
underground river that the poet listens to in the ghazal in “Middle Distance” (351). Again, 
the relevant question here is what processes have rent the poet from her body which is 




Rather than conceiving of Fishstar, or Webb’s lyric self, as an abstraction—since it does 
not articulate itself and cannot be fully seen—we could instead consider Webb’s lack of 
concreteness as a burial, and, thus, fully material. Who, then, would we find with a 
spade? 
 In the next poem in Water and Light, the poet is “leaning out of the Leaning / 
Tower heading into the middle distance” (352). Butling interprets the “middle distance” 
as a meeting point between poet, reader, impressions and truths: “Webb’s poems explore 
both positive and negative dimensions of the ‘shadow’; they posit mottled truths located 
in the ‘[m]iddle distance.’ Truth is a moveable point within a continuum, a point of 
convergence” (52). The end of this poem, “Leaning,” gives Butling the title to her 
monograph, where the addressed seems to inhabit—or be stuck in—the middle distance: 
And you, are you still here 
 
tilting in this stranded ark 
blind and seeing in the dark. (353) 
Though the middle distance represents a point of crisis, “tilting” and a “stranded ark,” it 
nevertheless enables new kinds of truths unavailable to the blinding enlightenment. In this 
sense, the middle distance, according to Butling, is a reprieve from the European 
enlightenment tradition, a place where the interplay between shadows and light radically 
destabilizes so-called “Truth,” where, as Butling suggests, the more diminutive “truth” 
moves and acts and listens like another character or speaker. 
 The middle distance, as a space of anti-enlightenment, seems not necessarily to 




deep skepticism, but also of reflection and refraction, the constant pull of Webb’s literary 
upbringing that throws her poetry again and again back into the garrison. Thus, in the 
middle distance the poet sees not the full illumination of a white-yellow sun, but “a fur-
blue star” which “contracts,” that is to say, diminishes (is this furry, blue, mammalian star 
another cousin to the reclusive Fishstar?). However, this emblem for the feminine dark 
quickly “becomes / the ice pond Brueghel’s figures are skating on” (352), though 
curiously enough Brueghel has two 1565 paintings that depict frozen ponds with skaters: 
the more well-known Winter Landscape with Ice Skaters and Bird Trap as well as The 
Hunters in the Snow, the former most likely being the pond that Webb has in mind in this 
poem, though the latter’s ice boasts a dark blue that would perhaps more closely match 
Webb’s star. In any event, the poet finds herself pitched back into the European 
Renaissance that would eventually give way to the enlightenment. Likewise, when “North 
Magnetic pulls me like a flower / out of the perpendicular // angles me into outer space,” 
the poet seems to be on the precipice of a new truth or perspective, but this time French 
modernist sculpture intrudes like a mundane force to disrupt her vertical movement: 
“(Rodin in Paris, his amanuensis, a torso …)” (352). The poem is then in full crisis, her 
“sick head on the table where I write,” as we quickly move through Wagner’s Parsifal, 
Noah, “the phalloi of Miës,” Columbus, Einstein, and Bohr. Butling calls this a “feminist 
resistance to the entropic patriarchal institutions and phallic towers exemplified in the 
tower [of Pisa] itself” (Butling 55), or, as the poem puts it, this is “the whole culture 
leaning …” (Webb 352). This poem more forcefully interrogates the poet’s recoiling from 
the edge of a new language and turning back to the “café in Milano”; the image of the 




that the poet struggles to make any articulation without the baggage of the past. Thus, the 
garrison here is policed by the shadows of these domineering patriarchal figures, and the 
walls of the garrison operate just as much to keep the poet in (like a prison) as they do to 
ward against the encroachment of the outside. The poet, then, oscillates in the middle 
distance between the walls of the garrison and the new alphabet beyond the horizon, 
unwilling or unable to move fully into either one. 
 I wonder, though, if another sense of the “middle distance” could be operating 
here, particularly one that is subject to a media analysis of distance. It is perhaps strange 
that the poem’s first inclination in the shifting of the middle distance from insight to the 
garrison occurs in the distant background of a Brueghel painting. Mary A. Favret’s War 
at a Distance: Romanticism and the Making of Modern Wartime reads violence with just 
such a sensitivity to visual art, particularly in her analysis of the ways that media tend 
either to abstract away from war, keeping it at a clinical distance, or to see war in a close-
up, leaving only despair and numbness. Favret conceives of another way of seeing 
through media that escapes “the polar pulls of abstraction and numbness”—what she also 
calls the “middle distance”—which “opens wartime” in the Romantic era, she tells us, “to 
the present” (10). What is so curious and coincidental here is that her analysis of the 
“middle distance” stems from a reading of William and Thomas Daniell’s painting, The 
Rope Bridge at Serinagur (first exhibited in 1800), which depicts refugees at the Indian 
city of Srinagar fleeing from the oncoming army across a bridge that seems to barely 
hold. The painting, Favret says, presents for the most part “a familiar picturesque 
aesthetic,” other than the fragile human figures on the rope bridge who occupy the 




picturesque landscape interrupts what we would otherwise experience as an “exhilaration 
or nationalized awe provided by the sublime panoramas” (223). Thus, in the middle 
distance, we are forced to confront human despair, and forced to re-politicize the territory 
of India as a zone where violence takes place at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
whereas the picturesque abstracts the viewer away from that violence, so that those 
figures “recede into nature” (223). Yet, crucially, the middle distance avoids the implicit 
colonial gaze that is cast onto illuminated figures in the foreground: as Favret puts it, “this 
is no sentimental tableau inviting identification” (223). The problem of the close-up 
seems to lean in two directions: first, the close-up invites this pernicious, condescending, 
sentimental gaze, and, second, if the gaze is not sentimental, then it risks the numbing 
effects of shock, a political deadening. Instead, the middle distance keeps violence and 
fragility in the centre with a scope wide enough to set that violence within the larger 
frame of its historical and political context. 
 Favret’s conception of the advantages of the middle distance in the ecosystem of 
media images and violence does oppose traditional ideas in media studies about the 
dehumanizing effects of distance, that our compassion and empathy diminish as the space 
between us as viewers and the fragility of others grows. Yet, Favret does in fact recover a 
more nuanced theory of distance within media studies, such as in her insightful discussion 
of Raymond Williams’s “Distance” (Favret 223–25), where she argues that while the 
drawing away from the close-up does entail a dehumanization, it is also necessary in 
order to destabilize or problematize our sense of our own “distance” from the site of 




makes simple positioning—political or geographical—‘impossible,’ spinning distance 
itself into something quite variable and provisional” (225). 
 Her sensitivity here to the disparate potentials of distance (both a possible 
dehumanization but also an empathic dislocation from our locale) seems to come out of 
skepticism toward a simplistic faith in something like Levinas’s humanistic project of 
asserting the face of the Other, a theory that the previous chapter of this dissertation 
developed in more detail. Indeed, the middle distance may seem to be an utter departure 
from the close encounter altogether. Rather than square these two approaches to distance, 
it seems to me that they are most instructive and useful in tension: Levinas awakens us to 
the dampening effects of mediation on our recognition of the Other (and not our 
identification with the Other—that is, our encounter is with the otherness of the Other), 
whereas Favret critiques the possible sentimentality of the close-up, which particularly 
clarifies the implicit colonial gazes contained within humanistic images. 
 And this critique of a sentimental humanism in media is precisely where my 
analysis of Webb’s involvement with CBC Radio begins to break down. I wonder, to 
what extent is Webb’s use of the “middle distance” cognizant of something like a colonial 
media gaze? Or, to ask this question another way, what is the relationship between the 
uncertain, vanguard, anti-establishment intellectualism of Ideas (or even Water and Light) 
and a gradually emerging postcolonial theory (with a landmark text such as Edward 
Said’s 1978 Orientalism preceding Water and Light by six years)? In Stephen Collis’s 
introduction to his monograph on Webb, he does mention that Water and Light can be 
read “in relation to the development of postcolonialism” (19), but the book’s later 




of this reading. Perhaps Webb’s jostling in the “middle distance” with the authors who 
“are in Eternity”—her critique of the Western literary canon—as well as her adoption of 
the Arabic ghazal as a rebuke of the typical forms of Canadian poetry could be seen as the 
first tentative steps toward anti-colonial thought. And, interestingly, this tentative anti-
colonialism seems to emerge naturally out of Webb’s feminist thought. However, Webb’s 
“middle distance,” though opening a critique, also entails a kind of embeddedness within 
the object or system of that critique. Just as Webb’s critique of the garrison (of the 
Western patriarchal canon) takes the form, as Frye suggests, of a vanguard within that 
garrison, so too does her grappling with the systems of colonialism come only in 
glimpses, with growing pains and some hesitancy—or else inability—to see beyond the 
conceptual edges of the colonial system. For instance, if we return to the earlier section of 
Water and Light, “Frivolities,” we find a poem that seems to stumble from an anarchist 
critique to something resembling a postcolonial one: 
Reserved books. Reserved land. Reserved flight 
And still property is theft. 
 
 
Guilt in the morning and afternoon. 
 
Stick-pin doll, that’s me, needled. 
 
Night-time rattle of bones. Island 





Inside this skull an oyster brain. 
Pearl / plain. Pearl / plain. Earth works. (344) 
The language games that move us from “Reserved land” to “Reserved flight” end up 
making a hauntingly precocious critique of the invasions of colonial systems into the very 
materials of the land, or “Earth works,” of Canada, that is, the forced displacements of 
Indigenous communities onto reserve lands. The “Night-time rattle of bones” of the dead, 
and the “midden” that contains their artefacts, assert the dead’s primacy and historicity in 
the face of the ideological system that has the power to “reserve” and thus also to “free.” 
The “Reserved books” then also seem to resonate with the critique elsewhere in Water 
and Light of Western patriarchal authors. Indeed, it seems that the free associative play of 
this poem converges the collection’s wider rebuke of the Western Enlightenment tradition 
with an understanding (from an anarchist lens) of the ways in which capitalist systems 
administer power not only onto populations of communities but onto material nature as 
well. And, finally, the poet is pawn, perpetrator, and victim in this system, suffering 
“Guilt in the morning and afternoon,” once again positioning the poet as a voice (perhaps 
ironic, perhaps hypocritical) of vanguard critique that emerges nevertheless out of—and 
because of—that system. 
 This poem is probably the most conscious in Water and Light of the dovetailing of 
the critique of Western patriarchy with an awareness of settler colonialism, and it should 
come as no surprise that the connection is only glimpsed through the resonance of word 
play. The half-formed nature of the critique—the inability to articulate that language 




Said’s comments in Culture and Imperialism (1994) on Joseph Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness. Said says that while “Conrad shows us that what Marlow does is contingent . . . 
neither Conrad nor Marlow gives us a full view of what is outside the world-conquering 
attitudes” of imperialism (24). According to Said, Conrad’s outsider status with respect to 
European imperialism meant that he could register and account for the cracks in the 
colonial system, yet, since the “politics and aesthetics” of Heart of Darkness are so 
embedded in an imperial way of perceiving the colonies, the text cannot imagine an 
alternative. Said’s rhetoric of the vanguard margins and the failed search for an 
unarticulated world beyond seems to resonate precisely with the garrison and the poet 
stuck in the middle distance: “because Conrad also had an extraordinarily persistent 
residual sense of his own exilic marginality, he quite carefully (some would say 
maddeningly) qualified Marlow’s narrative with the provisionality that came from 
standing at the very juncture of this world with another, unspecified but different” (24; 
emphasis added). One can imagine the speaker in “Leaning” or in “Reserved” inhabiting 
this purgatory between a system that seems clearly untenable and an alternative way of 
being that scarcely reveals itself in glimpses, still hidden in the rainforest beyond the 
horizon of the known. This seems to be the stagnant fate of Webb’s involvement with 
public radio, at first appearing to offer the utopian, anarchist possibilities of raising the 
public’s consciousness, yet, as Kelly and Butling suggest, that very modernist-vanguard 
critique ends up reaffirming the nationalist boundaries of the garrison, short-circuiting the 
potential development of a “new alphabet” that could supplant what was available to 




 Perhaps, then, Webb could be considered in a kind of prophetic role—herself a 
“Priestess of Motion” (Naked Poems)—gesturing to the new language beyond the 
garrison even if her later work, such as Water and Light, does not seem to fully realize 
that language. Webb does indicate that she is somewhat cognizant of the limits of her 
historical contingencies, and what might be possible for later writers of her kin. Her aptly 
named poem “Following” fleshes out her relationship to future potentials for Canadian 
literature that she can only begin to glimpse. “Following” appears in the 25th anniversary 
issue of Canadian Literature (the 100th issue of the journal) in Spring, 1984 alongside a 
host of Canada’s celebrity writers at the time, including Earle Birney, bill bissett, Michael 
Ondaatje, Al Purdy, Daphne Marlatt, and others. This poem, unsurprisingly dripping with 
contradiction, is dedicated to Daphne Marlatt, yet it begins, again, with a looming father 
of Western art, Botticelli, and his erotic and devotional paintings of classical women, 
such as the figure of Venus in his Primavera. The poem indicates that something divine 
and remarkable in femininity is captured in Botticelli, yet it also seems to evade or resist 
that capture: 
That which is beautiful in Botticelli 
disintegrates, 
gathers again in women: 
a woman in white, 
a lily, 
a dream in the eye 




There is some resonance here with Webb’s more widely analyzed “Marvell’s Garden” 
(1956), which indicates a similar aesthetically stagnant fate for Venus as Marvell’s tamed 
nature: “The garden where Marvell scorned love’s solicitude— /that dream—and played 
instead an arcane solitaire” (ll. 9–10). “Marvell’s Garden” pits a contradiction between 
technical mastery and a revivified or self-determining nature (or nature-as-the-feminine): 
“and yet—he did care more for the form / of things than for the thing itself” (ll. 17–18). 
So too does “Following” suggest that, while Botticelli’s Primavera may be technically 
impressive, the male painter holds the female subject at a clinical distance, since “He is 
standing apart / from Primavera” (ll. 12–13). One wonders to what degree the “woman in 
white” and (or, who is) the “lily” become like the still-life for Botticelli. After all, he, too, 
seems captured in this motionless aesthetic prison: “He is painting forever / her in this full 
moon / winter’s night” (ll. 14–16). 
 In contrast to the still, haunting, and demure “winter’s night,” the poet is then 
greeted by a new, yet familiar, figure: 
A woman in light 
leans out and over me, 
waving a wand 
of old language 
unspoken beyond 
these words . . . (ll. 17–22) 
Crucially, in all of these prophetic poems, it is not the poet herself who bears the 




harbinger of these other transformative figures: the Priestess of Motion, Fishstar, the 
woman in white. “I follow,” the poet admits: 
a flower is held out 
and placed in the shell of Venus 
who rises, wet, 
to greet her. (ll. 29–32) 
The poet now seems merely to be an observer to this exchange between the woman in 
white and Venus, who, rather than lock each other in the hedges of a garden or the frames 
of a painting, reciprocally exchange a flower, one of those items often contained within 
the artist’s capturing medium. And, instead of maintaining the mediated distance between 
the subject and artist-observer, Venus and the woman in white close that distance to greet 
each other. This greeting offers a new paradigm for relationships between artists and even 
between art-makers and their subjects. 
One problem, though, which gets to the heart of the bizarre relationship of 
mythopoeia, 1970s settler-Canadian popular intellectualism, and Indigenous cultures in 
Canada, is the teleological casting of contemporary Western society against the Other. 
We can see this typified in the new linguistic future that Webb time and again alludes to, 
which slides so easily between the “new alphabet” which “gasps for air” (Naked Poems) 
to this “old language / unspoken” (“Following”). The “new alphabet” is a becoming of a 
world that Webb seems to glimpse without ever having obtained full access to. The new 
language hesitates and catches as it “gasps for air.” The air does not lend itself easily to 
the creation of this new intimate, erotic discourse, yet the material of the air itself must 




“brash” and bold prosody of the radio voice as it masters and rides across the airwaves, 
“air” signifying not much more than a vehicle. Webb’s inability to precisely articulate the 
potential world of this new discourse means that it would be an error to cast this future as 
exactly anarchist or exactly feminist, although it probably does have something to do with 
each of those future worlds. However, the easy sliding between this new future and an 
old, primordial, primitive world seems couched in a patronizing mid-century Western 
anthropological discourse that imagines, in obscured Christian metaphors of the Edenic 
and the eschatological, that contemporary Westerners inhabit an especially complex, 
fallen or compromised world for which non-Western cultures, thought to be more “pure” 
or untainted by industrialization and modernity, can provide an antidote. We see this with 
Frye’s conception of the vanguard garrison of artists who oppose the numbing and 
dehumanizing effects of modernization: “as society gets more complicated and more in 
control of its environment, it becomes more of a revolutionary garrison within a 
metropolitan society” (231). We can also see traces of this in Webb’s bewilderment and 
interest in Lilo Berliner and Wilson Duff’s esoteric and patterned readings of West Coast 
Indigenous myths (and consider, too, the colonial language of benevolent ownership and 
discovery in the claiming of a cultural artifact as “Wilson’s Bowl”[SEE James O. Young 
“Profound Offense and Cultural Appropriate” 2005, pg 136.]). Despite the best intentions 
of Webb and the other counter-cultural white intellectuals involved with vanguard public 
broadcasts, the absence of a critique of this primitivist discourse is perhaps their most 
consequential blindness. 
 To return to the poem, the speaker leaves us with the image of her “following” the 




“following” seem to move in many directions. The poem positions the queer feminism of 
Daphne Marlatt as a literature that “follows” the suggestion first hinted at in Webb’s 
Naked Poems (and these early collections, including The Sea Is also a Garden, 
themselves “follow” the perhaps deliberately obscured traditions of H. D. and Sappho). 
And even in this claiming of a new (or, recovered) feminist tradition in Canadian 
literature between herself and Marlatt, neither do the lines of “following” seem unilateral: 
although Webb, like the “woman in white,” offers Marlatt a flower in the groundwork of 
her early queer texts, they both, the poem says, greet each other, suggesting a reciprocal 
kinship or borrowing between both of them. In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, 
which focuses on the queer protagonist of Marlatt’s war novel Taken, Marlatt’s similar 
response to this reciprocal greeting in her doubling metaphors of mothers and lovers will 
be explained in more detail. 
 For now, Webb curiously casts this relationship in erotic terms. Webb is not 
primarily an erotic poet, and, though there is probably more purchase for considering an 
erotic aesthetic in Marlatt’s work, neither is the erotic the only mode by which Marlatt’s 
poetry apprehends the world. Thus, it is somewhat striking, and quite revealing, that when 
Webb in “Following” considers her relationship to the emerging generation of (queer) 
women’s writing in Canada, the poem articulates this connection through the erotic: the 
flower is itself “placed” in the concave “shell of Venus / who rises, wet, / to greet her” (ll. 
30–32). First, the erotic here is more than an aesthetic and certainly more than thematic. 
Second, this is also specifically a queer erotic. Since the queer feminine erotic appears for 
Webb precisely at the interstice with her intertextual and political relationship to other 




world. In Laurie Ricou’s 1986 attempt to characterize Webb and Marlatt as Canadian 
women writers in “Phyllis Webb, Daphne Marlatt and Simultitude,” he quotes Kathleen 
Scherf, who at that time was attending Ricou’s graduate seminar. She has this to say 
about Marlatt’s conflation of linguistic interrogation with the erotic: “Marlatt habitually 
creates an etymological figure in which the ancient world is melodiously sounded 
between two modern cognates ‘lost, losti, lust-y one’ [. . .] The fluent nature of female 
sexuality is best licked with long flowing lines and smooth, slippery word associations” 
(quoted in Ricou 209). Scherf’s passage itself is marked by long lines and slippery word 
associations, but, more importantly, it makes the case that Marlatt, like Webb, is 
preoccupied with the queer erotic as the expression or performance of queer feminist 
politics, insofar as Marlatt’s experiments with language and the apprehension of the 
material world are themselves embodiments of politics. The following two chapters make 
the case that this interaction with the world that we see in Marlatt’s work, born out of 
feminist phenomenology and media theory, provides us with a new way of registering 
global and local trauma. Indeed, as the fourth chapter details, the queer erotic opens 
vulnerabilities that allow us to feel across distances, an intimate, if estranged, relationship 





Chapter 3: Labour and the Lyric Camera: (Re)viewing Robert Minden’s 
Photographs in Steveston with Daphne Marlatt 
In the fall of 1972, Daphne Marlatt and Canadian sociologist and artist Robert 
Minden became involved in an aural history project first initiated by Reynoldston 
Research and Studies in its effort to document the various cultural groups that made up 
British Columbia. This particular project set out to interview and document the 
predominantly Japanese fishing village of Steveston, just south of Vancouver. Daphne 
Marlatt’s skills as a poet were leveraged into writing and editing for the project, while 
Robert Minden documented the village through photographs. The two joined Maya 
Koizumi, who conducted interviews in Japanese with the residents of Steveston, and Rex 
Weyler, also responsible for photography. After some funding setbacks, the newly created 
Aural History Programme at the Provincial Archives of British Columbia allowed the 
work to continue (Steveston Recollected xiii). The translated interviews and photographs 
were finally published in a book called Steveston Recollected: A Japanese-Canadian 
History in 1975. The main concerns of this aural history project were the encroachment of 
Vancouver suburbs onto and the gentrification of Steveston, worries over the potential 
loss of this distinct BC community, and the early history and wartime experience of the 
older members of the community. The book appeared during the new, burgeoning interest 
in heterogeneous cultural groups within mainstream (read: white) Canadian academia. 
The documentarianism of Steveston Recollected inspired Marlatt and Minden to pursue 
another type of encounter with the community that would be guided by the principles of 
the lyric rather than the interview: after they completed their work on Steveston 




combined poetry from Marlatt with Minden’s photographs of the town that was first 
published in 1974 and titled simply Steveston. 
Steveston Recollected and Steveston are curious historiographies for the fact that 
they both purport to capture and express the history and legacy of life and labour in the 
town of Steveston, while they actually revolve around stories of the wartime internment 
of Japanese people in Canada from 1942 to the years following the end of the war. The 
structure of Steveston Recollected, like a more standard historical account, narrativizes 
internment insofar as it contains a recognizable pre-war context, a swelling of racist 
legislation, a culmination of exile within the camps, and a postwar return. It may be more 
curious to regard Steveston, composed primarily of lyrics and photographs, as historically 
minded, or as having internment as a primary focal point. Beyond the simple biographical 
fact that Marlatt and Minden worked on both texts in the span of a few years, and that the 
documentary aspects of Steveston Recollected are recognizable—even, perhaps, in their 
negation—in the artistic book Steveston, I would like to suggest that Steveston offers an 
encounter with the history of internment that responds to historiographical problems 
endemic to the scholarly work on the internment of Japanese people in Canada published 
from the 1970s onward. As the later parts of this chapter contend, Steveston, in its poetry 
and photographs, repudiates a narrativization of history in favour of a lyricization of the 
history of internment. Furthermore, the chapter argues that both the photographs and the 
poetry must be analyzed through the lens of lyric history in order to attend to the fragile 




The narrativization of history has been a concept at the forefront of theories of 
historiography over the past half century.10 Narrativity has, at times, been rejected as an 
obfuscation of historical reality, a marring of history in accepted and overwritten cultural 
symbols, and at others it has in fact been championed as a way of servicing historical 
discourse for political liberation.11 At the heart of these various interpretations of the 
usefulness of the narrativization of history is our almost natural, or unconscious, 
boundedness to narrative, and how narrativization depends on prior, ideological ways of 
structuring reality. In uncovering the pragmatic effects of narrativity, Hayden White in 
“The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality” connects our ways of 
understanding historical narratives with our preconceptions about literary narratives: 
If every fully realized story, however we define that familiar but conceptually 
elusive entity, is a kind of allegory, points to a moral, or endows events, whether 
real or imaginary, with a significance that they do not possess as a mere sequence, 
then it seems possible to conclude that every historical narrative has as its latent or 
manifest purpose the desire to moralize the events of which it treats. (17–18; 
original emphasis) 
It is not the intention of this chapter to pursue the usefulness of narrativity in the general 
field of historical studies as a discipline. Instead, I am interested in looking at the 
 
10 Narrativity describes the underlying structures by which data can be shaped into a 
story. Narration instead refers to a specific instance of storytelling. See Hayden White’s 
“The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory.” 
11 See Hayden White’s discussion of the five theoretical attitudes toward narrativity in 
“The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory.” Indeed, the fifth 
category is constituted by those historians who choose not to engage in a critical 
understanding of narrativity, against which the other four categories are emboldened with 




consequences of historical narratives on our ability to encounter events in the past, in 
other words, to examine the ways in which the narrativization of history mediates our 
encounter with the past. Theories of historiography including White’s often suggest that 
an understanding of the past demands the use of narrativity, with whatever consequences 
that brings. We should either be cognizant of those consequences, and attempt a sort of 
‘mastery’ over the discourse of narrative in order to structure historical reality into 
something at least politically neutral if not beneficial, or otherwise retreat to non-narrative 
forms of historical data-keeping, such as the use of annals, which disrupt typical 
narratives of cause and effect in the writing of history. In contrast to these proposed 
solutions to the problem of narrativity, this chapter argues that the poetry and photographs 
in Steveston offer another, lyrical way of encountering the past, which allows us to, in a 
way pragmatic only to photography, face some of the problems of narrativity in the way 
that we approach history. 
 As White argues above, within the narrativizing of history a moralizing of history 
can be uncovered, which is to say that historical narratives are mobilized, whether 
consciously or unconsciously (in his words, “latent”), toward ideological or political ends. 
In his view, historians should interrogate the goals and consequences of the ways they 
employ narrativity, ultimately in order to harness the transformative powers of narrativity 
for righteous political action. Some writers have taken issue with this conception of 
history’s redemptive power, suggesting that it seems to be at best utopian and at worst 
dangerous. For example, A. Moses Dirk argues that the harnessing of historical narratives 
for moral and political ends has been a staple strategy of oppressive, nationalist political 




epistemic grounds on which these movements take root, but may also call them into being 
by submitting history to the ideological whims of its practitioners: “White’s endorsement 
of the power of nationalist mythologies needs to be taken seriously because his view of 
the ‘public role of history’ (Jürgen Habermas) can be said to hold the field in many recent 
problems” (314). Chief among these problems in historiography is the resurgence of 
revisionist historical narratives: “For the past thirty years, nationalist ‘revisionisms,’ 
including Holocaust denial, which challenge the critical, post-nationalist consensus 
among historians, have been unleashed in, for instance, Irish, German, Israeli, Italian, and 
Australian historiography” (Dirk 314). Dirk’s analysis is most wary of putatively explicit 
oppressive regimes adopting White’s theory of narrativity for revisionist ends. It may be 
hard to imagine that these revisionists would submit their work to the kind of theoretical 
scrutiny Dirk has in mind, but Dirk’s point is that we should remain skeptical of so-called 
politically “redemptive” historical narratives, which may actually serve nationalist goals. 
 In the decades after the internment of Japanese communities in Canada, several 
national narratives emerged in the historical accounts of internment. Ann Gomer 
Sunahara, who first became interested in the history of internment when she learned about 
the experiences of her partner, David Sunahara, and his family during the Second World 
War, wrote one of the first histories of internment, called The Politics of Racism: The 
Uprooting of Japanese Canadians During the Second World War (1981). In the opening 
pages of the book, Sunahara frames the history of internment explicitly by evacuating the 
narrative of moral aims: “The intention of this book is not to arouse bad memories or to 
make accusations. What is past is past. Rather my intention is to tell frankly what the 




public image most Canadians hold of their society” (xi). White’s analysis of narrativity in 
historiography insists that no history can be “frank” and to “the record,” that is, the 
meaning-making devices of historiography already editorialize, or, narrativize, the 
putative ‘raw facts’ of history. This opening claim, that the book will simply present these 
raw facts of “the record,” attempts to suppress the book’s narrativization of history, 
which, in turn, would also suggest that the text has no moral aims, that it will not “make 
accusations.” Taken at face value, this claim would suggest that the following text 
actually lacks some key meaning-making apparatuses. If the text makes no accusations, 
then it perhaps also lacks an analysis of cause and effect, of the volition of historical 
actors, and of the roots of political policies and decisions. This would suggest that what 
follows is a poorly written history, which, even if it were the case, would be a peculiar 
claim to make in the opening pages. In fact, the body of the text goes to great lengths to 
assign responsibility and analyze the course of political and social energies that enabled 
the internment of Japanese people in Canada. This history certainly does narrativize, and, 
in White’s sense, it implicitly moralizes as well. What, then, could inspire such a claim 
toward the “frank” facts of “the record”? 
 It seems that a larger historical narrative is at work here, one that extends beyond 
the event of internment. This narrative is the one of Sunahara’s contemporary Canada, 
wherein those Canadians “born and raised since the Second World War [. . .] have known 
only a tolerant Canada: a Canada in which discrimination has been greatly reduced,” and 
in which Canadians “have lived free of racism, and hence in ignorance of its pain and 
power” (xi). She goes on to say that “this book is intended as a reminder that the tolerance 




This historical narrative dichotomizes the events of the Second World War, characterized 
by prejudice and displacement, with the liberal humanist Canada of the 1970s and early 
1980s, which is “free of racism,” tolerant, and seemingly incompatible with wartime 
Canada. Thus, on the one hand, internment emerges as a relic from an earlier time; since 
its constituent conditions no longer exist, it cannot be repeated, but it nonetheless should 
be studied for the ways that it created the contemporary moral landscape of Canada. On 
the other hand, internment is held back only by “a thin [. . .] veneer,” and thus requires 
the constant vigilance of our attention unless we risk sinking back to that earlier time 
when such events were possible. So, Sunahara’s historical narrative of the emergence of 
contemporary liberal Canada is characterized by a simultaneous distance from the 
shocking events of the Second World War, and their incessant proximity, which calls us 
to remember the past and renew our commitment to the liberal humanist ideals of 
tolerance, freedom, anti-discrimination, and so on. 
 In this configuration, this historical narrative, what is internment? It becomes both 
more and less than an event that happened. If living in a free Canada is the moral carrot, 
then internment becomes the stick wielded against us (who, ostensibly, “have lived free 
of racism”) in order to carry us teleologically forward toward the end point of the 
historical narrative (the becoming of a utopian, liberal Canada). The presence of 
internment in the past is a constituent event in the formation of contemporary, tolerant 
Canada, while the (remote) possibility of its reoccurrence (it could never happen now, but 
we must also make sure that it never happens) would be a disruption in the historical 
narrative. Wartime itself seems to be an interruption of the ordinary logic of the national 




people could enact such a policy or at least stand by as it happens, finds its proper place 
within the comparably absurd wartime. 
 The paradox here is that wartime exists in opposition to and thus outside of the 
Canadian historical narrative, but, simultaneously, wartime constantly encroaches on the 
present moment, threatening always to plunge us back to that disruptive time of 
intolerance, irrationality, and violence. This pervasiveness and porousness of wartime 
recalls both Fussell’s and Favret’s conceptions of total war. They agree that the constant 
threat of war, real or imagined, comes to invade, as it were, all time. The threat itself 
takes on the malleable figure of the enemy, so that we mobilize our defences—including 
material production, policy, and military personnel—against the threat of war rather than 
against any actual entity. The paradox that wartime simultaneously disrupts history and 
propels history into the present moment resolves when we consider the ways in which 
historical narratives of war, like Sunahara’s, treat war as exceptional to and in excess of 
history. War’s irrationality puts it at odds with the narrativization of history, that is, the 
process of turning the raw data of the past into a meaningful narrative. War narratives 
can, on the one hand, contain war by reducing out its complexity until it becomes a 
simple story of righteous, if tragic, hero nation and morally repugnant enemies. On the 
other hand, if a war narrative maintains war in its irrationality and complexity, it does so 
by bracketing war outside of the normal and rational historical narrative. If war becomes 
an exception to and thus lies outside of history, then, in a narrative sense, it also lies 
outside of narrative (or, in this case, historical) time. Unmoored from typical historical 
time, war constitutes a time of its own, a time of excess, that is, wartime. Wartime runs 




in a past almost too distant to understand, and, at the same time, barely held back from 
invading the present moment. 
 The exceptionality and non-rationality of wartime then allows wartime to become 
a moment of national genesis. Thus, Sunahara’s Canada, “free of racism,” is indebted to 
the constitutive wartime events of which internment forms a crucial part. Through this 
historical narrative, we can only see internment distorted and coloured by our own 
mitigating explanations that curiously correspond to our anxieties over this event’s 
presence in the historical record of Canada. So, when one states that internment could not 
happen in Sunahara’s (or our) contemporary Canada, we should not read this statement as 
purely an analysis of the political possibilities of the present time period; more so, the 
statement actually serves to claim that the speaker is not so ethically lethargic that they 
would allow internment to occur today. Rather than fully encountering internment in the 
past, this kind of response redirects the encounter to the speaker’s own responsibility in 
the present, ultimately attempting to evacuate the speaker of culpability for internment (‘I 
certainly wouldn’t have stood by and let it happen’). This schema demonstrates two 
points. The first is that, if we are beholden to historical narratives of internment, we may 
never actually encounter the past, and it will remain mediated through our own anxieties 
about ourselves in the present. The second point is that the constant evacuations of our 
culpability for the past (what Sunahara calls “arous[ing] bad memories” and “mak[ing] 
accusations”), the terrible anxieties that we bring to historical narratives (or that they 
bring to us), reveal just how implicated in and responsible for the past we remain, despite 




 One of the more troubling consequences of narrativity in history is the way that 
traditional literary narrative modes come to supplant our reception of the past. Hayden 
White, and perhaps Northrop Frye as well, may respond that these narrative modes are 
important for meaningfully structuring reality, and that our knowledge of history may be 
severely limited if not for the meaning-making powers of narrative and genre. However, 
as readers of history, we are then led into the role of the audience, and view only a 
particular perspective of the past. If we were to categorize histories of internment, such as 
Sunahara’s or even Steveston Recollected, in the four-part generic structure that Frye 
develops in Anatomy of Criticism (the tragedy, the satire, the comedy, and the romance), 
the narrative of internment would most closely resemble a comedy. Frye writes that 
typical comedies follow a process “from a lower world of confusion to an upper world of 
order” (184); an initial state of precarity (the pre-war community of Steveston, facing 
legal troubles and labour exploitation) undergoes a chaotic and nearly tragic 
transformative period (exile and internment), which leads to rebirth and reintegration (the 
return to Steveston, and the emergence of contemporary multicultural Canada, putatively 
“free of racism”). Frye makes much of how being a member of the audience mediates our 
view of the story, saying that, in comedy, “We see the action, in short, from the point of 
view of a higher and better ordered world” (184). This kind of mediation of the narrative 
seems to correspond with the framing of Sunahara’s history by way of our current, 
privileged vantage point in history, where racism is supposedly a thing of the past. Being 
members of the audience of history, we hold the past at arm’s length, measuring it against 
our “higher and better ordered world” (Frye 184), our “tolerant Canada” (Sunahara xi). 




of the final narrative of internment, the comic ending that results in both a return (the 
leaving of the internment camps) and the constitution of our “better” world. At best, the 
comic ending rectifies (and depoliticizes) the troubling state of internment, and at worst it 
makes internment a hard but nevertheless necessary lesson to learn on our way to a 
multicultural Canada. The second point is that, as audience members, we do not form a 
part of the story of internment: we can only receive the story of internment from a 
distance, and react, emote, or absorb. We cannot be responsible for internment, be held 
accountable for internment, continue to be hurt by internment, be psychically unable to 
leave the camps, or hold any other stances toward internment that would be available to 
actors in history. 
Since narratives of internment paralyze our ability to engage with a living past, I 
argue in this chapter that we can turn to Daphne Marlatt and Robert Minden’s Steveston 
as a blueprint for a reinvigorated mode of encountering the past. Both the poetry and 
photography in Steveston explore the possibilities of engaging in alternative, non-
narrative modes of encountering the past so that we may find ourselves, crucially, within 
internment once again. We must ask, then, if historical narratives in the decades following 
internment were (and continue to be) so coloured in present anxieties, what are the ways 
in which we can viably encounter internment? Is it possible to unravel the medium of 
narrative, and to see, as it were, internment in some other way? 
One possibility for eschewing historical narratives of internment is by looking 
through the eyes of those who experienced it firsthand. In “Memories of Internment: 
Narrating Japanese Canadian Women’s Life Stories,” Pamela Sugiman analyzes the 




women who were interned during and after the Second World War. She notes that “Many 
writers of the internment have long promoted the view that the collective Nisei response 
to their internment was aptly expressed by the phrase, shikata ga nai, resignation to the 
situation or what can be done” (“Memories of Internment” 380).12 However, she argues 
that the interviews she conducted reveal “a fuller narrative” that complicates the face of 
this common sentiment: she says that the statement “‘What can be done,’ helps to neatly 
and benignly describe a complex, ambivalent, and perhaps dangerous set of emotions” 
that “are almost always associated with resignation rather than acceptance” (381). 
Sugiman draws a distinction in how her interviewees understand their current relationship 
to their experience of internment in the past. Within shakata ga nai, or, “what can be 
done,” she sees “resignation rather than acceptance,” a sentiment that, she suggests, must 
be hidden due to “cultural and gendered views of acceptable behaviour” (381). Within 
Sugiman’s construct of propriety, memory, and resignation, it is possible to understand 
these memories of internment as, psychically, undone (resigned, but not accepted). What 
Sugiman’s study reveals is that the memory of internment is not settled, or, in narrative 
terms, resolved. An encounter with internment, then, must also bear the unresolved nature 
of the event, the resignation of history. 
The town of Steveston has been a focal point in the history of Japanese Canadians. 
In Roger Daniels’s analysis of Canadian and United States internments of Japanese 
immigrant communities, he argues that the economies of fishing that took place largely in 
Steveston are both an integral part of understanding the history of the Japanese Canadian 
community as well as some of the root causes of anti-Japanese rhetoric that led to 
 




internment: “Many of these [Japanese] fishermen lived in villages that were largely 
Japanese—Steveson [sic], at the mouth of the Fraser River south of Vancouver was the 
largest—and were in almost feudal thrall to the canneries which provided their equipment 
and were the sole market for the salmon they caught” (174). Daniels suggests that the 
canneries exploited the Japanese fishers through a merchant feudalism that tied up most 
of their earnings in the rental and replacement of equipment. Furthermore, the resulting 
financial precarity of the Japanese fishing communities made it possible for the canneries 
to pay the Japanese fishers much less for their work than their white and Indigenous 
counterparts. Being undercut, then, fuelled animosity between the white and Indigenous 
labourers and the Japanese fishing community in Steveston. This picture is corroborated 
in Steveston Recollected, which recounts an 1897 public address to the Japanese fishers in 
Steveston by Mr. T. Nagao: “If the standard price [of salmon] is 6½ cents, the season’s 
catch for one boat will bring $216.465. Expenses will be $66 for the puller, $100 for nets, 
$10 for licence, $24 for food (3½ months), $7 for boots, $2.25 for rubber poncho, $35 for 
boat, and $25 for personal expenses, total $268.65, which will leave us $52 short” (9). As 
Mr. Nagao states, the fishing profession, rather than being a livelihood, sometimes 
resulted in the accumulation of debt and financial servitude to the monopolistic canneries. 
Steveston Recollected (with Marlatt being the principal editor) notes that, when the 
Canadian government seized fishing boats owned by anyone of Japanese ancestry in 
1941, the average Japanese family in Steveston had three years net income invested in 
their boat. Indeed, Harry Sameshima recalls that “‘They deducted 5 cents from the price 
of each fish for the rent, so if you caught a thousand fish that meant $50 a year for the 




Sameshima notes that rent was never actually payable in full, but instead scaled with the 
amount of fish that were brought in. The scaling of rent crystallizes Daniels’s analysis 
that the Japanese fishers could never sever their ties to the exploitative canneries. The 
profits from the booming BC salmon industry that were in large part due to the efforts of 
Japanese fishers never translated to viable wages for the families themselves. 
Daniels further argues that anti-Japanese hostility grew, ironically, because of this 
chronic undervaluing and underpaying of Japanese fishers by the canneries: “By 1901 
more than 40 per cent of the commercial fishing licenses issued by the province (1,958 of 
4,722) were issued to Japanese, whose prominence in this key BC industry quickly drew 
complaints from interested whites and Indians who felt that their prior rights were being 
ignored” (173). Much of the wealth enjoyed by predominantly white BC business owners 
in the early- and mid-twentieth century resulted from the overworking and underpaying of 
Japanese immigrants, and this exploitation formed the basis of anti-Japanese discourse, 
repackaged as a rhetoric of competition between labour classes. As Daniels further 
illustrates, laws and policies restricting the fishing licenses given to Japanese workers, 
restricting immigration from Japan, and restricting suffrage for Japanese Canadians 
provided a basis of legislation that made internment intelligible and palatable in Canada’s 
wartime political and public spheres. If we examine the roots of anti-Japanese rhetoric as 
well as the kinds of racist laws and policies that were forerunners to internment, we can 
therefore see that labour exploitation of working-class Japanese immigrants—centred in 
large part around Steveston—historically underpins internment legislation. 
When Marlatt and Minden originally began visiting and collecting materials in 




gentrification from the encroaching Vancouver suburbs, which brought back feelings of 
class and race struggles in Steveston as well as the expulsion of internment. In the poetry 
of Steveston, the repeated word “monopoly” begins to spread over and choke the book’s 
vision: “This corporate growth that monopolizes / the sun. moon & tide, fish-run. So they 
see nothing remarkable / in this [. . .] it sucks them dry” (18). Gentrification becomes a 
final iteration of the ways in which the exploitative monopolies of the canneries swallow 
the lives of those in the community, so much so that even the natural world (the sun, 
moon, tides, and rivers) seems to answer to the companies. The simultaneous 
pervasiveness of the canneries and the seemingly imminent collapse of Steveston’s 
traditions due to urban encroachment indirectly recall internment, at this time displaced 
only by a single generation: “Or how the plant packs their lives, chopping / off the hours, 
contains them as it contains first aid, toilets, beds, the / vestige of a self-contained life in 
this small house back of the carpentry / shed” (21; original emphasis). The members of 
the town seem frozen between the possibility of the town’s collapse, an expulsion which 
would mimic internment, and the immovable restraints that cannery life throws onto 
them, containing them (as the central metaphor of the word “internment” suggests). The 
poet’s lines too are “chopp[ed] / off” in unlikely, syncopated rhythms: the poem absorbs 
the pressures of containment into its own constitution. Steveston revolves around a 
doubling of internment in the present through modes other than the explicit legislations of 
1942; now, labour exploitation and gentrification contain and cordon off the lives of the 
community members. The book subjects the past to the symbolic energies and patterning 
that we usually find in poetry, which, I argue, indicates that Steveston makes possible a 




with internment, which enables us—and the Steveston community in the early 1970s—to 
participate in the history of internment, rather than simply being audience members held 
at a distance from the drama of history. 
How, though, can we theorize a lyricization of history? In “Lyric History: 
Temporality, Rhetoric, and the Ethics of Poetry,” John Michael asserts that new scholarly 
historicizations of lyric poetry seem to ignore the fundamental readerly moment: since 
poetry not only attempts to do things (such as meditate on a subject or capture a feeling), 
but more specifically to do things to a reader that are both hard to predict and 
indeterminate, it shares a relationship with rhetoric. In this sense of poetry’s rhetorics, the 
reader seems to mimic Frye’s conception of the dramatic or narrative audience. However, 
Michael notes that this indeterminacy of the reader has consequences on our 
understanding of history as well: 
Paradoxically, the historicization of lyric reminds us that history itself has a lyrical 
aspect. It combines recollection and projection, a statement of a past experience or 
state of being addressed to the subjectivity of a future reader or audience whose 
realms of experience and states of being remain indeterminate. In this sense, 
history becomes lyrical, a disturbing fact that lyric poetry often calls to mind, but 
one that historicism often seems to forget. In the subjectivity of a future reader 
emerges history’s and poetry’s significance and whatever ethical efficacy either 
might achieve. (266) 
Thus, the reader of poetry, in contrast to the narrative audience, does not simply observe, 
providing both an instrument to measure the passing of narrative (or historical) time as 




content of history (which also becomes, in poetry, the subjectivity of history) 
corresponds, converses, and clashes with the lyrical content or subjectivity of the reader. 
This is to say that history is no longer mediated by the distance between the action and 
the audience, as it is in narrative; the medium of the lyric only provides us with a 
meaningful encounter with history by way of deliberately putting into conflict the 
subjective modes of the past with the subjective modes of the reader. In this way, we 
become active participants in the expression of history’s ethics, with all of the potential 
traumas and accusations that might entail. 
In “On Lyric Poetry and Society,” however, Theodor Adorno brings up some 
consequences of engaging in lyric poetry, which force us to tread carefully in the 
theoretical grounds of the lyric. He pauses on a certain dilemma within the lyric between 
those dreams and desires, repressed by social antagonisms, that can find expression 
within poetry, and those people who are fortunate enough to be able to express these 
dreams and desires in the first place: “Not only does the lyric subject embody the whole 
all the more cogently, the more it expresses itself; in addition, poetic subjectivity is itself 
indebted to privilege: the pressures of the struggle for survival allow only a few human 
beings to grasp the universal through immersion in the self or to develop as autonomous 
subjects capable of freely expressing themselves” (45). Adorno sees in the lyric impulse 
the desire to express the truth of historical antagonisms, and in the poet the rising of many 
voices distilled into one. Yet, as this one voice rises, as it were, among the many, it 
reproduces another antagonism between those who can and those who cannot speak 
(lyrically or otherwise), even within the topography of speech-acts of resistance. 




autonomous subjects capable of freely expressing themselves” seems to hinge on the 
language of liberal humanism, indicating a paradox between a materialist analysis of the 
proletariat and the liberal humanist utopian ideals of the subject, which seem to find a 
reality within lyric poetry. He goes on to say that “The others, however,” and here he 
means those who cannot speak through lyric poetry, or even speak at all, “those who not 
only stand alienated, as though they were objects, facing the disconcerted poetic subject 
but who have also literally been degraded to objects of history, have the same right, or a 
greater right, to grope for the sounds in which sufferings and dreams are welded” (45). 
The disparities between those who can access and express the universal and those who 
cannot speak are not only revealed in the lyric but magnified: the political Other, 
incapable of (or prevented from) lyric expression, alienated from subjecthood, then 
becomes a lyric object in the emancipation of the poet into the universal. In other words, 
the many voices that the poet distils lose the potential of their subjecthood when they 
come to signify and constitute the poet’s universal subjectivity. 
This dilemma would seem to be a threatening blow to any lyric with an ethical 
project, yet Adorno does indicate that each lyric poem grapples differently with the voices 
of alterity, preferring those, like Baudelaire’s, which strike against bourgeois society to 
those lyrics which attempt to smooth over and silence those voices. Adorno further 
suggests that the expression of the voices of the Other, as much a paradox as that may be, 
is a fundamental, irreducible ethical principle revealed by lyric poetry: not only do those 
others “have the same right, or a greater right, to grope for the sounds in which sufferings 
and dreams are welded” as the lyric poet, but, moreover, “This inalienable right has 




intermittent—the only forms possible for those who have to bear the burden” (45). We 
can characterize the “impure” forms of the Other’s speech (which, by principle, fails) as 
ruptures in the humanist impulse of the lyric, the impulse to universalize and sublimate 
the lyric subject. Thus, this chapter contends that Steveston, and its relationship to the 
work of aural history, Steveston Recollected, bear an essential paradox between a liberal 
humanist and anthropological desire to represent the Japanese community of the BC town 
to the mainstream, white Canadian literary world, and the actual presence of the 
Steveston community as an alterity in Canadian history. Thus, the text works out an 
insoluble negotiation between the essentially privileged status of the lyric poet and 
photographer, and the actual contents of alterity that find expression within the poetry and 
photographs, however “impure, mutilated, fragmentary” they may be. 
This task, to reintroduce alterity into the history of internment, hinges on a similar 
point to the one Mona Oikawa makes in Cartographies of Violence: Japanese Canadian 
Women, Memory, and the Subjects of the Internment. Oikawa discusses the paradoxes of 
a racial analysis of internment, first noting that, although “race” as such lacks scientific 
evidence, it still operates in profound ways on our social bodies. She then destabilizes a 
simple historical reading of race and internment, first the mistaken belief that “only a few 
politicians used power to expel Japanese Canadians from the coastal area” (7), and then 
the assumption that “while some people are constituted as ‘racists’ in narratives of the 
Internment, it is suggested that some who participated in the process of the Internment 
were not racist” (8). Thus, a naïve reading of race that ignores colonial and relational 
analyses of power distorts our understanding of our own participation in the history of 




Canadians who were not politicians, legislators, or RCMP members at the time. Oikawa 
argues, instead, that “Discourses of race position everyone in relation to them, and while 
white people may not think of themselves as racist they still participate in the rules and 
practices that sustain a racial social order and from which they benefit” (8).13 Oikawa 
further points out that these often-ignored relations between power and race are actually 
constitutive elements for the invisible subjectivity of whiteness in Canada: “whiteness is 
discursively unmarked and normalized through some of the Internment narratives 
themselves. Therefore, in representing racialization of Japanese Canadians in the past, we 
may reproduce the rules that produce white domination in the present” (8). Like Sugiman, 
Oikawa looks to interviews in order to eschew the problems inherent to what she calls 
“some of the Internment narratives.” However, it is my contention that both Sugiman’s 
and Oikawa’s moves to look outside of typical narrative modes of history, that is, to look 
to the witness, betray a deeper trouble with historical narrativity in general. This chapter, 
then, aims to destabilize liberal humanist ways of looking, both poetically and 
photographically, in order to avoid the simple dichotomies between race and racist, 
historical villains and neutral observers, which continue to perpetuate the dominance and 
the ethical vacuum of whiteness in Canada. 
Steveston Recollected was originally part of a larger effort led by William J. 
Langlois to provide photographs and aural recordings of various cultural groups in British 
Columbia (Woodward 63). It is somewhat tempting to consider this wider project—to 
pair visual and aural history—as being underpinned by liberal humanist multiculturalism. 
 
13 Daniel Coleman makes a similar point in regards even to early progressivist ideologies 




Certainly the project secured its funding (no easy task) by taking advantage of the 
burgeoning interest toward multiculturalism in Canadian academia in the 1970s. 
However, writers for the project articulated their work in a neutral discourse that made 
room for other types of historical inquiry, and the attention in this project toward the 
visual and the aural itself demonstrates a skepticism toward narrative history. Therefore, 
we should at the outset already understand that Steveston Recollected, the more typical 
history of the two books, already navigates between liberal humanist documentarianism 
and other forms of bearing witness to events in the past. Much of the literature on 
Steveston sees it as a stylized—and perhaps intensified—progression of the historical 
documentary work of Steveston Recollected. Moreover, the meaning of ‘the documentary’ 
and its relationship to factual reality seems uncomplicated in the literature. Instead, it is 
perhaps more pertinent to note the ways in which Steveston undermines the purported 
‘objectivity’ of the documentary. 
Critics of Steveston, though, have for the most part attended to the similarities 
between the two texts. For example, Simona Bertacco notes how Marlatt’s poetry in 
Steveston seems to reflect the same kind of humanist impulses for protection of the 
particular that underpin Steveston Recollected. Furthermore, Bertacco considers the two 
texts both to be branches out of the same historical event, that is to say, Marlatt and 
Minden’s visits to the town: “In the early 1970s, Marlatt was working on an Oral History 
project for the Provincial Archives of British Columbia concerning the Japanese 
fishermen town of Steveston, BC, which gave rise to two books: Steveston (1974) and 
Steveston Recollected (1975). Both works marked a strict collaboration of the poet with 




in the way that Bertacco does here implicitly argues that they are both responses to the 
same archival task, to document the town, and it emphasizes congruency between 
Steveston Recollected and Steveston as well as between Marlatt and Minden. For instance, 
Bertacco sees Minden’s photographic way of looking in Marlatt’s poetry. She seizes on 
the opening poem of the collection, “Imagine: a town,” as exemplary of Marlatt’s 
commitment to the visual; in relation to the colon after “Imagine,” she says, “The pause, 
symbolised by the column, between the imperative verb and the object is pregnant with 
the expectation of a tableau taking shape in front of our eyes” (131–32). Bertacco’s 
reading of the interaction between the first photographs in the 2001 edition of Steveston 
and the opening poem is anchored by the un-noted yet deft wordplay between the words 
“image” and “imagine.” Bertacco demonstrates the ways in which both poem and 
photograph present images of the town and ask us to “imagine” through several vectors: 
they ask us to imagine what is left in the gaps of the photographs and poetry, they ask us 
to imagine actually being a part of the community, and they ask us to imagine the town’s 
past. 
Karis Shearer, in considering both the biographical account of Marlatt and 
Minden’s visits to the town as well as the final texts, notes that Steveston “is perhaps less 
a ‘private’ poem, than an attempt to engage personally with the past and present of a local 
community, which is a kind of public” (226; original emphasis). Although both Bertacco 
and Shearer call attention to the presence of the past in Steveston, Shearer emphasizes the 
personal or impressionistic nature of Marlatt and Minden’s encounter with history rather 
than the purported ‘objectivity’ embedded in the traditional view of the documentary. 




between Minden and Marlatt, Shearer describes it as “a process that constantly involves 
separation and return” (Shearer 226), which she picks up from Marlatt’s remarks on their 
collaboration upon its inclusion in The Long Poem Anthology (1979) edited by Michael 
Ondaatje. Shearer’s reading does attend to the nuances of collaboration and the 
documentary. Her concerns, however, lie in elaborating the restrictions placed on The 
Long Poem Anthology itself. My reading, then, agrees with the core principles of 
Shearer’s view on collaboration and documentary and extends these principles to a longer 
analysis of the text itself. 
In contrast to both Bertacco and Shearer, Laurie Ricou seems more ambivalent in 
his reading of Steveston as an artistic attempt at historical documentary. He says that 
“history speaks diminuendo in Steveston” (295), and the history he has in mind here is 
Indigenous land claims in the Fraser River valley. He also goes on to note that the map, 
which forms the cover of the original 1974 print of Steveston, “announce[s], initially, the 
documentary impulse: the map, as a form implies truth, accuracy, and objectivity in 
representation” (296), an impulse borrowed from Steveston Recollected. At the same 
time, Ricou says that part of the way that the poet in Steveston understands maps and her 
role in documenting the town is by questioning the power-dynamics of map-making as a 
form of geo-social control.14 In Ricou’s conception of the paradox of maps, that they 
purport to be objective even as they betray the values of the cartographer, we can see a 
correspondence with the photograph’s role in Steveston. It attempts an “objectivity in 
representation,” an accurate look at the town, although embedded within the photographs 
 
14 For a lengthier discussion of the histories of settler-colonialism and cartography in 
Canadian literature, see Sarah Wylie Krotz’s Mapping with Words: Anglo-Canadian 




seems to be an articulation of the power, and ethics, of looking. Thus, part of how 
Steveston breaks away from the original aural history project is in its investigations into 
the problems and contradictions of the documentary. 
Some of the photographs in Steveston lend themselves to this reading of the text as 
an artistic (anti-)documentary, a protection of the local and the particular. For instance, 
the set of eight images along “Moncton Street” (Steveston, 2001, 82–89) depict various 
community members going about their daily lives in the town, from “Crossing Moncton 
Street” to the photographs of the “Pool Hall,” “Christine’s Café,” the “Marine Garage” 
workers, the Barbers, and the Hair Stylists. The image of the worker at a gas pump (86) 
emblematizes this documentary aspiration that is humanist more than it is scholarly or 
objective. The garage worker stands in the focused foreground with an almost (but not 
quite) invisible smile, wearing grease-stained coveralls and gently placing a hand on the 
pump. These signifiers juxtapose his clean and contented face (the marker of his 
humanity) with his labour, suggesting a kind of contradiction between the work and the 
worker (or, perhaps, a celebration of the humility and happiness of blue-collar work). 
Advertisements on what we assume to be the Marine Garage building sit blurred in the 
background and obscured by his upright body, again highlighting how his essential 
humanity is surrounded and permeated by the structures of labour and capitalism, which 
attempt (and ultimately fail) to overtake his body. These images seem to respond in part 
to Roger Daniels’s analysis covered earlier in this chapter, which emphasizes the severe 
constraints that the canneries’ exploitation levied on the everyday life of the residents of 
Steveston. The images take us into the felt moments of individual lives in Steveston in 




The other photographs in this section more obviously demonstrate the liveliness of the 
town, a liveliness felt even among those taking a short break from earning their wages. 
The main concern of the images here is with the portrait: recording the many faces of 
Steveston, which, curiously or not, all happen to be smiling in the set of photographs on 
Moncton Street. What is important here is not necessarily that the arranged portraits15 are 
at odds with the “objective” nature of the documentary (to record things as they are), but 
more so that the burying of labour beneath a celebration of diminutive contentedness 
indicates a humanism of the camera-eye. 
Thus, these images depart from the ethics of a traditional documentary, and 
perhaps raise the question of the relationship between “objectivity” and the documentary 
itself. In an interview with George Bowering in 1979, Marlatt gives the following 
description of the poet’s responsibility toward the world of political realities: “I take it 
that a writer’s job is to continue to give accurate witness of what’s happening [. . .] You 
cannot change the world. You can change consciousness, & language is intimately tied up 
with consciousness. That’s our true field of action, is language, as poets. And all you can 
do is to insist on the seeing as it’s evidenced & manifested in the language. In an accurate 
use of language” (Open Letter 82). Marlatt suggests that the poet must be “accurate” with 
respect to the “witnessing” of the world and the “use of language,” which is to say that 
the poet is responsible for maintaining a certain level of honesty in their impressions of 
the world as well as in their record of those impressions. This view leaves room for a 
 
15 Whether the subjects were arranged by the photographer, or whether they arranged 
themselves (a distinction which the images themselves cannot answer), the effect is 
largely the same. The presence of the camera itself seems to interrupt everyday life, 




degree of ambiguity or uncertainty regarding the actual data or facts of the world. A 
documentary, or anti-documentary, in this sense would be one that records the mediated 
encounter between the documentarian and the subject, or even blurs the lines between the 
two, but, in the end, it must remain skeptical of the politics embedded in the 
observed/observer relationship. 
Robert Minden articulates some of this skepticism during a 1980 interview with 
Avis Lang Rosenberg about his photographs of Doukhobor communities in British 
Columbia. He first critiques the idea that “documentary has implied a dispassionate view, 
an impartial presentation of a phenomenon, that anyone who was there at that place, at 
that time, would have come up with the same kind of understanding” (14). What is 
‘captured,’ if anything, in the photographs is not the Doukhobors-in-themselves, but a 
particular encounter between a guest and a community that is not separate from but is 
itself a product of historical conditions. Minden goes on to note that the transparent view 
of documentary as a window into objective facts is almost heightened in the ways we 
might approach photography, if we are not careful: “What is being implied, essentially, is 
that there is no point of view here; it is point-of-view-less in a sense [. . .] The image-
maker is bracketed out of the picture, so that the viewer sees the image and identifies the 
image with the phenomenon, and the relationship between image-maker and image is no 
longer apparent” (14). Minden points out, as others like Barthes and Sontag have done, 
that the photograph deceives us in its simplicity and in its apparent record of what a 
human eye—any human eye—would perceive in that place and at that time. He, instead, 
wants to complicate or make us reflect on moments of mediation: between the 




there in the first place; and between the photograph’s circulation and our own moment of 
looking at the image which is also mediated by history and by various technologies. 
Perhaps more crucially, Minden suggests that another slippage takes place between “the 
image” and “the phenomenon,” which we might mistakenly confuse as being the same. 
To recognize that the image is not the phenomenon is to leave open the possibility that we 
may not be able to ‘see’ through the various mediations and arrive, finally, at a record of 
a phenomenon in its proper contexts. Instead, there may not be a Doukhobor or a Hideo 
Kokubo (whose face forms the cover of the 2001 edition of Steveston) ‘beneath,’ so to 
speak, the photograph at all: there may only be an image itself. Thus, the photograph, 
especially in its documentary mode, engenders at once these two self-annihilating 
potentials: that it records a mediation of an encounter, and that it records only itself. 
Minden goes on to voice his skepticism: not only was documentary “becoming 
increasingly difficult for [him] as an idea,” but also he says that he is “suspicious now 
about the way cameras are used” (14). “One has to be suspicious,” he claims, “about what 
kind of machine the camera is, what the nature of the relationship between image-maker 
and subject is, what happens to that image after it’s made. All those things loom large in 
the making of a portrait, especially when you intervene in another culture.” A 
simultaneous use and mistrust of media technology defines, in a sense, the anti-
documentary aspects of Steveston, the suspicion of the camera even as one points and 
clicks it. This is to say that the use of photography in Steveston also creates a document of 
its own deconstruction, a ‘dirtying’ or obstruction of the same lens that one usually keeps 
spotlessly clean: “to see or understand or investigate is to be involved in a relational 




takes the work of breaking the frame to acknowledge that we’ve been framed” (16).What 
is unique in the way that Minden explains his process of photography in the Doukhobor 
community—to make himself purposefully “conspicuous” as a photographer on the street 
corner, free for community members to speak with, be photographed, or ignore—is that 
the openness of his method is in a sense orthogonal to the technology of the camera 
aperture, which operates by the exclusion of light outside of the frame. The skepticism 
results in a kind of struggle between the photographer and the camera device, as if they 
have competing desires and intentions that must be managed. One of the desires of the 
camera seems to be in “capturing” what Minden calls the subject’s “trace,” which has 
deep implications for the power imbalance between the photographer and the subject: “To 
the extent that the negative contains or is believed to contain a trace of the subject, and to 
the extent that the photographer retains all rights to somebody else’s trace, this power 
raises all sorts of dilemmas about the subsequent use to which photographs are put and 
the kinds of contexts which they may appear in” (16). This issue is acutely important for 
Minden’s immediate project of depicting Doukhobor communities differently than the 
negative portrayals with which they have been shown in previous media. However, the 
“capturing” of another’s trace is a problem that persists across all photographic portraits 
and is also raised in relation to the marginalized and multi-racial communities in 
Steveston. There seems to be, at the root, something useful about an accurate depiction of 
an encounter with a minority community even as a photographer—and, in our case, a 
viewer—must navigate the traps and pitfalls of a fundamentally unequal relationship of 
looking. This impulse to engage in what is at its core a fraught endeavour possibly comes 




Canadian intellectualism in the 1970s that possibly reflects a humanist responsibility 
toward marginalized communities in Canada. 
Although Marlatt and Minden undertook Steveston as a joint project, it would be a 
critical mistake to collapse their contributions into a homogeneous whole that does not 
account for their differing viewpoints, encounters, and, crucially, media technologies. In 
Marlatt’s Afterword to the 1984 edition of Steveston, she recalls that she “was drawn to 
the river, to the tidal town at the Fraser’s mouth where it pours into the sea,” whereas 
Minden “was drawn primarily to people” and “Only with effort did he photograph the 
place” (Steveston, 1984, 93). We do not have to dig too far into the poetry to realize 
Marlatt’s striking expressions of the landscape, or to feel acutely her presence as an 
outsider in Steveston. At the same time, Minden’s portraits of various community 
members, such as the set of images from Moncton Street, seem, on the surface, the most 
memorable, so gracefully performing the humanist desire to crystallize the town in a 
moment of flux, as well as providing a kind of tangible record of their encounter with 
Steveston. However, I am also interested in what the images of the faces, what I theorize 
as a humanist gaze, both assert and obscure, what swirls beneath their surfaces, like the 
overwritten history of internment beneath community politics in 1974. That is to say that 
the great “effort” required of Minden to turn away from the people and toward the place 
is not simply a duty he performed in order to get some necessary photographs for the 
documentary. Rather, his “effort” can also be located within the signs of labour in 
Steveston. The photographic eye, though in some images fully humanist, also betrays a 




The full extent of this chapter’s argument is that the visuality of Steveston offers 
us the same choice as the text’s approach to history. We can look, so to speak, at history 
in a narrative mode, but we are also called (by the text, as well as by the past itself) to 
encounter history in a lyric mode. So too do some images in the collection ask us to look 
with a humanist gaze, perhaps even with the ethical gaze of Levinas as discussed in the 
first chapter. However, other images, especially of labour, demand that we articulate a 
lyricization of the photograph in order to dislocate our perceptions of subjecthood and 
objecthood. When we consider the influence of the archival work of Steveston 
Recollected on Steveston, and when we consider the narrative trajectory of Steveston 
Recollected, how it approaches and recedes from internment as its guiding focus, it seems 
profoundly curious that Steveston has not been read with more than a cursory mention of 
the wartime internment of Japanese people in Canada. Perhaps, though, the suppression 
of internment out of public consciousness, and even the consciousness of the Steveston 
community, explains the absence of this guiding historical event from the literature as 
well as the fragile, obfuscated undercurrent of internment in the text. 
The poem “How it goes” in Steveston exemplifies the simultaneous proximity and 
apocrypha of internment in the collection. It is in the style of an elegy or funeral poem, 
beginning with the poet almost accidentally stumbling on “a pall draped placard” in a 
“store window” that reads: 
In Memoriam 
Steveston Post Office 
Doors Closed 




Michelle Hartley argues that “The placard performs the work of mourning for a 
community that is itself becoming absent. With the removal of the post office, the fishing 
village as it was passes into memory” (para. 31). The closing of the post office signifies 
both the shrinking economic state of the town as well as an end to its ability to speak. 
This book, then, and this poem in particular, act as a kind of vanguard to this loss of 
communication, a last murmur from the town. The loss of the town becomes 
emblematized in the activities and labour of the new generation. The poet learns of this 
when speaking with a woman: “‘The kids grow up & go elsewhere,’ she said, / not 
fishing, not limited to that, or limited, how the company pays, & she / stays” (Steveston, 
2001, 22). The end of this life cycle, that is, fishing, living in the town, having children, 
bound up as it is in exploitative economics, co-occurs with a crisis in the town’s potential 
to express itself. Tsuneko Johnson in Steveston Recollected presents a similar fear and 
dissatisfaction with Steveston’s youth: “‘Most young people leave Steveston. I don’t 
think they want to continue their fathers’ job as a fisherman. A lot of young kids sort of 
look down on their dads, as if to say, well, you’re only a fisherman, you know?” (86). The 
economic pressures put on the town coupled with neoliberal fantasies about social 
mobility, education, and white-collar jobs make fishing life unsustainable and untenable 
in the postwar era. 
 The poem continues on to imagine (or remember?) disasters at sea and personal 
illness: “‘Distress signal should not be used where Urgency signal will do.’ & so, / mouth 
shut, silent, falling into the sea — why won’t they cry out?” (23). The precarity of fishing 
work becomes a guiding metaphor for a spouse dying, possibly in old age, without 




silence: “A pain, a pain rising & no one . . .” (23). Not only does the trailing sentence 
seem to end with an accusation that the pain lacked a witness, someone to see and feel the 
pain, and to provide a testimony, as is expected of all witnesses, but the sentence itself 
loses its words and passes into silence, like a death. Finally, the poem ends with another 
pronouncement of loss, haunting, silence: “Doors / close. & she is haunted by it, as she 
crosses, into shadow, any silent / sunny street” (23). The personal story of loss, the sick 
spouse, stands in for the wider loss, a literal emptying of the town, as the old ones who 
kept up the traditional fishing and canning life die and the young leave, and suburban 
sprawl ruptures and overwrites the town’s history and identity. 
 Part of why this loss is felt so acutely and why such anxieties about the town’s 
future permeate the consciousness of the Nisei is because it already happened. In 
Steveston Recollected Hideo Kokubo recounts the overwhelming anxiety the community 
had about being exiled and split up: “The people who went first felt easier about going 
because there were still may people left behind, but then there got to be fewer and fewer 
men left and we worried what would happen to the women and children. So a group of 
niseis, I was one of them, got together and demanded that they let us go with our families 
to wherever they had to go” (66). The police, of course, came and forcibly removed the 
men from the town, not only imprisoning them in labour camps but also keeping them 
unsure and unaware of the location of their families, who were interned shortly after.  
Kokubo’s account highlights the town’s total lack of political power, and, even 
more, the fact that attempts at advocacy simply mobilized further police violence and 
authoritarianism. Furthermore, Unosuke Sakamoto testifies to the aftermath of internment 




The union people asked me how many fishermen would be coming back when the 
Japanese were allowed back to the Coast in April [. . .] I said I thought maybe 150 
men would come back. Then the union people said if all the Japanese fishermen, 
that would be about 500 or so, came back at once, they’d have to ask the Minister 
not to grant us [fishing] licences. I told them I was absolutely sure 500 men would 
not come back at first [. . .] Many fewer than 150 turned up. (Steveston 
Recollected 72) 
Kokubo’s and Sakamoto’s accounts present a wartime picture of Steveston whereby the 
exile of internment was thought to have caused the death of the town. The community 
was not expected to return, and by and large did not, until years after the war. Steveston 
Recollected goes on to recount the harsh, painful, exploitative, and persecuted return of 
community members who lost nearly all of their previous possessions and who 
experienced racist attacks upon coming back to the town. The difficult return occurred 
only two decades before Marlatt, Minden, and the rest of the team arrived to document 
Steveston. The conversations archived in Steveston Recollected make it clear how 
extraordinary and fragile the return to Steveston was, and that their anxieties about the 
future of the town are permeated by the memory, suppressed as it may be, of exile and 
internment. Steveston Recollected edits and organizes the interviews into a narrative arc 
that pivots around internment, although it also approaches history through testimony and 
memory. 
Marlatt’s poem “How it goes” similarly draws on this hybrid conversational-
archival dialogue that forms the heart of Steveston Recollected, and, as lyric tends to do, it 




correspondence between the future emptying of the town and the haunting of a loss in the 
past. Unlike some other texts in Steveston, this poem does forge more concrete 
connections to internment than hauntings, silences, and ghosts (which are, of course, 
fragile connections to a fragile memory). The poet meets a woman complaining about 
roadwork in the town, which strangely maps the problem of urban sprawl onto the 
memory of internment. The speaker remarks: “They continue, as if. it wasn’t so long ago / 
they changed direction, roads, leaving sea & moving inland, inroads, to a / heart that 
changes. Monopoly” (22). The passage leaves the referent of “they” ambiguous so that it 
refers both to the roads themselves as well as to the interned members of the community. 
Thus, “it wasn’t so long ago” that roads were built to lead into the interior, to the 
internment camps, and “it wasn’t so long ago” that the Japanese people of Steveston 
“changed direction,” were sent away from the sea and interned in the interior. This 
memory, which “wasn’t so long ago,” of State-sponsored exile, the emptying of the town, 
the “Monopoly” of violence that the State wields over the lives and freedoms especially 
of marginalized communities in Canada, becomes infused with the language of 
neoliberalism. This repetition of the past exile in the present suggests that the new form of 
violence perpetrated against the town is diffused, invisible, and economic rather than 
explicitly legislated. This poem suggests that the memory of internment is, in part, 
predicated on, or made tangible by, the survival of the town of Steveston. Thus, the 
emptying of the town due to economic pressures and the recasting of its face by way of 











Figure 4: “Cannery Workers, 1974,” from Steveston (2001), p. 75. 
I would like to draw attention to two photographs which were added to the 2001 
edition and were not included in the first or second editions of Steveston. They are paired 
in the text, sitting opposite each other in the same two-page spread, the first called 




of images of women’s labour in the 2001 edition I think betrays the growing maturation 
of the collection toward the signs of work, on the one hand, and women’s public presence 
in Steveston’s history, on the other.16 The other photographs of cannery workers were 
included in the first edition and showed white men, alone or in pairs, looking blank, busy, 
or exhausted. Instead, we have a group of women, formally posed, smiling, hands resting 
on each other’s shoulders, demonstrating some kind of unity in their shared labour. Both 
the image itself and its new inclusion in the 2001 edition are politically compelling and 
pull us into a range of experiences within Steveston that were previously excluded. 
Indeed, even in Steveston Recollected, the main interests toward labour revolve around 
men learning the fishing trade from their fathers, men being sent to labour camps, men 
whose boats and fishing equipment were seized by the RCMP during World War II and 
forced into auction, netting only scraps. This image, though, seems to me to be a 
celebratory proclamation of an otherwise to the predominantly androcentric history of 
Steveston. This photograph, though, is conspicuous for its occlusions: I wonder, where 
are the comparable images of exhausted, overworked women, women distracted by the 
tasks of the cannery, women outside of this camaraderie of workers? The posing and the 
half-smiles here seem consistent with the photographs of domestic spaces, portraits, and 
families elsewhere in Steveston, suggesting an extension or overlap between the 
workplace and familial spaces in the camera gaze. 
This hybrid gaze between work and private life does some interesting things to 
reconstitute the androcentric historical narrative of labour in Steveston, revealing 
 
16 One could also read the new versions of Steveston as politically “redemptive” historical 




undercurrents of women’s work that had previously been washed over in the aural history 
project. Partly, I think the photograph so skilfully pulls us into the camaraderie and self-
sufficiency of the cannery workers, providing a visual counterpoint to the poet’s 
experience of being an outsider in the town—not only outside the human community, but 
also alienated from the Fraser River and from the town’s fraught histories. However, I 
cannot help feeling that this image also pulls us into a humanism which, in the end, masks 
a materialist encounter with labour itself, an encounter that has the potential to 
reconstitute the history of Steveston in a lyric rather than a narrative mode. Thus, in the 
following reading of the visuality of Steveston, I would like to focus on photographs 
beyond the portraits, the images of work without the workers, in order to show how the 
camera-eye in Steveston operates with a lyric vision. 
The image on the left of the two-page spread, “Herring,” is paired with “Cannery 
Workers” in the book ostensibly because these herring are the kinds of things that cannery 
employees work with. The actual processes of that labour are occluded from the shot, 
leaving us, who are probably unfamiliar with the actual processes of canning herring, to 
struggle to make sense of the excess of the herrings’ bodies. The shot is taken from a soft 
downward angle, which reveals that the pile of fish actually has a topography as we look 
from the foreground into the distance. It hauntingly recalls some of the most well-known 
war photographs, such as the notorious image of Nazi physician Fritz Klein standing in a 
mass grave in Bergen-Belsen, an image as visually shocking as it is a darkly ironic 
inversion of the Hippocratic Oath. The visual language of “Herring” perhaps corresponds 
even more closely with the photographs of the aftermath of the bombings of Nagasaki and 




bodies and uncountable violence. In Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan Sontag sees the 
close proximity of these historical events and their being captured by the photograph as a 
rupturing point in the way we see war and violence: 
If there was one year when the power of photographs to define, not merely record, 
the most abominable realities trumped all the complex narratives, surely it was 
1945, with the pictures taken in April and early May at Bergen-Belsen, 
Buchenwald, and Dachau in the first days after the camps were liberated, and 
those taken by Japanese witnesses such as Yosuke Yamahata in the days 
following the incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August. (17) 
Sontag argues that these sets of images that emerged out of the Second World War came 
to be a defining moment not only for politics and media dissemination, but also for 
photography. This dominance of the images of mass graves on Western photography 
seems to faintly shine through in “Herring,” like a negative. 
“Herring” seems to adopt its visual language from these sets of notorious war 
images. Sontag argues that war photographs such as these, like war art, also “could be 
beautiful—in the sublime or awesome or tragic register of the beautiful” (55). Although 
we may recoil at the suggestion that war photography can be aesthetic, she nevertheless 
declares, “the landscape of devastation is still a landscape” (55). These images of mass 
graves primarily seem to operate by stunning us in both senses of the term: we are 
impressed even as we are bewildered, and, indeed, one relies on the other. As I have 
stated, we can attempt to take on a narrative reading of photography, though not without 
the consequences of narrative on our conception of history. However, in images of mass 




the grave, whereas narrative readings abound in images of single victims, which results in 
a tragic mode of analysis. When viewing mass graves, we are shut off from the typical 
ways we might want to feel toward death: pathos for the victims, a coherent narrative of 
violence that we can condemn, the historical particularities of the individual people, and 
so on. We are left, then, at that moment of being stunned, able to see clearly an almost 
too-private excess of violence, but unable to actually peer meaningfully into the world 
that contains the bodies. Thus, these images present a kind of negative sublime, a world 
that transcends the human and human understanding, but, ultimately, reduces rather than 
expands our potentialities. This negative sublime captures the second sense of being 
“stunned,” which points to the strange aesthetics or artistry of the photograph. Sontag 
calls this aesthetic mode a “landscape of devastation”; what is so dangerous and 
compelling about this visual language of the mass grave is that, in these photographs, the 
bodies themselves form the landscape, which I describe as a topography in relation to 
“Herring.” Images of violence embody a duality: they record for moral effect and retain, 
however uncomfortably, their status as art objects. The mass grave more than any other 
style of photograph holds these two opposing characteristics. If there is an artistry in these 
photographs, however haunting or horrifying, it must be found in the only landscape 
available, the bodies. Finally, our inability to narrativize these photographs to any 
substantial degree of analysis (that is, an analysis that still looks at it as an image and not 
only as a historical document) means that we must face them in their visuality, 
simultaneously as moments of real violence and as art objects. Thus, the sublime rises in 
this contradiction—the halting, stunning effect of wavering between our bearing witness 




object. The photographs of mass graves, offered silently before our gaze, waver 
intentionally beyond our understanding. 
 Although “Herring” borrows from the visual language of photographs of mass 
graves, we are thrown into the world of labour, which halts the stunning effect endemic to 
war images. Rather than shocking, then, the photograph becomes fatiguing. To narrativize 
the fish, or to comprehend them as atomized objects (let alone beings), begs us to engage 
in a visual labour that corresponds to, and empathizes with, the physical labour that 
actually goes into canning herring: preparing equipment and nets, catching the herring, 
collecting and organizing them, dividing them into cans, etc. In the face of the exhaustion 
that “Herring” puts us through, the collection almost calls us to abandon “Herring” in 
favour of the humanist gaze found in, say, the nine smiling or serene women in “Cannery 
Workers,” which conveniently sits on the opposite page. 
My focusing in on the photographs of labour rather than the portraits reminds me 
of a passage in Roland Barthes’s Camera Lucida. As Barthes is trying to figure out why 
he finds some photographs so inspiring, and others dull and contemptuous, he says, “In 
this glum desert, suddenly a specific photograph reaches me; it animates me, and I 
animate it. So that is how I must name the attraction which makes it exist: an animation” 
(20). Barthes here, looking for an essential quality that connects the photographs that he 
loves, finds that it is an animation. In this chapter, I am trying to analyze not what 
connects the photographs in Steveston that I love, such as “Cannery Workers.” Rather, I 
am trying to explain what connects the photographs that make me recoil, or that exhaust 
me, that seem weary in their gaze, their appeal, and their content, what, in the two-page 




us so thankful to be able to turn away from the herring and toward the cannery workers, 
what compels us toward narrativizing the town’s history, and what is lost when we do. 
So, I am suggesting that in Steveston we should turn away from the portraits and 
toward the work, just as we turn away from narrative and toward lyric, and away from 
humanism and toward the materiality of labour. 
“Herring” not only resists the humanist gaze, but, like Sontag’s reading of mass 
graves, it also seems to rebuke its constitution as an art object. In “Lyric History: 
Temporality, Rhetoric, and the Ethics of Poetry,” John Michaels argues that the quality of 
the lyric or the photograph that resists its own artfulness opens up an imaginative or 
psychic space that allows us to engage with “living history” (275). Drawing on Barthes, 
he describes how this psychic space operates in both the lyric and photography: “It is by 
its unpredictable and uncoded elements, its punctual and idiosyncratic being in the 
reader’s experience, that the lyric or the photograph actually enters lived time and living 
history” (275). Moreover, he says that in the unpredictability of the lyric or the 
photograph—and not in its coded structures—“hopes for ethical engagement finally 
lodge,” even if “those hopes can always be disappointed” (275). To engage ethically with 
the lyric or with the photograph is to pause on the moments of excess and otherness in the 
text. I would wish only to complicate Michaels’s idea that lyric history is a “living 
history”; surely, lyric history is a history of a perpetual present, as grief and trauma 
themselves perpetually invade the present. However, as Barthes notes in Camera Lucida, 
all photographed objects are spectres, and, as he puts it, in every photograph is “the return 
of the dead” (9). Thus, there seems to be a more complicated duality in the so-called 




to the living via the interplay between the viewer and the photograph, but also a renewal 
of the death itself. The photograph, then, is caught out of step with narrative time, and, 
moving among the spectres of the past, we as viewers become spectres ourselves (and 
Barthes deliberately refers to the viewer as the spectator). In this sense, the photograph, 
viewed lyrically, does not represent the living nor the dead, but the moment of dying 
redrawn perpetually within the frame. 
“Herring” makes an interesting case for lyric photography, since, of course, the 
fish are already dead. Thus, the loss that we bear witness to in the photograph is post-
mortem, the moment when the fish are transformed from beings to commodities within 
the cannery. This accounts somewhat for the fatiguing effect of the photograph, since the 
lives of the herring are beyond the captured moment. The historical moment that we are 
thrust into by way of the lyric gaze of the photograph is a commemoration of the loss of 
labour, and we look through laboured eyes. In contrast to the humanist gaze in “Cannery 
Workers,” the gaze of “Herring” seems to converge the camera “eye” and the lyric 
“eye”/I. This lyrical and laborious gaze is shared with sections of Marlatt’s poetry in 
Steveston. In “Steveston as you find it” the poet reflects her disgust for the discarded and 
commodified bodies of the fish onto an ignorant middle-class lifestyle: 
        We orient 
always toward the head, & eyes (yes) as knowing, & knowing us, or what we do. 
But these, this, is “harvest.” These are the subhuman facets of life we 
the town (& all that is urban, urbane, our glittering table service, our white 
wine, the sauces we pickle it with, or ourselves), live off. These torsos. 




we also raise to kill, mink up the valley. (Steveston, 2001, 19) 
In this lyric, the decadent lives of other people in Vancouver, the “urban, urbane,” cast 
further shame onto the callous way that the fish are transformed into objects, “These 
torsos,” which end up as garbage, thrown away. So, the acute loss experienced in this 
lyric is the moment that the fish become object-commodities, the invisible underbelly of 
bourgeois life, a commemorated moment that also takes place in “Herring.” Since this 
poem and “Herring” hinge on the very same instance of loss, we can see how both 
operate on lyrical visuality, a gaze that turns away from the human and, shamefully and 
mournfully, toward labour. 
A narrative analysis of the photograph called “Canadian Pacific Camp, Spring 
1973” (see Figure 5 below) would wonder about this man’s circumstance—is he a 
fisherman, working on his own boat, or perhaps contracted to help someone else? Who 
are his friends and relatives in Steveston, do their portraits appear in the book, does he 
appear in the poetry? And, finally, the mysteries of this image are fully answered when 
we turn to the next photograph in the collection, a close-up portrait of his face and hands, 
casually holding an oiled rag. Part of what happens in the narrative analysis is that we 
want to turn to his full face on the next page, and for this reason I have chosen not to 
display the image here. We want to turn away from this photograph, and toward his life, 






Figure 5: “Canadian Pacific Camp, Spring 1973,” from Steveston (2001), p. 68. 
Instead, I wonder if we can dwell with the lyric properties of the photograph, if we 
can refuse to evade the weariness of work. In a lyric analysis of this photograph, it is 
possible to read this image metaphorically: the slight figure of the worker kneeling on a 




more singularly purposed boats loom and rock. He almost becomes swallowed by their 
size and craftsmanship. His raft attaches to the boat he is working on, like a scaffold, 
perhaps placing him in a side role in a grand tragedy of construction: at one moment the 
image underscores his efforts, and in the next they fall away in obscurity beneath the 
blank faces of the vessels. With such unsalvageable possibilities of wasted work, it is no 
wonder that we are compelled to look on in the collection for a portrait of his casual, half-
smiling face, desiring the ease with which he turns from his work to the compassionate 
lens of the camera. 
If the first, narrative analysis of Steveston is typified by the incredible portrait of 
Hideo Kokubo used as the cover image of the 2001 edition, then my analysis of the 
lyricism of labour finds its full expression in the photograph called “Gill Net, 1973” (see 
Figure 6 below). The image is both thrilling and exhausting. It depicts a close-up of a 
tangled net cascading over the side of a boat, piling its attached buoys in the immediate 
foreground. The seemingly accidental flowing of the net seems to gather a kind of 
Latourian material energy, both revealing and concealing the ghosts of labour beneath the 
net. This is, perhaps, the most lyric photograph in the collection, and in such a typical 
lyric fashion it bears an unresolvable contradiction. Even as it compels us, unbidden, into 
an unmediated encounter with labour, it also seems disturbing, somehow wrong or 
ungraceful, from the tangles that are almost too complicated to dwell on, to the framing 
that seems deliberately irritating, almost as if the camera refuses to rescue or clean up the 
image, while, at the same time, shuffling us on to more humanist and tolerable encounters 






Figure 6: “Gill Net, 1973,” from Steveston (2001), p. 79. 
The aural history project, Steveston Recollected, narrativizes the history of the 
internment of Japanese people in Canada, and that narrative resembles a literary structure. 
First, Steveston had an integrated community, that was then exiled and displaced in the 
internment camps, and finally the community returned and reintegrated in Steveston. The 
problem with this popular narrative of internment is that, in literary terms, we would call 




artistic work, Steveston, handles the narrative in a much more complex way, essentially 
duplicating internment through fears about the encroachment of Vancouver’s suburbia. 
However, it seems to me that an analysis of Minden’s photographs as primarily reifying 
Marlatt’s poetry tends toward narrativizing the history of internment, and narrativizing 
internment obscures our ability to encounter history in its animation in the present. So, by 
lyricizing the photographs, we can then lyricize rather than narrativize history, allowing 





Chapter 4: Daphne Marlatt’s Taken, Intimacy, Clarity 
 This final chapter looks at war through the fragmented lens of Daphne Marlatt’s 
1996 novel Taken. The novel explores the afterlife of the 1941 Japanese invasion of 
Malaya from the vantage point of the highly technological—even postmodern17—1990 to 
1991 Gulf War. The first chapter of this dissertation laid out the foundations of Levinas’s 
traditional phenomenology in order to analyze trauma. The second and third chapters 
connected Levinas’s phenomenological encounter with otherness to radio’s garrison 
technology and to the alterities of history. This chapter explores materialist feminism’s 
recent critique of traditional phenomenology, which argues that traditional 
phenomenology universalizes sense experience and does not take into account the 
particularities of real material bodies—i.e., that differences in sex, gender, culture, and 
ability all disrupt the idea that our sense experiences are the same. Therefore, I outline a 
new feminist phenomenology that is sensitive to the materialist critiques, and this 
feminist phenomenology develops from two converging directions. First, feminist 
scholars provide a theoretical basis for a new phenomenology that accounts for the 
materialist critique and reestablishes the otherness of sense experience. Second, Taken 
itself suggests new kinds of perception and kinship as antidotes to global war: the novel 
asks us to consider relationships of mothering and intimacy with unknowable Others and 
across vast distances. I further suggest that these relationships develop out of a feminist 
queer ethos that is partially rooted in Marlatt’s intertextual communications with Webb’s 
lyric poetry. Finally, the chapter compares these fragile kinships with traditional types of 
wartime media, such as letters and television broadcasts, which distort the perceptual field 
 




of war while reinforcing British colonial and patriarchal power structures. At the very site 
of the confusion between the colonial and the patriarchal in wartime discourse, the queer 
feminist ethos of mothering and intimacy allows us to peer beyond the distortions of 
media and to apprehend global violence, paradoxically, through the diminutive, intimate 
relationships of care. 
At the same time that Taken forces us to stretch our conception of violence across 
the globe, from Canada to Singapore, Kuwait to Melbourne, it derives these long-
reaching sensibilities out of the intimate relationships between mothers and daughters. 
Indeed, Suzanne in 1990 reimagines her mother Esme’s experience of getting married and 
having children in Malaya when she looks through old photographs of her parents and 
their letters to each other. Mothering, however, breaks its strictly biological bonds in the 
novel. For instance, when Esme cannot imagine that her own mother, an upper middle-
class white woman in colonial Malaya, could have nursed her, she wonders, “Who had 
that first ayah been [who had nursed her]? with what child of her own or child lost? And 
what had she covertly passed to Esme in her milk, what tastes, what feelings?” (113). The 
implication here is not only that mothering interrupts colonial binaries (even as the act of 
nursing is the product of colonial servitude in the first place), but also that the possible 
ghost of this ayah’s lost child, that is, a mother’s grief, may have been passed on in her 
milk. The intimacy of grief here provides a counterpoint to Levinas’s conception of the 
encounter with the Other, which was outlined earlier in this dissertation: rather than the 
encounter remaining mediated by the gap between the gazes of the self and the Other, this 




 This idea of mothering, taking another into oneself, a possible rupture of the 
liberal subject or individual, also applies to the novel’s conception of broader social 
relations. It is, then, not coincidental that the novel begins with the following epigraph 
being taken, as it were, from Phyllis Webb’s Water and Light: 
My loves are dying. Or is it that my love 
is dying, day by day, brief life, brief candle, 
a flame, flambeau, torch, alive, singing 
somewhere in the shadow: Here, this way, here. 
The novel asks us to understand this resonance between Webb and Marlatt as a form of 
mothering, which seems to offer a feminist rejection of traditional ways of reading 
intertextuality and the canon. Stephen Collis in Phyllis Webb and the Common Good 
outlines the ways in which Webb counters Harold Bloom’s conception of intertextuality 
as an anxiety-driven property claim, and the paradoxically atomized “individual talent” of 
T.S. Eliot. Instead, Collis calls Webb’s technique “a poetics of response” (15), being 
separate together, with writing as the bridge that forges kinship between poets. The 
familial metaphor of kin bears some resemblance to the concept of mothering that is 
central to Taken and, I argue, Marlatt’s relationship to poets like Webb. However, 
Collis’s conception of a poetics of response stops short of the essential feminist 
phenomenology that forms the intimate ways of looking that are at the heart of Marlatt’s 
work. The previous chapter on photography in Steveston developed a poetics of the image 
of the Other. This chapter asks, then, if not the gaze of the Other, but the gaze (or the 





 The passage from Water and Light thinks through “love” by way of the 
reverberation of light and darkness, “a flame . . . singing / somewhere in the shadow.” 
The ambiguity in the passage relates to whether the torch is alive despite the shadow, 
singing in repudiation of obscurity, or whether the shadow itself grants life to the torch, 
which is to say that her love, dying, is both the candle and the darkness. In Seeing in the 
Dark, Butling traces this shifting metaphor of light and darkness in Webb’s work. She 
associates this formal aesthetic with Webb’s feminist sensibilities, contending that the 
patriarchal hubris of the Enlightenment tradition has suppressed into the darkness both 
non-Western, racialized Others as well as women. Webb’s poetry, Butling argues, 
initiates “a seeing within the dark” (1) that reclaims the essential otherness which is 
suppressed in the liberal humanist metaphor of enlightenment. Thus, Webb’s poetry 
provides a new way of understanding darkness, politics, and history that resonates out 
from the sensitive “eye” of the poet. 
 The broad strokes of Butling’s analysis also apply to Marlatt’s concerns, 
especially in Taken. In the following passage from the novel, despite the prose being 
probably too strict in its syntax for Webb, one can still hear her nurturing voice, and 
nearly mistake it for either writer: 
And all my stories turn in this transition hour just before dawn, when light begins 
to intimate the differences between things still rooted in earth’s shadow. I think of 
you in the Midwest where it has been light for some time and the furrows are 
drawing you out beyond town. (129–30) 
The light of dawn seems to solidify and clarify the distinctions between objects as well as 




is perhaps not available to the lighted world. However, and this is where my analysis 
departs from Butling’s, the lighted world here does not seem to be the enlightened world; 
this is to say that the binary between the night’s darkness and dawn’s clarifying light is 
not simply the opposition between a dark, creative otherness and the patriarchal and 
colonial strictures of the public (humanist, positivist) world. Instead, as the novel puts it, 
the “light begins to intimate the differences between things” (129; emphasis added). The 
text suggests that intimacy is somehow related to this basic phenomenological experience 
of clarifying the differences between objects. Indeed, in the passage, the narrator thinks of 
her lover across a great distance in the precise moment when the world begins to be 
distinguished. So, if a binary opposition is possible (and the text indicates that binaries 
may only be available to the lighted world), it would hinge on the contrast between the 
darkness of the Other and the intimacy that is somehow enabled by the process of dawn’s 
distinction. 
 Webb’s collection Naked Poems does not seem wholly alien to this relationship 
between light and darkness that becomes a central motif in Taken: 
    walking in dark 
   waking in dark the presence of all 
  the absences we have known.     Oceans. 
   so we are distinguished to ourselves 
    don’t want that distinction. 
  I am afraid. I said that. I said that 




This is the closest to a traditional lyric that Naked Poems comes, and it lies at the 
precipice in the collection between the lovers’ meeting and the existential confusion that 
the book falls into. Yet, we have already witnessed the flourishing and the demise of the 
women’s relationship, so, are we out of time here, or in a memory? Is this poem a product 
of the broken relationship, the distinction being the first step to abandonment? Or could 
this poem occur on any typical night, thereby revealing something more essential and 
endemic to the conditions of intimacy between the lovers? The ambiguity here points to a 
purposeful confusion between the so-called good times early in the relationship and the 
breakup that occurs quite linearly over the course of the first two sections of Naked 
Poems. This is to say that the poem seems to suggest that isolation (or, distinction) is not 
at odds with intimacy, rather they are products of each other. So, waking out of the dark, 
amorphous world and into distinction provides the simultaneous conditions of intimacy 
and isolation. Indeed, the beauty of the poem seems to originate in the fragile balancing 
of fear and care: “I am afraid. I said that. I said that / for you.” This poem draws together 
what seem to be the poles of romance, the getting together and the falling apart, and 
instead suggests, ironically, that there is no distinction between the two. A falling into 
love is as dangerous and self-erasing as a falling out. And, as this chapter will explore, the 
poem also indicates that this simultaneous intimacy and isolation stem from our coming 
into contact with the world. What is more, the intimacy and isolation expressed in 
Suzanne and Lori’s own version of “waking in dark” resonate not only with their fears 





 So, this chapter connects lyric intimacy with media studies through the shared 
aesthetic of light and darkness in order to look at how Taken responds to and articulates 
violence. In this examination of media, I am drawn back to the first chapter’s analysis of 
phenomenology and alterity in Webb. However, the commitment to intimacy even in the 
face of global violence that permeates Taken (and, as it happens, crops up in various 
places throughout both Webb’s and Marlatt’s oeuvres) demands a feminist rethinking of 
phenomenology. If we conceive of media as an extension of sense experience, then our 
way of being in the world is predicated on our structures of sense experience, which are 
not only biological (eyes, ears) but also technological (radio, television). Feminist 
phenomenology allows us to make a historically contextualized and de-universalized 
account of the whole sphere of sense-making apparatuses, whereas traditional 
phenomenology mistakenly conceives of a transcendental observer with sense structures 
that are universal among humans. 
 Recent feminist scholars have returned to early feminist phenomenologists, such 
as Simeone de Beauvoir, in order to point out that these foundational texts do contain 
some groundwork for de-universalizing phenomenology. In The Ethics of Ambiguity, de 
Beauvoir attempts to show how the otherness of alterity provides a new foundation on 
which to ground both phenomenology and ethics. Part of her project is to disrupt the idea 
that our sense-making apparatus is fixed, stable, and thus universal: 
As soon as one considers a system abstractly and theoretically, one puts himself, 
in effect, on the plane of the universal, thus, of the infinite. That is why reading 
the Hegelian system is so comforting. I remember having experienced a great 




Nationale in August 1940. But once I got into the street again, into my life, out of 
the system, beneath a real sky, the system was no longer of any use to me: what it 
had offered me, under a show of the infinite, was the consolations of death; and I 
again wanted to live in the midst of living men. (158) 
De Beauvoir suggests here that there is a chasm between the transcendental system of 
Hegel and the material world of the “real sky” and “living” bodies. However, as Leonard 
Lawlor points out, de Beauvoir’s analysis is split between her commitment to the 
presence of the Other, living in the midst of real others, and her understanding of 
phenomenology as a transcendent apparatus of philosophical inquiry. She does, certainly, 
complicate universalism as it relates to our sense-making structures, questioning whether, 
in fact, we receive sense whole, or if sense is constituted and conditioned by our historical 
contexts and material bodies—perception, in the end, is unstable and ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, as Anne van Leeuwen artfully demonstrates, even if de Beauvoir does 
contextualize our sense-making apparatuses, in her phenomenology the fruits of those 
apparatuses still reveal transcendental truths about the structures of our senses. 
 More recent materialist feminisms have grown out of Gilles Deleuze’s work on 
empiricism, and they offer a biting critique of this commitment to transcendence that 
underpins phenomenology. According to these scholars, if phenomenology is the search 
for the transcendental structures that condition any specific experience, materialist 
feminism instead attends to the actual products and effects of an experience. As Claire 
Colebrook summarizes, “The question of philosophy, for empiricism, is not to account for 
the condition of meaning of the given but to respond to the given” (113). The “condition 




attempts to describe the structures (the conditions of meaning) by which we come to 
know things (the given). Materialism instead rejects a philosophy that is purely schematic 
or scientific in favour of one that can also be creative, dialogic, and generative: 
“Philosophy’s creation of concepts is not a clarification or formalisation of possible 
experience, but a form of experience itself” (113). 
 As both Colebrook and van Leeuwen point out, this rupture between 
transcendental and material philosophies in feminism stems from the erasure of sex or 
gender difference18. In the rejection of gender essentialism, such as in a radical 
poststructuralist interpretation of Judith Butler’s early works,19 sex and gender become 
primarily contested discursive fields rather than irreducible categories of difference or 
unstable conditions of perception. Gender difference, then, sublates into the 
transcendental identity of the subject, even when that subject is under scrutiny or 
complication. Even more sinisterly, and this may apply to Deleuze as well, gender 
 
18 The more-familiar category of gender difference is rendered variously in early feminist 
works, mediated especially by the problem of translation, as sex, sexual, or sexuate 
difference, and its appearance has been critiqued as essentialist in writers like Irigaray. 
Stevi Jackson, however, does argue that sex as a social category had already been 
articulated as early as the 1970s by French materialist feminists (110). Still, as van 
Leeuwen also suggests, there exists some ambiguity in the extent to which sex or sexual 
difference refers merely to foundational, biological categories (481). Thus, the following 
discussion somewhat crudely uses the phrase gender difference to connote this highly 
contested and ambiguous translated phrase sex difference in order to point to, at least, the 
materialist effects of gender divisions if not also to maintain some distance from material-
essentialist interpretations. 
19 Interpretations of the connection between the materialist turn in feminism and Butler’s 
Gender Trouble (1990) and Bodies that Matter (1993) vary. Some critics claim that new 
materialism corrects Butler’s de-emphasizing of the agency of matter (see Gill Jagger), 
while others contend that there is a materialist strain in Butler that accords with new 




difference may sublate to difference or alterity in general under transcendental 
philosophies. In this sense, transcendentalism performs an erasure of gender difference. 
In the face of this dire critique, one may wonder whether phenomenology, 
ostensibly committed to transcendentalism, can recover at all. Interestingly, materialism 
has had its own struggles with the tendency to collapse gender difference into other 
categories of critique, but feminist scholars have managed to recuperate the field, and 
perhaps the same can be done with phenomenology. Since materialist feminism grew out 
of Marxian and socialist materialism, as Diana Leonard and Lisa Adkins discuss, 
materialist feminisms have had to contend with the erasure of gender difference under 
general categories of class divisions. Crucially, Leonard and Adkins remark, in the 
theorizing of material problems such as domestic inequality, low pay, and gendered 
violence as ideological products of capitalism, “both capital and labour were viewed as 
ungendered categories” (9). Materialist feminists thus have had to reclaim materialist 
analyses of sex and gender from their politically hollowed place as simply instantiations 
of wider, “ungendered” social antagonisms. As early as 1980, Christine Delphy 
summarized the primary political task of materialist feminism when she baldly stated that 
the subsumption of gender difference into general Marxian categories was “due to a 
desperate desire to continue to exempt men from responsibility for the oppression of 
women” (79; original emphasis). So, part of the recuperative project of materialist 
feminists like Delphy, Leonard, and Adkins is to assert gender as a primary mode of 




in carving out their methodology as distinct from the (purposefully) de-gendered roots of 
Marxian materialism out of which they grew.20 
 Curiously, though, the materialist critique of feminist phenomenology proceeds on 
the same grounds. Colebrook, for instance, outlines the materialist position that feminist 
phenomenology is untenable because its root philosophy—phenomenology—tends to 
reduce gender difference to alterity in general. The claim, then, is that feminist 
phenomenology should be abandoned for materialist feminism instead, because the latter 
has undergone a successful turn to assert the irreducibility of gender difference. However, 
van Leeuwen demonstrates several key re-readings of Simone de Beauvoir and Luce 
Irigaray to suggest that feminist phenomenology may be able to undergo a similar turn. 
The most illustrative example that van Leeuwen takes comes from the opening remarks of 
Irigaray’s Sharing the World, where she says, “As soon as I recognize the otherness of the 
other as irreducible to me or my own, the world itself becomes irreducible to a single 
world: there are always at least two worlds” (Irigaray, x). Irigaray claims that a true 
recognition of the Other creates “at least two worlds,” and van Leeuwen argues that these 
worlds which are at least two complicate transcendentalism since they suggest that radical 
otherness is embedded in the very structures of our senses: the world of the Other cannot 
collapse into the world of the self, and thus no universal subject can exist. This version of 
phenomenology that van Leeuwen discovers in Irigaray begins with the irreducible 
 
20 For instance, Donna Haraway recovers gender difference by arguing that all knowledge 
is embodied. She says, though, that feminist embodiment must resist being a “fixed 
location in a reified body, female or otherwise,” and instead correspond to “nodes in 
fields, inflections in orientations, and responsibility for difference in material-semiotic 
fields of meaning” (588). Consequently, gender difference, representing discrete 
processes of coming to embodied knowledge, remains distinct from the general problem 




alterity of gender difference, thus it seems to reject the transcendentalism that forms the 
heart of the materialist critique. 
 This irreducible gap in our ability to conceive of the Other lies at the heart of the 
question of mothering outside of hereditary family structures. In Taken, Esme’s questions 
over the ayah who had nursed her actually begin with a kind of disgust that she feels 
toward her own biological mother when she considers how she might raise her own 
daughter: 
There were days when she longed for something she knew she couldn’t expect: a 
sure knowledge, an easy familiarity with mothering Aylene might have passed 
on—like mother’s milk, she thought, and then recoiled. It was impossible to 
imagine her mother, who worried about babies spitting up on her and complained 
of grubby little hands, it was difficult to imagine Aylene ever nursing a baby. 
Amazed that she had never wondered until now how she had been nursed, she 
realized she must have been handed over to a wet-nurse, an ayah hired so that her 
mother could carry on her social round. Who had that first ayah been? with what 
child of her own or child lost? And what had she covertly passed to Esme in her 
milk, what tastes, what feelings? (112–13) 
Esme first experiences a barrier to intimacy with her real mother that manifests in a 
disgust that she “recoiled” at. One might expect the connection between biological 
mother and daughter to be one of the most intimate bonds. However, at the moment when 




connection to her own daughter, the gap, the impossibility of full intimacy, rears its head 
as the primary emotion of disgust.21 
 This context, the assertion of a relational gap that is coterminous with Esme’s 
attempt at intimacy, is necessary for a proper reading of her connection to the absent 
ayah. In a sense, these two relationships, one to a biological mother and one to an almost-
adoptive mother, are two instantiations of the same phenomenological dynamic. When 
Esme cannot imagine her own mother nursing her, an absence is revealed to Esme, that 
she may lack a mother or at least lack knowledge of her own constitution through 
mothering. This lack in how she understands her own constitution would manifest as a 
lack in herself, and, thus, in phenomenological terms, the lack would resound outwards to 
her relations with the world and with others. The absence in herself, then, is filled by an 
absent ayah whom she has no direct access to. Her connection to this ayah is at both the 
height of intimacy and the depths of distance. In the case of the former, Esme knows the 
ayah through her own body; she has literally taken the ayah into her own being. Yet, for 
the latter, this ayah remains an unknowable Other, one whom she cannot even recall 
meeting. 
 This moment, then, also addresses our relations to an Other across racial or 
colonial grounds. The text holds the ayah’s thoughts, motives, constitution, and even 
basic bodily appearance at such a distance that Esme cannot meaningfully encounter her. 
Indeed, as I noted earlier, the tenor of their connection is not even available to Esme, 
 
21 Julia Kristeva reads the child’s disgust at “the fantasy of incorporation” with the 
mother, represented by the transference of milk, as the child’s first emergence into a 





whether she was fed in addition to an also unknown “child of her own,” or, mournfully, in 
place of a “child lost.” Furthermore, this instance of adoptive mothering seems to distill 
the larger questions of British colonialism in Malaya: even if Esme’s desires for an 
adoptive mothering in her childhood are accurate, the shades of an imperial relationship 
between a wealthy British woman and a local woman acting as her servant still colour her 
connection to the world of the colonial Other. This moment of intimacy that Esme begins 
to feel between herself and a racial Other is, in van Leeuwen’s terms, coextensive with 
the emergence of an irreducible gap between herself and the ayah. Indeed, draped in 
colonial domination, even mothering takes on the duality between intimacy and distance 
that feminist phenomenology offers. 
 On first reading, Taken seems to suggest that colonialism itself creates this 
profound gap between the European and Malayan subjects: 
Esme had doubts. In the glimpses of life in the kampongs she sensed a way of 
being in and of the island she would never experience, despite its flowers that 
filled her house [. . .] But she didn’t say this, didn’t know how to say these things 
that felt like glimpses rather than positions she could take in conversation. (31) 
The tenor of the language here is steeped in phenomenological discourse: glimpses, 
senses, ways of being, and experiences. Esme’s intuitions of radical alterity, however, 
leave her looking sort of naïve. Decorating with local flowers in this passage opposes the 
gap she feels between herself and the island, but the obvious colonial overtones, the kind 
hand of empire gently dominating while also acquiring, appropriating, and domesticating, 
simply reify Esme’s inability to actually encounter Malaya. Under other philosophical 




“positions [one] could take in conversation,” Malaya may truly remain inaccessible to the 
British colonizers. This is to say that the inaccessibility of Malaya, solvable or not, 
creates a problem in traditional epistemology or ontology. However, the inaccessibility 
itself is barely registered for Esme, only in mere “glimpses,” a word repeated twice in this 
passage. Rather than a problem in phenomenology, this gap is a generative origin point 
out of which ethics spring. Time and again Taken attends to these “glimpses” of radical 
Otherness not only as an assertion of decolonial knowledge (that the empire cannot, as it 
posits, know or control totally), but also as the production of a postcolonial ethics, 
predicated on the fragility of our bodies, mothering, and how we look at others. 
 If we are to approach cultural Otherness through feminist phenomenology, 
however, a large problem exists in regard to the ways in which our culturally inflected 
structures of speech already pre-suppose the characteristics of Otherness and thus reduce 
radical alterity to the simple fact that other minds exist. This problem stems from 
incorrectly identifying the ways in which our own descriptions of phenomena themselves 
come up against radical alterity. For instance, how we experience our own bodies can be 
as culturally bound as language itself. Feminists have dwelt on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
unification of embodiment and pre-reflective experience with phenomenology as a 
possible answer to the gender-vacuum in much transcendental philosophy. As he says, 
“We do not merely behold as spectators the relations between the parts of our body, and 
the correlations between the visual and tactile body: we are ourselves the unifier of these 
arms and legs, the person who both sees and touches them” (133). That point of 
unification, at once seeing the body as an object of the world and experiencing it as the 




the experience of the body itself as a phenomenon. This assertion of the body as the 
self—and not as the worldly manifestation of our transcendental and more primary ego—
is crucial for the development of a phenomenology that is also feminist. 
 However, Shannon Sullivan argues that Merleau-Ponty’s idea of “projective 
intentionality,” that we can read the intentions of others by the way that we ourselves 
interact with or experience the world, reveals a problem at the limits of his 
phenomenology. Projective intentionality occurs almost as a form of communication: the 
structures of my body permit, inhibit, and demand certain kinds of habits and behaviours 
(such as walking, chewing, or embracing). Thus, Merleau-Ponty claims, the universality 
of the structures of our embodiment demand that Others must also experience those habits 
and behaviours. Sullivan classifies this as a kind of solipsism, where the world is not 
experienced in itself, but is instead experienced as a projection of the ego: for instance, 
the structures of our hand make gripping a primary function, so a handshake may seem to 
be a natural and universal form of greeting, but the anthropological record shows us how 
culturally specific handshaking is. According to Sullivan, “In Merleau-Ponty’s 
explanation of the way in which intentionality is bodily, Merleau-Ponty assumes too 
easily and quickly that the generality of human bodies, i.e., the similarities found in 
human bodily structures, allows one to understand the meaning of another’s intentions as 
communicated in their bodily gestures” (185). There are two key issues that make this 
turn in Merleau-Ponty’s project so curious. The first is that this emphasis on 
communication seems orthogonal to his key insight that our embodied experience occurs 
pre-reflectively, i.e., our ability to perceive and think is simultaneous to—and not in front 




point for our account of philosophy itself, and not simply an addendum to the abstracted 
mind. However, his focus on shared bodily experience as communication between the self 
and the Other indicates that the first experience of the body may not be pre-reflective. 
Although communication between bodies may occur before verbal articulation, the body-
as-communication transforms the body into a sign-system comparable to a language, 
which calls into question what exactly the pre-reflective refers to. The second curious 
issue is that the attention given to communication with the Other ends up overcoming the 
radical alterity of the Other. The phenomenological tradition that has been most fruitful 
for feminists like Butler, van Leeuwen, and Sullivan is the one found through Husserl, 
Levinas, and even Merleau-Ponty (elsewhere), namely, the phenomenology that is 
predicated on our encounter with an Other that seems to exceed the limits of our sense. 
Merleau-Ponty’s move to projective intentionality, however, seems to want to 
domesticate the Other under the known world of the structures of our own bodies. In this 
sense, the Other would become dominated, not by my physical force, but by my 
knowledge of myself. Exerting this form of phenomenology onto, for instance, British-
controlled Malaya would constitute a colonization not simply of the external body or of 
the mind, but of the very emergence of the body into the world and into our field of sense. 
And since, as Merleau-Ponty posits, the body is the self and the self is the body, this form 
of colonialism would exert its control over the very existence of selves—or Others—in 
the world. 
 Even if we shelve the question of culturally bound experiences of the body, we 
would still have to contend with Merleau-Ponty’s reduction of the body into a normative 




behaviours and habits can only be legible if bodies take a limited range of shapes. Indeed, 
he makes much of, for instance, a distinguishing feature of the human body that sets it 
apart from other large apes, namely, opposable thumbs which grant the ability to 
manipulate and grasp tools in specific ways. We can take a cue from disability studies and 
ask, what, then, of people with other configurations of fingers, people without thumbs, or 
people without hands altogether? Are we to understand that projective intentionality, the 
ability to commune with others based on shared bodily experience, closes off at the 
moment that people with the normative bodies that Merleau-Ponty has in mind come into 
contact with people who inhabit non-standard bodies? His response might be that, aside 
from particular types of grip, there are other shared bodily experiences that permit 
communication. Since there exist (and we can imagine) people whose bodily structures 
depart from an incredible range of normative features, we would have to continue to peel 
back the layers of shared experience until we are possibly held together only by the bare 
existence of life itself (even, perhaps, before consciousness), in which case projective 
intentionality does not offer us much more than Heidegger’s sense of Being-in-the-world. 
Furthermore, if communication is predicated on shared bodily experience, does this mean 
that, as my bodily structure has less and less in common with another’s, my capacity for 
empathy and care is likewise reduced? And even if not, then projective intentionality 
would not offer any benefit to empathy and care in the first place. 
 In addition to differences among non-standard bodies (if a normative body is even 
tenable outside of an imagined concept like Merleau-Ponty’s), shared bodily experiences 
also break down when we consider gender difference. The emphasis on the sameness of 




marred much transcendental Western philosophy. As differences become dissolved under 
the assumption that a culture-less androgyny will emerge, dominant identities instead take 
the illusory form of the universal, such as Eurocentrism, normative body structures, 
masculinity, and heteronormativity. In Taken, we can read the rejection of a 
universalizing masculinity in Suzanne and Lori’s retreat to diminutive intimacy as a way 
of apprehending global hurt: the novel’s ethical gaze begins in the confusion of the two 
women’s bodies, the breakdown of the erotic partner as an object (of desire). Similarly, 
Irigaray’s notion that “there are always at least two worlds” can be understood as the 
material female body reasserting its radical difference and demanding that we discard the 
illusory universal subject. Here we must emphasize “at least” in reference to the number 
of worlds we may find: “at least” begins with two, but leaves open the possibility of more 
worlds—even if Sharing the World generally has some difficulty with moving beyond 
this binary entry point. The feminist intervention in phenomenology seeks to maintain the 
radical Otherness of not one or two bodies, but of an uncountable multitude: a multitude 
of worlds, of kinds of femaleness, of kinds of maleness, and kinds of being otherwise. 
 What, then, can feminist phenomenology say about the Other? As Kalí Tal notes 
in Worlds of Hurt, the medicalization of experiences like post-traumatic stress disorder 
demonstrates the extent to which our concepts of trauma are culturally bound. Since the 
meaning of something like post-traumatic stress disorder (as it grew out of the earlier 
concepts of shell shock, battle fatigue, and even nostalgia) morphs within Anglo-
American culture over even a few decades, we can begin to imagine the chasm between 
our contemporary articulations of trauma and those of other cultures, especially outside of 




shared experiences of the body, I wonder to what extent can feminist phenomenology 
make claims about the way an Other experiences fragility, pain, and grief. Does feminist 
phenomenology simply obscure the terms of the game, and continue to make culturally 
bound, universalizing assumptions about traumas of the Other, even as it dissects and 
ruptures gendered norms of Otherness? And what does Taken have to say? 
 One bizarre moment occurs when Suzanne, the narrator, remembers as a child 
accompanying her mother to the Chinese tailor’s shop in Penang to be fitted by him for a 
new gown. As Esme stands in the shop, wealth and social status literally being woven 
around her, the text seems more aware of the visual cues of oppression than the child 
Suzanne does: “I think her gorgeous, the tailor, squatting on the floor to pin up the hem as 
she stands on thin brown paper, properly deferential” (43). Throughout this scene, the 
child Suzanne acts as a passive observer, scarcely remarking the imbalanced relationship 
between her mother as an object of admiration and the tailor as the one who labours for 
that beauty. And even less does she seem, at first, aware of her own embeddedness within 
this scene. She is barely more than a pair of eyes, although her gaze does seem almost to 
sublimate to the infinite or universal: “Endless it seems, my staring out between blinds at 
the usual stream of shoppers, loiterers, hawkers, everything slowing down so that i [sic] 
see the teacups on the sidewalk, a bowl of rice, and not the syce-driven cars.” However, 
amidst this gaze that is both reductive and prophetic, Suzanne stumbles on a moment of 
ambiguity that ruptures her gaze, almost letting her for an instant see herself: 
See, for just a second, what it might be like to be that girl, younger than me, 
hanging around the kedai across the way, spoken to and speaking to the others but 




and cars at me, outsider in her father’s? uncle’s? shop, while i, guardian of this 
gorgeous mother, just as rudely stare back. (43) 
Suzanne here begins to understand her situatedness in this colonial landscape; she is both 
under the protective arm of her own mother and the motherland of the British Empire, as 
well as herself being modelled into her future role as a British middle-class woman. This 
scene represents an initial moment of Suzanne coming to a recognition of her place in the 
world, that there is a world that exists beyond her and her mother, and beyond the limits 
of her gaze. She begins to see how unusual she and her mother appear, how obtrusive 
they may be (generating a “territorial rudeness” in this other girl). And, she further 
understands that, as she has her own mother and place in the world, this young girl must 
have a father or uncle, and thus a place of her own. 
 On first glance, this coming-of-age scene seems to show Suzanne encountering 
the gaze of the Other, and thus her singular world—with herself as the sole, passive, and 
infinite observer—breaks into two. However, there are glimpses in the passage that 
suggest that Suzanne performs a kind of projective intentionality onto the girl near the 
kedai. Whereas projective intentionality refers specifically to a supposedly shared 
experience of the body, here Suzanne projects her interiority onto the Other. First, 
although the girl is “younger” than Suzanne, Suzanne sees herself doubled because of 
their shared identity as young girls in the shopping district of Penang. The passage 
betrays almost an attraction or desire for the girl at the kedai due to Suzanne’s surprising 
insight that she so easily could have been born to different parents and thus just as easily 
could be the one across the street instead of the one inside the tailor’s shop. This 




of psychic universalism that robs the self of its situatedness. Of course, if Suzanne were 
born to different parents, specifically, say, Chinese Malaysian parents, she would be 
constituted by wholly different social and material forces so that she would no longer be 
the phenomenological self that is Suzanne. Desire or attraction here becomes an attraction 
to the self in another’s body, entirely at odds with the rupturing of the subject that adult 
Suzanne finds in her relationship to Lori. 
Other moments in the passage seem to indicate that Suzanne is still in the midst of 
struggling to emerge out of her childhood solipsism. For instance, the girl is said to be 
“speaking to the others but all the while” Suzanne claims to observe her “staring between 
people and cars at me.” The ambiguity of the scene lies in the extent to which we can 
trust the child Suzanne as reliable in this passage. Perhaps she is quite the observer and 
does really notice the girl near the kedai sending her oblique glances through other 
conversations, other people, and cars. However, she may also be projecting her own 
interest for the girl into a comparable interest from the girl back to her. She also does not 
seem to recognize the ways in which her own eyes, the gaze of the colonizer, can generate 
particular kinds of responses such that Suzanne actually instigates this “territorial 
rudeness” even though she imagines herself to have stumbled as a passive observer onto 
it. Additionally, the equivocation of the bizarre “territorial rudeness” that, the text says, 
Suzanne “know[s]” and “just as rudely stare[s] back” indicates that Suzanne really does 
not understand the power dynamics inherent in looking and being looked at. The 
“territorial rudeness” occurs, Suzanne assumes, because she is an interloper in the shop of 
the kedai girl’s family (if, again, we can even trust that Suzanne knows the relationship 




text forges a wider comparison here between Suzanne interloping in the tailor’s shop and 
Britain’s greater presence in Malaya, however, this comparison seems altogether 
inaccessible to the young Suzanne. Furthermore, the equivocation between their two 
rudenesses evacuates such a comparison of all its critical acuity in regard to colonial 
power. And again, this still relies on assuming that the child Suzanne is a trustworthy 
reader of facial expressions, and that rudeness truly does anchor the kedai girl’s face if 
not her feelings. 
To return to the original question (are there problems with cross-cultural 
assumptions of interiority and experiences of trauma?), this passage clearly articulates a 
young Suzanne who emerges out of her childhood solipsism, but is nevertheless unable to 
truly encounter the Other without her own sense of self dominating her assumptions and 
projections. This passage usefully demonstrates the gradations between an utter refusal to 
take stock of the Other and a full encounter with radical alterity through the eyes of 
feminist phenomenology. The passage suggests that more than looking, even empathic 
looking, is necessary to apprehend the ethical demands of the Other. 
One issue at stake in this critique of the limits of cross-cultural projection is my 
own assumptions about how the radical Other may experience trauma and fragility. Pain, 
of course, is felt on what Merleau-Ponty might call a pre-reflective level as a visceral, 
sensory phenomenon, but it can also be felt through layers of cultural significance. For 
instance, ascetic behaviours like pilgrimages, fasts, and meditations can all involve forms 
of pain that are nevertheless experienced as a way of coming to know the divine 
supernatural. Even the idea of personal acts of sacrifice, stories of both civilians and 




supposedly pre-reflective phenomenon. The line of thinking I have briefly followed here 
is a kind of anthropological one that assumes some sort of (albeit partial) access to 
cultural experiences beyond one’s own. However, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s now-
canonized essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” seems to force us into a methodology that 
must admit the fundamental unknowability of a particular kind of alterity, the subaltern. 
Specifically, the subaltern is more than simply outside of the hegemonic elite of Western 
patriarchal imperialism. The subaltern is so fundamentally disconnected from all forms of 
power—even the little intra-cultural power available to people under colonial rule—that, 
Spivak claims, they may lack even the ability to utter a word (a lack that we must also 
read as a material expression of colonial traumas). The subaltern’s inability to speak—
either verbally or through the flesh itself—rejects utterly Merleau-Ponty’s projective 
intentionality, or the shared experiences of our bodily structures and capabilities: although 
the subaltern can very well have the physical capacity to produce speech in verbal, 
nonverbal, and written forms, the contents of that speech remain radically inaccessible. 
The experience of the phenomenon of producing speech, then, cannot strictly be 
pre-reflective, because part of the shared experience of speech-making includes the 
experience of being heard. Spivak takes the example of Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri, a young 
unwed Indian woman who died by suicide in 1926. In researching the story, Spivak 
discovers that Bhuvaneswari had been part of a resistance group fighting for Indian 
independence, and, after being unable to carry out a political assassination, she killed 
herself. However, knowing that her death, as an unmarried older teenage girl in India, 
would be assumed to be a romantic tragedy, perhaps a mistaken pregnancy, she waited for 




an interpretation. Yet, despite Bhuvaneswari’s attempt to write her narrative in the flesh 
of her own body, she was still assumed to have been a casualty of a romantic affair, or 
else insane, or both. The failure of the best efforts of Bhuvaneswari to have even her 
death speak a word concludes for Spivak the utter denial of the subaltern’s ability to 
speak. Indeed, Spivak’s own reconstructed narrative, carefully attending as it does to 
Bhuvaneswari’s context, motives, and cultural coding, still fails—or refuses—to represent 
or access Bhuvaneswari’s own experience of her death: was she mournful? Emboldened? 
Frightened? Patriotic? Courageous? Nostalgic? We are fundamentally unable to 
encounter the phenomenon of her death; her body, though revealed to be fragile like all 
bodies in death, still remains beyond the horizon of our sense. 
Taken, of course, does not resolve this dilemma of the radical inaccessibility of 
the subaltern, but it does at moments seem somewhat aware of the limits of our senses. 
Beverley Curran describes the structure of the novel as a “narrative drift,” wherein stories 
of the narrator and her lover, stories of her mother, letters between her grandparents, and 
photographs are woven into and out of each other in order to show the many sides of truth 
construction as a feminist ecological practice. All of these narrative threads are based on 
Suzanne’s own experience, her memories, stories told to her from family members, her 
digging in the archives of her parents’ correspondence, and her attention to old 
photographs. However, at key places in the text another first person narrative voice 
emerges in italicized vignettes that articulate brief moments in the experience of prisoners 
of war who, we are to understand, are taken by Japanese soldiers during the invasion of 
Malaya. The shock of these short sections jars us out of the already nonlinear story of 




These short snapshots of the prisoners of war camps all pay careful attention to moments 
of failed speech or times when speech becomes weaponized (such as the torturous 
counting of prisoners that seems more cruel than practically useful). For instance, even 
the brief respite of food in the otherwise unkind camps becomes tangled up with the need 
for silence: “It was the hand of bananas—you don’t talk about these things—it was the 
hand of bananas that brought it home. you can’t speak about it—only just ripe, and so 
many of them, enough to give you several bites each” (Taken 63). The narrator here 
almost falls into the desire for the banana as a form of survivalism in the camps, not 
unlike both the need for silence (to escape the admonishment of the guards) and the 
further silence after the trauma (as a protective measure from reliving the trauma). 
Strangely, though, the comfort is not found in a hand with bananas, or a hand that held 
bananas. Rather, the “hand of bananas” provides at least the memory of relief in the 
prison camps (63; emphasis added). The “hand of bananas” ruptures the boundary 
between the human and the non-human, the self and the Other, imbuing the physical 
world with the compassionate gesture of giving that the prisoners are denied in the camps. 
Butler and Levinas agree that traumatic violence reduces the human to an object (a 
corpse). The “hand of bananas” offers an escape from the traumatic objectification of the 
human by suggesting, instead, that the non-human world, the world of so-called objects, 
is animated by the same compassion that we usually ascribe to humans. 
The bananas also seem to call back to the supposedly normal life that the prisoners 
lived before the invasion in contrast with the abject life of the camps: “all they’d given 
you was a little broken rice, and all you can think is waste, the lost children, dead babies 




you can’t speak of it to her, you can’t break through her pain” (63). Paradoxically, the 
shared experience of trauma between the prisoners does not lead to a communication 
between them. Instead, there is a mutual recognition that trauma results in isolation and 
the failure of speech. Perhaps, though, trauma is not the cause of this isolation; perhaps 
the communal trauma simply makes clear the rupture of perception and communication 
that underpins the relationship between the self and the Other. In this way, Taken neither 
attempts to resolve the dilemma of colonial cultural production nor erases it altogether. It 
seems cognizant of Spivak’s critique, but the novel provides no answer except the 
prisoners’ failure to communicate—the torturous gestation of silence. 
Taken seems to register this inherent isolation in its exploration of intimacy in 
wartime. Taken, not unlike other novels about war, features an almost furious romantic 
intimacy in the face of the dehumanization of war. Here, during the Gulf War on an 
isolated island in British Columbia, Suzanne and her lover Lori attempt to shut out the 
violent world around them: 
Knotting and unknotting ourselves by candlelight, I think of [the nearby animals] 
even as we submerge in hunger searching out the soft parts, undoing nipples, lips 
with tongue talk, parading it, for that long final shout. Then gone in our own foetal 
curl, soft gone and long gone, impossible to know where each of us ends. (15) 
The dim room is illuminated by a non-electric source, “candlelight,” which contrasts the 
new spectacle of the television war that constitutes Western media coverage of the Gulf 
War. Elsewhere, Suzanne characterizes the Gulf War by its emergence in technology: 
“And all the while this high-tech war drags on—impersonal, systematic, it narrows our 




the Gulf War, and Paul Virilio articulates this point in Pure War, is that the precision of 
the news cameras, capturing the war in high definition, ends up distorting and limiting our 
view as “it narrows our focus.” Whereas the distant reach of the news cameras should 
expand our capacity for empathy, the cameras actually turn war into a spectacle, blurring 
the war’s distinction from Hollywood blockbusters. So, the natural light of the candle not 
only reminds us of the epigraph by Webb and its reclamation of the generative qualities 
of darkness, but also responds to the artificial, distorting, enlightening media used to 
capture, or take, the Gulf War. 
In addition, “counting” or taking stock (of casualties, of war ships, of days), which 
forms the bulk of media coverage, creates an atomized and similarly narrow viewpoint of 
the war. The lovers’ bodies then, “knotting and unknotting” themselves, submerging into 
each other, blurring distinctions, serve as a counterpoint to the individuation inherent in 
war media. The blurring of the lovers’ bodies is partly a postmodern sexual aesthetic that 
emerges directly out of Webb’s Naked Poems. But the relationship of indistinction, 
possible only through the queer politics of the erotic seen here and in Naked Poems, 
provides in the material terms of the body an escape from the individualism and 
individuation inherent in American cultural productions of war. 
 War media soon penetrate this safe harbour of quietness, of queerness, of 
women’s intimacy, as it becomes populated by “good old boys waging their epithets, their 
death-curse” (15). Suzanne now remarks that they are in actuality “Enclosed here—as if 
becalmed. The days slide by in a slow gel woods and water suspend. Nothing we do has 
any consequence. The fatal idea of islands cut off from the main” (16). Not calm itself, 




Salt Spring Island, Suzanne discovers that the violent tendrils of war search out and 
invade her “Enclosed” space of intimacy. At best, their home offers only isolation and 
enclosure “cut off from the main,” which would constitute nothing more than an escape 
from (and thus tacit political approval of) the Gulf War. The women begin to imagine that 
in their admonition of the distortions and atomizations inherent to news media, they 
perhaps walled off their perceptions of violence and distant places altogether. Indeed, 
later in the novel when Lori leaves Suzanne and returns to her own mother in Iowa, she 
indicates that their detachment from the world around them became untenable for her. 
 Yet, against their own perceptions of the politics of their enclosed, intimate space, 
the text offers another, wider reading. Suzanne’s search for intimacy within Lori, and the 
productive confusion between mother and lover that she finds there is comparable to her 
search for her own mother Esme within the letters that Suzanne has kept. The immediate, 
furious search for intimacy seems to be a product of wartime, which would mean that the 
enclosure of the lovers is not, in fact, an isolation from wartime, but a way of registering 
wartime on an affective level. Wartime is characterized not only by vast distances and 
media’s collapsing of those vast distances as Mary Favret argues, but also by intense 
intimacy. In this reading, the blurring of the lovers in their bedroom, supposedly an utter 
contrast to the death and dehumanization on the Persian Gulf coast, actually bears the 
marks of the war as its photographic negative: war violence breaks down the subject-
object relationship (by turning humans into corpses), but instead of attempting to 
reconstitute the subject, the blurring of the lovers offers a new queer politics of intimacy 
that rejects the subject-object relationship altogether. The distance and intimacy reflect 




critique which focuses on our relationship to the material bodies that surround us. Rather 
than distance and intimacy being a binary opposition in wartime, they become two faces 
of the same perceptual problem, namely, how can one grasp, or take, war and trauma in 
their totalities? 
Indeed, as Suzanne searches through her parents’ wartime correspondence for a 
way to understand her place in the Gulf War, she finds the marks of her own mother’s 
desperate search for intimacy with her husband Charles. First, her pleas for him to come 
home are displaced in what we might call an analogy—between their situation and that of 
their neighbours. Esme writes in a post-script: 
I met a Dutch woman today whose husband is in Java—& she said as far as she 
knew women could return to Java—if I were not going to have a baby I could 
have joined you darling—a bit tough isn’t it? I had better stay til after Aug. any 
way—I suppose. What do you think dearest? (20) 
Although Esme desperately wants to express in clear terms her desire for her husband to 
return to her, she stifles her wish and hides it in oblique pauses and subtext. Partially, the 
formal restrictions of the British middle-class genre of letter writing constrain Esme’s 
ability to be honest. These restraints contrast sharply with the kind of letter writing that 
Webb theorizes both in Talking and Wilson’s Bowl, a fragile and brutally honest form of 
communication that managed to forge an intimate bond between the strangers Lilo 
Berliner and Wilson Duff. Taken at these moments demonstrates the distortions that often 
accompany media, distortions which in this case force Esme to express herself almost 
metaphorically (through analogy). Esme, though, is also constrained by an inner imperial 




speculates that the dashes “suggest hesitation, the pressure perhaps of her father’s voice—
Use your head, my girl! You’d be nothing but a millstone round his neck” (20). The voice 
of her father emerges as the expression of colonial power exercised over the affect of its 
constituents. Imperial control demands an impervious separation between the domestic 
sphere and the public sphere—the domain of men who wage war and organize the waging 
of war, as Charles does—so that ethical responses which may reside in a form such as 
intimate letter writing do not disrupt the continued smooth operations of the colonial 
state. 
 So, British gentility and the constraining power of colonial discourse stifle Esme’s 
language. However, her desires for intimacy with her husband crop up obliquely in the 
hesitations and half-stated feelings in her letter. Suzanne even notes that Esme “knows 
she is writing against his manly duty, his heroism, her role as dutiful wife. Planting the 
thought in his mind, using their familiar language, appealing to the lover in him. Come 
back” (20). The gendered language of colonial violence, the “manly duty” and the 
“dutiful wife,” seem to be roles that shut one off from an ethical denunciation of war. 
This is to say that when Esme inhabits the identity of the “dutiful wife,” she necessarily 
supports the war effort via her suppression of any compassionate fears she may have for 
the danger that war poses to the bodies of her loved ones. The moments when her 
desperate fears slip through the language in her letters, she simultaneously—and 
fearfully—casts off the mantel of the stoic, demure British wife that has been thrown on 
her since childhood. This rejection of colonial gender norms mirrors the one that takes 
place via the queer love between Suzanne and Lori fifty years later on an island off the 




“Knotting and unknotting” themselves, “impossible to know where each of [them] ends” 
(15), also repudiates the demarcation of bodies that seems endemic to wartime discourse. 
As Suzanne notes when consuming Gulf War news media, bodies become atomized as 
they are turned into munitions or supply objects, akin to the number of fighter jets 
available, the number of shells exploded, or the amount of ground gained in an 
engagement (land itself becoming an expendable supply). Bodies too become demarcated 
into the roles available to the grand theatre of war, from generals to soldiers, allies, 
enemies, civilians, prisoners of war, or terrorists. And, as Suzanne’s comments about 
manly duties and dutiful wives suggest, the demarcation of bodies into gendered roles 
sustains colonial and wartime narratives. So, in Suzanne’s search for intimacy in the body 
of her lover and in Esme’s search for intimacy by way of the letters to her husband, they 
both reject war discourse specifically by way of attempting to cast off colonial gender 
norms and their constitution as atomized subjects. 
 The furious desire for intimacy and, of course, the instability of that intimacy can 
be considered, then, as a response to the pervasiveness of war, or perhaps as produced by 
war. The language of loss, the felt register of war, invades intimacy by way of the 
interrelationship between ghosts or absences and intimacy. Suzanne and Lori’s 
relationship breaks down in a literal sense because Lori’s fears about the Gulf War 
become wrapped up in her fears about her mother’s health. Suzanne, though, also mulls 
over other moments of their relationship that contributed to their breaking apart, 
particularly her own unresolved connection to her family’s past: 
Ghosts. Each of us already haunted. When I told you about the pretas, those black 




really believe in such things? you asked, thinking how superstitious. All this talk 
of ghosts. We know about women’s desire, we know the materials conditions that 
must be changed to satisfy it. (99) 
The pretas, suffering ghosts whose hunger and thirst can never be quenched, become 
wrapped up in a metaphor for “women’s desire,” a queer identity out of step with the 
“material conditions” of the real world. Thus, Suzanne here expresses her anxieties about 
being haunted by her family’s past, but Lori, skeptical of haunting, strangely turns the 
metaphor on its head so that queer women’s identity itself becomes a kind of ghost, a 
cultural absence that flickers out of view and longs for an end to its suffering. Lori, 
speaking practically, departs from the ‘ghostly’ metaphor when she suggests that they 
“know the material conditions that must be changed” in order to substantiate or “satisfy” 
the kind of Being that is at the heart of women’s queerness. The “material conditions” 
that she mentions are, foremost, Western military interventions like the Gulf War, which 
we can be read as colonialism by other means, rife with their associations that women 
must be ‘dutiful wives,’ that compassion for the Other is a threat to national security, and 
all manner of wartime ideologies. Thus, the type of non-Being, or ghostliness, that 
produces and is produced by women’s queerness, embeds an antiviolence ethics by way 
of being incommensurate with a world that creates and justifies war in far-reaching 
places. 
 Lori’s refusal to remain incommensurate with the world, to remain a ghost in the 
world, is echoed in her later statement, “We just don’t live in the same reality,” which 
Suzanne calls “your way of erasing our ghost-written bond” (126). Lori is specifically 




“material conditions” of the world until they support a queer feminist ethics. As noble as 
Lori’s desires to reform the world may be, I argue that the way that Suzanne reads 
intimacy through ghostliness provides a fundamental perceptual shift in the way we see 
the world that both registers the material reality of violence and paradoxically may 
provide a foundation on which to ground the world that Lori desires, a world that could 
substantiate women’s queerness. 
 Suzanne’s obsessions with the ghosts of her past—her mother, her father, the 
absent ayah who nursed her—also become tied to her romantic relationship to Lori, which 
Suzanne calls their “ghost-written bond.” The metaphor of “ghosts,” which connects her 
uncertain family past with the war dead, invades and constitutes her understanding of 
intimacy. When her future with Lori is at its most unclear, her love seems to flourish in 
that uncertainty and absence: “I find no words for this threshold, though the sense of 
being suspended here is exquisite. Present in your absence, my love, loves echoing. It’s 
still dark, the gulls are crying” (115). This passage, so reminiscent of Webb’s “walking in 
dark,” even down to Webb’s articulation of the “presence of all the absences we have 
known” (Webb 177), oscillates in the “exquisite” suspension between intimacy and 
alienation, whether Lori will return or remain away. The experience of love, then, 
becomes not only an intimate connection with another, but also an encounter with 
vulnerability (of the self, of absence, of the war dead). The perceptual shift that queer 
intimacy provides, therefore, is an encounter with the world that extends both compassion 
and fragility at the most fundamental point of contact with the world. The passage is 




of global, fragile intimacy in Taken seems to be rooted in the queer aesthetics that Webb 
develops in Naked Poems, Water and Light, and elsewhere. 
 The passage continues on to broaden this sense of intimacy by connecting lovers 
and mothers. This question of intimacy develops out of the perceptual problem of 
daytime, which crystallizes and paradoxically obscures objects: 
Mourning the loss of early light which opens first to sound or smell or touch, not 
sight. The eye, unfocused, gazes at water, air, all that envelops us, pre-dates us. 
Post-dates us too. Mourning the loss of being before knowing narrowed into the 
dangerously exclusive we label meaningful, or what counts. “Knowing who your 
friends are.” (Your lovers too?) And what about all that mothers, has mothered us 
into existence? Relations beyond number. (116) 
As the concept of intimacy becomes extended here, so too does “mothering”; “all that 
mothers” points specifically beyond biological or familial mothering, and seems not only 
to include Suzanne’s relationship to Lori or the missing ayah, but also, perhaps, to the 
objects within her perception in the early dawn hours, the water, air, and “all that 
envelops us.” Mothering here seems to relate to Heidegger’s idea of our “thrown-ness” 
into the world, that we are “mothered” into existence by forces that are barely known or 
are even “before knowing.” In expanding Heidegger’s ontology into a question of 
intimacy, the text here suggests that this sense of intimacy—which is both a kind of 
mothering and a perceptual relationship with the world—does not require, and, indeed, 
seems to repudiate, a categorical apprehension of the world. That is to say that this 
intimate relationship with the world, mothering us into being, depends on the uncertainty 




Levinas’s critique of Being rather than Heidegger’s Being itself. The fundamental 
perceptual mystery of the Other that Levinas articulates instead becomes the limits of our 
categorical knowledge of a lover, or a mother, or any other of our “Relations beyond 
number.” 
This conception of the Other as a mother or a lover recuperates some of the 
problems with alterity that Spivak articulates. She argues that the prevalence of “the 
Other” in Western scholarship, especially as a way of theorizing colonized peoples, still 
defines the colonized in relation to the primacy of the colonizer. The concept of “the 
Other” as an operant and not merely descriptive term, then, has the potential to double 
down on the marginalizations that colonial ideology already enforces on those it seeks to 
dominate. However, Taken suggests that we can simultaneously maintain alterity as a 
fundamental perceptual limit (thereby maintaining the coherence and self-determination 
which should be the right of the Other) while also coming into an intimate relationship 
with the Other. Moreover, if the Other can also “mother[] us into existence,” then our 
relationship to the Other is not of a passive observer looking out and obtaining, 
perceptually, the mysteries of the world. Instead, first, we are constituted at least in part 
by those mysteries, and, second, our intimate relationship does not require us 
apprehending, that is, making categorical or knowable, the Other. 
Taken thus offers us a turn in the phenomenology of Levinas or even Merleau-
Ponty, and this turn is based in a perceptual relationship with the world that is defined by 
various trajectories of mothering. A similar kind of perceptual relationship to the world is 
articulated in Marlatt’s much more widely read novel, Ana Historic. The narrator, Ana, 




of fragments within historical archives. At the same time, she explores her own 
constitution as a new mother out of her early childhood and her relationship to her own 
mother, Ina. The irony at the centre of the text is that these various reconstructions, of 
Mrs. Richards, of her childhood, of her mother, of herself, do not entail an apprehension 
of the person, since the reconstructions simply reveal the chasms of meaning that separate 
us: “I-na, I-no-longer, i can’t turn you into a story. there is this absence here, where the 
words stop. (and then i remember—“ (11). To turn her mother “into a story” indicates that 
story-making is a form of apprehension or exerting control over an object or person. 
Thus, her mother (and this is true of Mrs. Richards and any Other) exceeds the grip of the 
story; the story forges new intimacies with her mother, but her mother remains in alterity, 
still wavering beyond Ana’s perceptual limits. This could then be described as a failed 
novel similar to how Webb describes Wilson’s Bowl as a text of failure. Failure in Ana 
Historic, of course, is really a failure of traditional history and archival reconstruction. 
The fragmented story of her mother and Mrs. Richards, instead, reveals a kind of feminist 
historiography that refuses to domesticate alterity by apprehending historical objects into 
categories. Thus, alterity survives in “this absence, where the words stop,” and 
categorization fails as language fails. The open parenthesis, “(and then i remember—,” 
though, suggests something beyond the failure of language and the failure of the historical 
story. Memory does not fill the absence that her mother leaves so much as it is 
coterminous with that absence. Indeed, the hesitation entailed by the dash (“i remember—
“) indicates the afterlife of that absence made intimate by memory. Ana Historic provides 




heart of Taken. Taken, however, places this perceptual reconfiguration in relation to 
violence, taking this new version of intimacy into its ethical consequences. 
Taken demonstrates the inadequacy of typical news media in thinking through the 
ethics of war. For instance, during the Second World War, Esme and Charles learn from 
print news the “revelations of a concentration camp in Holland” (117). Print news here is 
like a sacred text that provides “revelations” to its readers, but revelations of horrors 
rather than salvations. The novel continues on to say that “The paper described how in 
one section of the camp a nursery was found,” whereas “A second section housed a 
mobile crematorium and two large ovens.” The absurdity of these two extremes contained 
in one camp, a nursery and a crematorium, functions more like a trope within print news 
than a material location in the real world. That is to say that the juxtaposition of care and 
torture, the irrationality of the camp, becomes a way of making the enemy meaningful: 
the Nazi’s willingness to commit violence, which otherwise exceeds our comprehension, 
is domesticated by way of the Nazi being transformed into a tyrant-jester figure, not 
beyond rationality so much as irrational as an almost-literary characteristic. Print media 
likewise contain violence by what Suzanne earlier in the text characterizes as “only 
counting” (30). Print media must contend with two different impulses. First, they must 
articulate and make knowable the war, and in this way their strategy of perception mimics 
what Suzanne calls the light of the day which “intimate[s] the differences between things” 
(129); this kind of perception provides a foil to the reinvigorated feminist phenomenology 
that forms the basis of Suzanne’s relationship to the world and critique of violence. 
Second, while making war knowable, print news must also obey popular notions of 




to read and discuss at the kitchen table. Indeed, print news makes its way into the daily 
chores of housekeeping, as “Esme, who had picked up the paper with her morning 
groceries while Charles was sleeping off his late watch, felt compelled to recite the details 
over lunch” (117). The seamless introduction of war violence into the innocuous domestic 
scene of the kitchen table is a testament to the ways in which print media recreate war 
into something that could serve as a conversation starter for well-mannered British 
subjects. 
Moreover, print news’ domestication of war has the bizarre propagandistic effect 
of reinforcing the homeliness of the home or the domesticity of the domicile, or, in other 
words, the chasm that separates the theatre of war from the space of the home. When 
Esme expresses incredulity at the absurd concentration camp which houses both a nursery 
and a crematorium, “Charles looked up from the loaf of bread he was slicing. Despite 
what your father thinks, war makes men less human not more so” (118). Charles at first 
glance here seems to push back against the chest-thumping propagandistic jingo of 
Esme’s father. However, the text lingers on strange objects that indicate Charles’s own 
war ideology. Charles’s grand pronouncement that “war makes men less human not more 
so” sharply contrasts the banality of his actions, slicing a loaf of bread for lunch. The 
pseudo-philosophical air of his statement, with its own kind of jingoistic symmetry, 
makes war into an immaterial field of contemplation. Moreover, humanity becomes an 
unstable quality that is imperfectly distributed among “men.” The clear distinction 
between the human and the otherwise-than-human simply reinforces the peacefulness of 
the home: war and inhumanity are problems for other people in other places, and it is 




meditate on the lessons of war. And what exactly constitutes the home, so sharply 
juxtaposed with the violence of the camp (even if, remarkably, the camp itself contains a 
well-maintained nursery)? Charles’s use of “men” as a synonym for humans in general 
nevertheless demarcates war as a gendered field of participation, a place where men can 
be tested for humanity. Women, in the domestic sphere, can almost be said to harbour or 
be the caretakers of this relative humanity, and thus are exempted from the trials of war. 
The distinction here starts to take on colonial language, as the “motherland,” the safe 
haven of humanity that all other places can only emulate, needs to be protected from 
hostile external forces. Sara Ahmed in The Cultural Politics of Emotion sees in the 
jingoism of a British National Front poster the articulation of a British nation as feminine 
and, indeed, vulnerable and in need of protection due to that very femininity: she says that 
the “soft touch” of Britain to which the poster refers “suggests that the nation’s borders 
and defences are like skin; they are soft, weak, porous and easily shaped or even bruised 
by the proximity of others. It suggests that the nation is made vulnerable to abuse by its 
very openness to others” (2). The ideology of British colonialism sustains itself by this 
constant gendered threat against its sheltered, domestic homeland. Moreover, the 
anxieties of this colonial ideology betray a kind of projection that the British homeland 
could experience the very same domination that the empire exacts on the homes of others: 
Ahmed notes that “Such attributes are of course gendered: the soft national body is a 
feminized body, which is ‘penetrated’ or ‘invaded’ by others” (2). Thus, the marrying of 
the British nation to the concept of the domestic home seems to pre-emptively rearticulate 
uncolonized places not as the homes of other people but as containing dangerous, 




demarcation of the theatre of war as an exclusively masculine space means, then, that 
uncolonized places may as well be war zones, containing nothing recognizably ‘domestic’ 
at all. 
For the Gulf War, which Suzanne experiences entirely by way of media, television 
news and direct visual reporting supersede all other forms of media communication. In 
the broadcasts, Suzanne notes the “new obsession with high-tech fighters and tanks” (56); 
coterminous with new war technology taking precedence in military strategies during the 
Gulf War is the fact that reporting also became “high-tech,” with the possibilities of 
infrared cameras tracking bombs and bodies, aerial images, and footage displayed only 
moments after it was taken. Virilio notes these vast changes in the technological 
landscape of war and media, arguing how advanced optics make long-range assaults 
possible just as they make the capturing of those attacks by news cameras possible. Even 
the language of camera operations seems to mimic a weapon: one aims the camera and 
shoots. 
The advanced precision of new camera technologies seems contradictory in front 
of the almost-purposeful obfuscation of the actual content of those reports. Suzanne 
watches a news story which reports: 
91 CHILDREN AMONG 288 BODIES RECOVERED IN RUBBLE, Iraq reports 
in the wake of American bombing, of—what? Language floats. An air raid shelter, 
Iraq asserts. Military bunker, the US counter-reports. Disputed terms echoing back 
and forth across communication waves. A CNN print displays painfully small 
bodies wrapped in blankets, blurred figures bending on the street to fold back a 




The floating language, disputed terms, and blurred figures show the irony at the heart of 
the new high-tech media age: the increasing specificity of the cameras, the quickness of 
the ‘wire’ from event to television screen, the exact figures of death tolls are all 
orthogonal to the possibilities of actually apprehending the war. The barrage of images, 
tallies, and locations, rather than giving a so-called ‘clearer picture’ of the war, end up 
contributing to the signal noise of the communications ecosystem. For all of the advanced 
technology and massive reporting teams, Taken shows the inaccuracy that underpins the 
actual meaningfulness of the news items. 
Taken opens an unresolvable dilemma, whether the signal noise of television news 
is part of its fundamental constitution, its way of seeing, or whether the confusion is 
deliberately fostered for propagandistic ends. For instance, this news story is capped by a 
weak, ambiguous defense of the target selection of the US military: “‘I suppose the 
suggestion that he [Saddam Hussein] may have indeed encouraged civilians to occupy 
what he knew to be a military facility is possible,’ the U.S. Secretary of Defense 
defensively purports” (57). The Secretary of Defense obfuscates even the origins of this 
supposition by both presenting it himself to the news media as well as distancing his own 
agency in the construction of this version of events: he only supposes that it “may have” 
been done, while the phrase “the suggestion” creates the effect that he is simply 
commenting on something he has overheard, which “is possible.” The irony of the phrase 
“may have indeed,” both solidifying and leaving open to ambiguity the truth of his 
statement, demonstrates the linguistic corollary of the signal noise of the visual images. In 
this obfuscatory rhetoric, we are still left to wonder, even if they targeted a military 




military order airstrikes without complete information about the actual location on which 
the bombing will take place? 
In Precarious Life, Judith Butler launches a critique at this kind of propagandistic 
doublespeak: “When a bleeding child or dead body on Afghan soil emerges in the press 
coverage, it is not relayed as part of the horror of war, but only in the service of a 
criticism of the military’s capacity to aim its bombs right. We castigate ourselves for not 
aiming better, as if the end goal is to aim right” (6). At the centre of this critique, 
something on which Butler does not follow up, is the relationship between media 
technologies and the exoneration of war atrocities. “Aiming right” is only made possible 
by the very optical technologies that allow one to see targets in the distance, whether 
through the lens of a weapons system or a camera. This question of “aiming right,” then, 
hinges on the furthering of optical technologies, where a ‘perfect aim’ would be 
coterminous with perfect media coverage, a kind of military and media omniscience. Of 
course, this rhetoric of “aiming right” misses two crucial points. The first is that time and 
again militaries across the globe, and particularly the US military, have shown that 
‘collateral damage,’ the indiscriminate killing of non-combatants including children, has 
not only been a function of inaccurate targeting and imperfect weapons; instead, the 
killing of non-combatants has been at times tolerated in the planning and execution of 
military assaults, and at others has been the mission of those assaults. Second, the 
language of “aiming right” already covers over an analysis of Jus ad bellum, or the 
justification of one’s own waging of war and the opponent’s waging of war. That is to say 
that, even if ‘perfect aim’ were possible and even if it were actually pursued by militaries 




combatants’ by a declaration of war deserve to die. Thus, one must already have an 
ethical claim in going to war, since a declaration of war does not on its own necessitate 
that the opponent must therefore be unjust (and that killing them is required in order to 
carry out justice in the world). Likewise, the opponent cannot themselves have a just 
claim to waging war, otherwise one’s own actions would block the carrying out of justice 
by another. 
However, television news focuses on the material facts of war, the number of 
bodies, the amount of munitions, and the locations of battles, creating a montage of 
sensationalism and banality, which has the effect of totally populating the airwaves with 
noise enough to drown out this contemplation of the ethics of war. Even the bodies of the 
killed children become distorted as signal noise: “A CNN print displays painfully small 
bodies wrapped in blankets, blurred figures bending on the street to fold back a corner, 
confirm the unthinkable” (Taken 57). Butler in a similar context succinctly articulates the 
curious absence of an apprehension of violence in American public discourse: “We do 
not, however, take the sign of destroyed life and decimated peoples as something for 
which we are responsible” (6). As Butler indicates, the material fact of a destroyed body, 
even voiceless as the dead are, makes an ethical claim especially on those who 
participated or witnessed its killing. What is so surprising in the Gulf War television 
broadcast in Taken is not the presence of children killed by the US military. Rather, what 
is surprising is the way in which the television broadcast reconstitutes the dead children 
not as material substantiations of violence but as more signal noise, shocking, yes, but 
montaged in such a way that the shock gives way to the banality and everyday-ness of 




omnisciently these material facts of the war, television media, populated with noise, 
drown out the voices of dead bodies, the ethical claims they, as Others nearly beyond 
perception, should make on us. 
Instead, Taken offers us a way of feeling toward those affected by global violence 
as we might feel toward a mother or a lover. The text seizes on a particular kind of 
relationship to perception that, according to Butling, Webb develops especially in the 
fragmented lyrics of Naked Poems and Water and Light. Marlatt and Webb both articulate 
moments of clarity which entail erasures of the liberal humanist subject, rather than 
moments of enlightenment that reify the individuality of the humanist subject, especially 
in regard to traditional phenomenology. Take, for instance, the lucidity that the poet feels 
after the parting of the lovers in Webb’s Naked Poems: 
You brought me clarity. 
Gift after gift 
I wear. 
Poems     naked 
in the sunlight 
on the floor. (169) 
 Even in this moment that should be mourning, she finds not an isolation, which would re-
establish the individual humanist subject, but the afterlife of the love expressed as gifts 
that are worn. The unresolvable turn of the poem, though, is that the gifts that are worn 
like garments simultaneously seem to be, or at least seem to leave behind, poems that are 
“naked / in the sunlight / on the floor.” Thus, vulnerability itself, the nakedness of the 




was intimately close but is now absent bears a similar relationship to Marlatt’s missing 
ayah in Taken. What, Suzanne wonders, “had she covertly passed to Esme in her milk, 
what tastes, what feelings” (Taken 113)? Clarity, thus, reconfigures the moment of 
perceptual recognition of the Other in phenomenology so that mourning, absence, 
intimacy, and the destruction of the humanist self all become part of the relationship with 
the Other. As Taken looks so distantly at violence, across history and across continents, 
far away from an island off the coast of British Columbia, it takes up the intimate gaze of 







War time, black and white time, whole cultures reduced to dirty adjectives 
under the acrid developer of national will. What was one individual, one 
tiny life in all of that? 
       —Daphne Marlatt, Taken 
 Taken ends with the dissolution of the narrator into her photographic negative, the 
ghost of the camera film roll. Indeed, when one finishes the novel, turns the final page, 
and finds oneself face-to-face with the back cover, the young woman depicted on the 
front of the book is revealed in a photo negative. The “ghostly” language, explored in the 
previous chapter of this thesis as a state of being in the afterlife of trauma, intensifies as 
the novel comes to a close. The ghostliness seems to shift more and more into a narrative 
or aesthetic strategy, that is, it becomes entangled in the very conditions of articulation 
that underpin Taken. As Suzanne parts from her lover Lori and the reach of global 
violence becomes too exhausting and too oppressive, their earlier political discussions 
seem trite and hollow, vaguely liberal idealism from a more hopeful—and archaic—time. 
Thus, individual subjectivity, of Suzanne and the narrator, dissolves into the haze of a 
haunting by the text’s final line: “The stories we invent and refuse to invent ourselves by, 
all unfinished . . .” (130). Distinctions bleed, and the work of the writer seems both not 
their own and not concluded. 
In light of this context, we are perhaps compelled to re-read the possibly 
overwritten “dissolution of the lyric ‘I’” (Collis 17) that is familiar to Webb scholars not 
simply as the product of a budding postmodernism or as an expression of her commitment 




tears apart human bodies and rends us until we are indistinguishable. This point is 
perhaps made more conspicuous by the fact that, as John Hulcoop recalls from a letter 
from 1970, Webb said that the Second World War “was one of the formative experiences 
of my youth,” and, moreover, she says, “It all came mainly through radio broadcasts and 
talk among people” (Peacock Blue 4). War as “formative” suggests that it is inscribed on 
the fundamental building blocks of her psyche, yet her experience of war comes second 
hand, through conversations and through media technologies like the radio (a particular 
technology that would itself have a singular influence on her life). 
So, the dissolution of the self responds to the ways in which technologies mediate 
these poets’ proximities to and distances from war. Susan Sontag, reading Virginia 
Woolf’s brief media analysis in Three Guineas, suggests that this process of dissolution is 
also particular to war photography: 
When Woolf notes that one of the photographs she has been sent shows a corpse 
of a man or woman so mangled that it could as well be that of a dead pig, her 
point is that the scale of war’s murderousness destroys what identifies people as 
individuals, even as human beings. This, of course, is how war looks when it is 
seen from afar, as an image. (45) 
Sontag, however, is mostly dissatisfied with Woolf’s short analysis, since she points out 
that Woolf fails to register the context of the observer of the photographs: when one 
already believes in the brutishness of war, then war photographs cannot fail to display 
that brutishness in full and horrid detail. Perhaps, Sontag suggests, when we are not at 
such a distance from the figures in the photograph, when those figures are our family 




other than the horror of war; they can, for instance, be used for propagandistic purposes. 
If the photograph of a mangled body can suggest the ingenuity of our scientists and 
engineers to design weapons that can make human bodies indistinguishable, then it is 
clear how the power of looking can itself be weaponized to unify rather than dissolve 
nationalist fervour. 
 We should, then, carefully consider how we approach media depictions of war, 
and analyze the ways that media technologies structure or limit our ethical response to 
violence. Reading Webb’s and Marlatt’s work in relation to feminist phenomenology 
creates ethical demands on how we perceive media depictions of war, so that only with 
great peril may we look at the body of a dead stranger and feel, for instance, elated. Thus, 
a case could be made that it is not that, as Sontag argues, Woolf does not understand that 
images of war have the potential to bolster nationalist fervour in specific contexts, but 
instead that Woolf is speaking only to those who possess the gaze of the pacifist. Now, 
under Sontag’s pragmatism, of course, Woolf’s commitment to pacifism does appear 
perhaps trite and archaic. Still, it is revealing that, if one would like to trace a literary 
history of war media studies, one finds the paths constantly returning to a mutual origin 
point. Thus, despite her dissatisfaction, Sontag’s illuminating book Regarding the Pain of 
Others returns to Woolf’s short remarks on war photography in Three Guineas. In turn, 
Three Guineas itself dissolves into an argument that feminism cannot be reforged into a 
tool to enable pacifism (as the man who asks Woolf, “How in your opinion are we to 
prevent war,” assumes), since, Woolf says, anti-violence is already embedded in the very 




The daughters of educated men who were called, to their resentment, ‘feminists’ 
were in fact the advance guard of your own movement [pacifism]. They were 
fighting the same enemy that you are fighting and for the same reasons. They 
were fighting tyranny of the patriarchal state as you are fighting tyranny of the 
Fascist state. (94) 
Thus, as we sketch out a tradition of war media studies, we land, finally, on Woolf’s 
quasi-manifesto of feminism that argues, for instance, that paid motherhood as a 
profession would go some ways to preventing global war (102), or that the 
disenfranchisement of British women makes impossible their participation in nationalism, 
forging both a ghostly, dislocated identity and a global communalism: “in fact, as a 
woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the 
whole world” (99). Thus, feminism and war media studies turn on each other: insofar as 
war media studies reduce to this origin point in feminist thinking, so too does Woolf’s 
grand argument for women’s emancipation start from looking at photographs of bodies 
that are mangled by war. Sontag, despite her misgivings, cannot help but begin with the 
same photographs seen through those original eyes. 
 Webb and Marlatt are too the daughters of educated men, perhaps from a different 
world than Woolf (concerned that though women have been for two decades legally 
allowed to enter the professions, they have thus far only been permitted skittishly into the 
lower ranks), though not a world as different as we might like. Moreover, Woolf’s 
declaration that “As a woman I want no country” shares a commitment to international 
pacifism with both poets. Her statement, for instance, anticipates the discomfort toward 




while it also describes Marlatt’s early experience of alienation as an immigrant to Canada. 
Webb’s and Marlatt’s explorations into grief, trauma, global politics, and global atrocities 
seem to be founded on the same principles as Woolf’s manifesto: a shared experience of 
hurt that ruptures the lines between nation-states, between bodies, between identities, so 
that trauma, then, is not bound by the demarcations or edges of one person’s skin from 
another’s, but can move, like a ghost, across borders and beyond history. 
 The poet’s translation across distances, though, comes at a cost in the era of 
proliferated media technologies. In Poetry and the Fate of the Senses, Susan Stewart 
paints a grim picture of contemporary poetry’s grappling with the oppressive nature of 
postmodern media: 
And because hearing and seeing are the most mediated senses, poets return again 
either to the antirhetorical bias of linguistic and geometrical abstraction or to the 
unintentionally ironic pathos of spectacles of suffering and epiphany. In each 
instance, distance precludes engagement: the reader or receiver stands like Kant’s 
general watching from a far hillside. (333) 
Stewart does go on to suggest that a commitment to specific kinds of traditional poetry 
can spark a renewed “engagement with the senses,” but media technologies nonetheless 
create passivity, abstraction, and disengagement even as they reduce geographical 
distances to the speed of signal transfers. And poetry is not necessarily safe from 
reproducing, like another form of media, this inoculation from an “engagement” with 
death, the world, or our own capacities to apprehend. The danger of poetry as a 
“spectacle[] of suffering” seems to echo Favret’s analysis of the numbing effects of war 




simultaneous deadening and spilling over of affect in war (Favret 113). Can Webb or 
Marlatt be charged with reproducing the spectacle of war, inoculating us against—rather 
than engaging us with—violence and hurt? 
 Webb, for her part, has been characterized, particularly by Collis, as moving 
toward abstraction in her career, not unlike what Stewart terms “the antirhetorical bias of 
linguistic and geometrical abstraction.” Collis, though, does demonstrate that abstraction, 
or silence, still registers a kind of political praxis, a rendering of the ego to the collective, 
a relinquishing of the most intimate of possessions. Still, though, there are many Webbs 
we have to contend with, one (or more) for each era of her writing career. Wilson’s Bowl 
in particular, as described in the first chapter of this thesis, seems specifically fearful of 
the abstract and impersonal. The shying away from the “Too grand and too designed” (9) 
of the originally conceived text “The Kropotkin Poems” demonstrates a wariness toward 
the spectacle and dramatization of history. In its place, we find ourselves in that most 
intimate and vulnerable of griefs: the suicides of her friends. While the poem “Still There 
Are Wars and Crimes of War” does on the surface seem to fit the “linguistic and 
geometrical abstraction” that Stewart warns against, the poem intentionally bleats like a 
war drum specifically to evoke the inuring, overflowing effects of global atrocities that 
seem too big and too terrible to wrap one’s head around. Wilson’s Bowl seems afraid of 
being charged with proselytizing from the pulpit, and when it does, the irony is 
unmistakable. 
 Marlatt’s work likewise grapples with the problems of engagement and history. 
The italicized sections in Taken which recount the firsthand experience of war prisoners 




contained by the main narrative, rupturing and overflowing from the novel. The lack of 
differentiation of voices and bodies in the prison camps works to sublimate the first 
person narrative to the voice of war victims as a whole: “what you know is this camp now, 
your particular barrack, your own bali-bali where you sleep between B. and S., the ‘lav’ 
below no more than a cement drain [. . .] you are learning to know nothing beyond the 
camp, except the road just beyond the gates where you file out at five in the morning to 
clear grass with parangs” (87). The experience of the camp, the ‘knowledge’ of the 
camp, fills and overflows the prisoners’ heads until they “know nothing beyond” it, and 
that thing that they know, the camps, itself reduces to the simplified, primary experiences 
of cruelty and monotony, the too-painful and the too-dull. 
 As I describe in the third chapter, the photographs in Steveston work both to 
humanize and to hold the people who live there at a distance, and the history of 
internment hides beneath the visible and speakable layer that can be captured in the 1970s 
like another form of photographic negative. Taken in some ways verbalizes this haunting, 
where violences of the past transform not only our identities but also our very structures 
of perception, which struggle to be clarified or revitalized beneath the pressures of 
traditional media technologies. In the last pages of Poetry and the Fate of the Senses, 
Stewart with great labour finally muses, “Perhaps I am writing at the end of a world” 
(333), wondering if she may be penning in 2002 one of the last ink-and-paper 
manuscripts before critique itself will become totally digitized in the age of postmodern 
media. The transition from war photographs in a newspaper sitting open on Virginia 
Woolf’s desk, or radio broadcasts that dominated the home conversations of a young 




engineering algorithms does seem stark and novel, the “end of a world,” as Stewart puts 
it. However, a whirlwind of barely intelligible media signal noise is also largely an 
extension or intensification of Marshall McLuhan’s analyses in the 1960s and 1970s. It 
remains to be seen, then, whether the age of postmodern media truly is, as Stewart 
anticipates, the “end of a world,” or if the development and proliferation of media 
technologies function by seeming, at every instance and in any decade, to obliterate our 
previous and ostensibly traditional ways of perceiving the world around us. 
Favret points out that Woolf parrots this view: in the nineteenth century, says 
Woolf, “Wars were then remote,” whereas, in 1940, “We turn on the wireless; we hear an 
airman telling us how this very afternoon he shot down a raider” (Woolf, The Moment 
130–131). Woolf claims that through media technologies like the newspaper and the 
radio, the everyday British citizen has lost their previous “immunity from war,” since war 
has now come knocking at their doors, translating through their walls to be voiced in their 
living rooms by radio speakers. In this view, media technologies collapse the distance 
from war that is necessary to be immunized, as it were, from the experience and effects of 
war violence. Favret instead suggests that much of Woolf’s ‘immediate’ (unmediated?) 
experience of war still comes second hand, not altogether unlike the ways that 
information would disseminate in the supposedly traditional nineteenth century: 
The media for broadcasting war had changed, but did they truly offer greater 
immediacy? Their affective force may be markedly different from earlier modes 
of communication, but was that force necessarily stronger? By what measure? Do 
feelings, like weapons and communications technology, become more powerful 




Favret leaves us with an open paradox: at every age, media technologies seem to bring 
war more and more immediate, utterly transforming (and devastating) a traditional world 
that we can no longer inherit. However, media technologies operate counterintuitively by 
mediating, or managing, that proximity between the viewer and the subject: what is 
seemingly made close has at one time been recreated as an object and has at another been 
transformed into a spectacle under the media gaze. What is more, the ways in which each 
new age in media seems to storm in like an apocalypse, the “end of a world,” mirrors the 
concept of “total war” or “absolute war” that Virilio takes up from Carl von Clausewitz. 
Favret notes that what is most curious about “total war,” or a war that can only end in the 
total annihilation of one side or the other, is that each war declares itself in those same 
rhetorical terms: “Ironically, this reorientation [of ‘war’ into ‘total war’] dissolves any 
war into the one War, so that the war to end all wars never, in fact, ends” (43). Thus, as 
each new war comes to signify an unprecedented intensification of violence, and thus 
obliterates both the past, as a quaint time when wars were not so violent and not so 
absolute, and the future, which is now unrecognizably transformed and in peril, so too 
does each new media age follow the same rhetorical structure. Perhaps what is more true 
of postmodern media and postmodern war is not the peculiarity of their reach or their 
brutality, but their way of abstracting the present from history in order to render history 
quaint and inadmissible. How can one be haunted by a past that exists only in a different 
world, one that has been annihilated by each new era? Virilio provides a possible answer 
here, where war and media meet in what he calls “impure war” (9), an extension beyond 
total war where war is waged “asymmetrically” between traditional armies and 




grand spectacle, war becomes embedded in the structures of our everyday lives, from the 
subway to the airport to the television, and war itself becomes a battle for information, 
grenades and guns exchanged for media technologies (Virilio 195). The new total, or 
“impure,” war is a diminutive war that renders itself barely visible and is certainly 
clouded by the lights and noises of media. 
 I do, however, engage reluctantly with Clausewitz, Virilio, and even Favret on the 
metaphysics of war in fear that such a discourse can itself make violence into the 
spectacular and formal ‘War’ proper. Rhetorically, the metaphysics of war can dominate 
the field of response in a way that repeats the very erasures which violence already 
performs on those who are subjected to, but who do not participate in, war, or on those 
adjacent to war, or who overhear it from, say, an island off the coast of British Columbia. 
Part of the aim of the analyses in these chapters is to recover a diminutive or adjacent 
response to violence, an affect of or engagement with violence that avoids making war a 
spectacle or repeating the now-trite criticisms to which we have become inoculated: ‘the 
horrors of war,’ ‘the brutalities of war,’ ‘war is hell,’ and so on. It was once hoped that 
the first-hand Great War poetry of people like Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen could 
make the so-called ‘horrors of war’ tangible and immediate beyond carefully managed 
media images in order to put the public off of the industry of violence once and for all. 
Yet, counterintuitively, and much like the proliferation of Hollywood war films (François 
Truffaut’s alleged pessimistic statement about the oxymoron of the ‘anti-war film’ comes 
to mind), the ‘horrors of war,’ as rendered in War Poetry proper, come to signify the 
terrible spectacle of war and the limitless pathos that we owe to victim-combatants. The 




as the metaphysics of war dominate utterly the conditions of our engagement with 
violence and hurt. 
 So, this thesis has looked not at traditional “war poets,” but at two poets with a 
particular sensitivity to diminutive forms of hurt, two poets who themselves reluctantly 
peer out at the global spectacle of war from perspectives typically outside the focus of 
war but that are nevertheless intimately tangled in its consequences. At the same time, 
this dissertation takes seriously the gendered demarcations of war, which Woolf expresses 
as “an outlet for manly qualities, without which men would deteriorate” (7). Since she 
does go on to say that someone like Wilfred Owen seems not to engage in war as an 
extension of masculinity, we are left to speculate whether she might consider Owen to be 
practicing another version of masculinity (likely) or whether his position would embody 
something outside of masculinity altogether (doubtful). Still, and this is crucial to Woolf’s 
rejection of being asked by a man, “How in your opinion are we to prevent war,” the 
prosecution of war, its criticisms, its rallying cries, and the mad dash to prevent its 
occurrence, all are functions of a singular political sphere dominated by men from which 
women were excluded. Thus, more than half a century later, Kalí Tal in Worlds of Hurt 
picks up on this point, demonstrating that sexual abuse narratives and war traumas, 
especially suffered by those whose experiences are not sublimated to the status of 
sacrificial heroes, that is, not victim-combatants, should both be considered as instances 
of gendered violence (68–69, 156–60). 
Tal’s study convincingly demonstrates that women’s experience of violence is not 
secondary or coincidental to war, represented by the prototypical figure of the male 




However, Tal, Favret, and other recent feminist theorists of war do not, I think, represent 
a critical turn in trauma, war, or media studies toward gender as a primary referent. 
Rather, the history of women’s writing about war in English—which, curiously enough, 
has also always been about media—from Woolf to Webb to Marlatt shows us that no 
viable apprehension of war violence is possible without the lens of gender analysis. A 
poet’s sensitivity, it seems, is necessary to cultivate a fragile, intimate register of care in 
the face of the deadening effects of global war. Phyllis Webb’s and Daphne Marlatt’s 
complex navigations of gendered social institutions and gendered historical narratives, as 
well as a growing sense of queer feminism particularly in Marlatt’s later work, give us 
insight into a marginalized perspective on global violence. Their negotiations of distance, 
intimacy, and perception both provide an antidote for, and are nevertheless entangled 
within, the brutal spectacles, the quick atrocities, and the inuring effects of media 
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